Arthur Lloyd Hamilton

The plaintiffs sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent an arbitrator from hearing and deciding a challenge to his own jurisdiction until the court determined the plaintiffs' cross-motion to set aside the arbitration agreement.

The plaintiffs had sold two corporations to the defendant for $40 million under a share purchase agreement containing an arbitration clause.

After the transaction closed, disputes arose regarding alleged breaches of warranties and post-closing adjustments.

The plaintiffs subsequently commenced a court action and challenged the arbitrator's jurisdiction in the arbitration proceedings.

The court dismissed the motion for an injunction, finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the first two prongs of the RJR-MacDonald test: there was no serious question to be tried, and no irreparable harm would result from allowing the arbitration to proceed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal from the motion judge’s order dismissing an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the expression at issue—a private comment between spouses—did not relate to a matter of public interest.

The court also denied leave to appeal the motion judge’s costs order, upholding the finding that the self-represented respondent had not established a basis for costs.

The decision affirms the high threshold for overturning discretionary costs decisions and clarifies the application of the public interest requirement in anti-SLAPP proceedings.

The applicants, Toronto District School Board and Simcoe County District School Board, sought leave to appeal an arbitration decision that dismissed their claim for a share of a guarantee fund upon terminating their membership in the Ontario School Boards’ Insurance Exchange (OSBIE).

The court granted leave to appeal, determining that the interpretation of the standard form Reciprocal Insurance Exchange Agreement constituted a question of law, which is subject to correctness review and of precedential value, thus satisfying the criteria for granting leave under the Arbitration Act.

The plaintiffs, Resolute Forest Products Inc. and its affiliates, brought a motion seeking an order to waive the deemed undertaking rule under Rule 30.1.01(8) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

They sought to use discovery evidence, including documents, from the Ontario action in a related defamation and intentional interference with economic relations action commenced in the United States District Court of the Northern District of California.

The defendants, Greenpeace Canada and its employees, opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Resolute failed to demonstrate a superior public interest that would outweigh the privacy protections of the deemed undertaking rule.

The court noted that the parties and issues in the Canadian and US actions were not sufficiently similar to warrant a waiver, and that Rule 30.1.01(6) already permits the use of discovery evidence for impeachment in another proceeding, including foreign ones.

The court also found that Resolute was not sufficiently particular about what specific evidence was required.

This appeal concerned proposed class actions against auto insurers for improperly deducting HST from statutory accident benefits (SABs) and against the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) for alleged regulatory failures.

The motion judge had dismissed claims against insurers due to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) under s. 280 of the Insurance Act, but allowed claims against FSCO to proceed.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming the LAT's exclusive jurisdiction over SAB disputes and affirming the court's jurisdiction over tort claims against the regulator.

The court also refused leave to appeal the motion judge's costs order, finding it within his discretion.

The applicant sought an urgent order to be certified as a candidate for the Conservative Party of Canada's National Council election after the returning officer refused her candidacy due to old social media posts.

The court found it had jurisdiction to intervene in the rules of an unincorporated political association where a significant contractual right was breached.

It held that the returning officer acted beyond his authority by imposing additional criteria not found in the party's rules, which explicitly stated that eligible candidates "shall be certified." The court granted the application, ordering the applicant's name to be added to the ballot.

BSMW Financial Inc. moved to convert an application brought by Triumph Capital Limited into an action, and sought alternate relief to strike certain paragraphs of Triumph's affidavit.

The court considered factors for converting an application to an action, including material facts in dispute, complex issues, need for discovery, and impact of relief.

Finding significant material facts in dispute, issues beyond document interpretation, and credibility concerns requiring viva voce evidence, the court granted the motion to convert Triumph's application into an action.

BSMW's cross-application was also converted to an action to be heard concurrently due to intermingled and interdependent issues.

Aviva Canada Inc. brought a motion for directions regarding the timing of its answers to undertakings, seeking to defer disclosure until the defendants, Hubio Solutions Inc. and Ingenie (Canada) Inc., provided their answers to questions ordered answered.

Aviva alleged that Hubio had taken an obstructionist approach during discovery and that there was a significant risk of Hubio tailoring its evidence if Aviva disclosed first.

The Master found a significant overlap in the information sought by both parties concerning pre-agreement representations and accepted the risk of tailoring.

The Master also criticized Hubio's conduct during discovery and its delay in contacting former employees.

The motion was granted in part, allowing Aviva to defer answers to undertakings related to pre-agreement meetings and discussions until Hubio provided its ordered answers, with a simultaneous exchange date set.

Other undertakings were to be answered forthwith.

Loan Away Inc. sought an interlocutory injunction against Western Life Assurance Company to compel payments and prevent termination of insurance policies, and also sought to amend its statement of claim to add IWS Creditor Group Inc. and consolidate arbitrations.

Western Life Assurance Company brought a cross-motion to stay the action based on an arbitration clause.

The court dismissed Loan Away's request for an interlocutory injunction due to lack of an undertaking as to damages and failure to meet the strong prima facie case and irreparable harm tests for a mandatory injunction.

The court granted Western's motion to stay the action and refer the issues to arbitration, including the arbitrator's jurisdiction over a permanent injunction.

Loan Away's request to consolidate arbitrations was denied due to lack of consent from all parties, and its motion to add IWS as a party was also denied as no tenable cause of action was pleaded against IWS.

This is a costs decision on appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The appellants appealed the decision of Justice Fred Myers dated April 12, 2017.

The Court of Appeal reviewed written submissions on costs and determined that the appellants must pay the respondent's costs in the fixed amount of $30,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The respondent appealed a Superior Court judgment that granted the applicant's application to enforce her rights under a Governance Agreement concerning the replacement of Board members of Spectrum Health Care.

The appellants argued the application judge erred in interpreting the contract, should have stayed the application pursuant to an arbitration clause in the shareholders' agreement, and erred in alternative findings regarding oppression remedy and interim injunction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation of the Governance Agreement or his analysis of the alternate remedies.

Lori Lord sought to enforce a Governance Agreement or, alternatively, relief under the oppression remedy against Clearspring Spectrum Holdings L.P. and Clearspring Capital Partners (US) II L.P. The respondents sought to stay the application pending arbitration.

The court found Ms. Lord was not a party to any arbitration agreement and could not be compelled to arbitrate.

The court held that Clearspring was in breach of the Governance Agreement, which was enforceable and not in conflict with the shareholders' agreement.

Alternatively, Ms. Lord's reasonable expectations were unfairly prejudiced, warranting an oppression remedy.

The application was granted, enforcing the Governance Agreement.