Arthur Lloyd Hamilton

The moving parties (the Donato Parties) sought an order enforcing an arbitrator's confidentiality decision and sealing the arbitral award so it would not form part of the public record in the appeal proceedings.

The court applied the Sierra Club test for confidentiality orders and found that the moving parties failed to establish a serious risk to an important commercial interest that required protection.

The court held that the general public interest in encouraging private arbitration does not automatically justify a sealing order when an arbitral award is appealed to the court.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant appealed an arbitrator's decision granting a confidentiality order and permanent injunction against the applicant and its counsel for publishing a press release linking to an arbitral award.

The court determined the standard of review was reasonableness.

The court found the arbitrator did not err in interpreting the arbitration agreement's confidentiality provisions, in excluding certain extrinsic evidence, in finding a breach of confidentiality, or in granting a permanent injunction.

The appeal was dismissed.

Lori Lord sought to enforce a Governance Agreement or, alternatively, relief under the oppression remedy against Clearspring Spectrum Holdings L.P. and Clearspring Capital Partners (US) II L.P. The respondents sought to stay the application pending arbitration.

The court found Ms. Lord was not a party to any arbitration agreement and could not be compelled to arbitrate.

The court held that Clearspring was in breach of the Governance Agreement, which was enforceable and not in conflict with the shareholders' agreement.

Alternatively, Ms. Lord's reasonable expectations were unfairly prejudiced, warranting an oppression remedy.

The application was granted, enforcing the Governance Agreement.

The plaintiffs sued Greenpeace Canada for defamation and intentional interference with economic relations regarding statements about the plaintiffs' logging activities.

In its statement of defence, Greenpeace pleaded qualified privilege and a moral duty to publish the statements.

In reply, the plaintiffs pleaded sweeping allegations about the historical conduct of international Greenpeace organizations.

Greenpeace appealed a motion judge's refusal to strike these portions of the reply.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and struck the impugned paragraphs, finding they would improperly expand the scope of the litigation into an inquiry of the entire global Greenpeace movement, causing prejudice that outweighed any probative value.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing their motion to strike portions of a reply in a defamation action.

The underlying action alleged defamatory statements and economic interference arising from publications about forestry practices in the Canadian boreal forest.

The reply pleading introduced allegations concerning a decades-long history of alleged unlawful campaigns by environmental organizations unrelated to the pleaded claim.

The court held there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge’s order permitting the expanded reply because it risked significantly broadening the scope of the litigation beyond the pleaded dispute.

Leave to appeal was granted given the importance of defining the permissible scope of reply pleadings and the risk of prejudice, delay, and unnecessary litigation costs.

The defendants brought a motion to strike several paragraphs of the plaintiffs' Reply under Rule 25.11, arguing they were irrelevant, scandalous, and would prejudice the fair trial.

The plaintiffs also sought leave to amend their Reply to add a new paragraph.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding that the impugned paragraphs were a proper response to the defendants' pleading of a 'moral and social duty' and 'public interest' in their Statement of Defence.

The court also granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their Reply, finding no prejudice to the defendants.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to strike the respondents' claim for intentional interference with economic relations.

The appellants argued the claim lacked sufficient particulars regarding unlawful conduct, actionable conduct against third parties, and damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the statement of claim and amended particulars provided sufficient material facts to allow the appellants to respond, and that the pleading adequately disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

The defendants brought a Rule 21.01(1)(b) motion to strike portions of the statement of claim alleging intentional interference with economic relations in a defamation action.

They argued the plaintiffs failed to plead the constituent elements of the tort, including unlawful means directed at a third party and resulting economic loss.

The court held that the pleadings, read generously and together with the particulars provided, sufficiently alleged the elements of the tort, including allegations of intimidation and pressure directed at customers.

It was not plain and obvious that the claim would fail.

The motion to strike was therefore dismissed.

Following a trial judgment awarding over $16 million to the plaintiff in a commercial dispute, the court determined the appropriate costs award and prejudgment interest.

The court held that although the plaintiff’s Rule 49 offer was served slightly outside the formal timing requirements, it could still be considered under Rules 57.01 and 49.13.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded from the date of the settlement offer and for work responding to a serious trading‑manipulation allegation later abandoned by the defendant.

However, the court found the plaintiff’s claimed hours excessive and reduced the requested fees.

The court fixed total fees at $1,400,000 inclusive of taxes, allowed disbursements of $191,813, and awarded prejudgment interest at the statutory rate from the date the cause of action arose.

The plaintiff, a junior oil and gas exploration company, sued the defendant underwriter for breach of a 'bought deal' engagement letter.

The defendant failed to close the transaction, arguing the letter was merely an agreement to agree and relying on 'out clauses' due to a drop in oil prices.

The court found the engagement letter was a binding contract and that the defendant could not rely on the out clauses, as it had not negotiated an underwriting agreement and the drop in oil prices did not constitute a material adverse change or disaster.

The plaintiff was awarded over $16 million in damages, representing the difference between the contract price and the replacement financing price, plus interim loan costs.

During the first week of trial, the defendant moved to amend its statement of defence and counterclaim to add new factual allegations and a mitigation defence relating to transactions undertaken by the plaintiff after the alleged breach of a share purchase agreement.

The court considered whether the proposed amendments disclosed a tenable defence, including arguments that damages should be assessed at the date of trial due to the plaintiff’s claim for specific performance and that subsequent transactions mitigated any losses.

The court held that damages for breach of contract would normally be assessed at the date of breach and that the proposed allegations concerning the plaintiff’s later transactions were irrelevant to the proper measure of damages.

The proposed amendments concerning the Red Willow transaction and complete mitigation did not raise a tenable defence and were refused.

The Chief Electoral Officer appealed a decision allowing the Conservative Fund Canada to amend its 2004 and 2006 election expenses returns to reflect GST rebates received under the Excise Tax Act.

The Fund argued that the Canada Elections Act required election expenses to be reported in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), meaning expenses should be reported net of GST rebates.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the plain wording of the Canada Elections Act does not require general election expenses to be reported in accordance with GAAP.

The Court found this interpretation consistent with Parliament's intent to maintain a level political playing field through equal spending limits.

The respondents (defendants) moved for security for costs of an appeal and the proceeding below.

The appellants (plaintiffs) are foreign residents with no assets in Ontario, have unpaid costs from the lower court, and are pursuing parallel proceedings in other jurisdictions.

The court granted the motion, ordering the appellants to post security for costs totaling $191,980.59 before taking any further steps in the appeal.

During a hearing to review a decision of the Toronto Stock Exchange regarding HudBay Minerals Inc.'s proposed acquisition of Lundin Mining Corporation, HudBay and Lundin requested confidentiality orders for certain documents filed in evidence.

The Ontario Securities Commission considered the open court principle and the test for confidentiality under section 9(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and the Supreme Court's decision in Sierra Club.

The Commission granted confidentiality for documents that were not relevant to its decision on the merits, including handwritten notes and a financial presentation.

However, it ordered that relevant documents, such as special committee minutes and an engagement letter, be made public, subject to minor redactions for third-party sensitive information.

The appellant appealed an order converting an application into a trial.

The Court of Appeal raised the issue of whether the order was interlocutory, which would deprive the court of jurisdiction.

The appellant argued the order was final because it was against a non-party and ended a summary procedure.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding the order was only against the appellant and simply converted the application into a trial within the same court.

The appeal was quashed as the order was interlocutory.

The appellant company appealed an order declaring it in breach of a redemption obligation and entitling the respondent to immediate redemption of his preference shares for $1,600,000.

The appellant had refused to pay quarterly dividends to the respondent despite having the funds, suspecting the respondent of breaching non-compete obligations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's finding that the failure to pay dividends constituted a default under the Shareholders' Agreement, triggering the respondent's unconditional right to redeem his shares.

The court rejected the appellant's argument that the default provision only applied when the company lacked funds.