Paul Harte

The appellants, pediatric neurologists, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for medical negligence in their treatment of an infant with a rare seizure disorder.

The trial judge found that the appellants breached the standard of care by prematurely concluding that a pyridoxine trial was ineffective and failing to reintroduce it when seizures returned.

The trial judge also found a breach of the duty to obtain informed consent for failing to disclose the pyridoxine trial to the parents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings on the standard of care were grounded in expert evidence, the failure to disclose a reasonable alternative treatment constituted a breach of informed consent, and the causation finding was supported by a commonsense approach to the evidence.

The appellant physician appealed a trial judgment finding her liable for the respondent's catastrophic brain injury following an acute asthmatic attack.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the standard of care by delaying intubation and failing to call for help sooner.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge improperly relied on a critical care note containing double hearsay and opinion evidence regarding the respondent's hypoxemia, and erred in his causation analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding the note was admissible under the business records exception and as a party admission, and that the trial judge's causation findings were supported by the expert evidence.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against two pediatric neurologists for their treatment of an infant's intractable seizures in 2003.

The infant suffered from a rare condition, pyridoxine-dependent epilepsy (PDE).

The court found that the defendants breached the standard of care by setting an insufficient observation period during a pyridoxine empirical trial, improperly concluding the treatment was ineffective, and failing to reconsider pyridoxine when seizures returned.

The court also found the defendants breached their duty to obtain informed consent by failing to advise the parents of the trial and alternative treatment options.

The court concluded these breaches caused or contributed to the infant's severe intellectual and developmental delay.

The plaintiff suffered a severe asthma attack and was admitted to the hospital.

The defendant internist assumed care but failed to promptly consult an intensive care specialist or arrange for timely intubation by an experienced clinician.

The plaintiff was eventually intubated by a respiratory therapist after multiple attempts and suffered a hypoxic brain injury, rendering her an incomplete quadriplegic.

The court found the defendant breached the standard of care by failing to consult a specialist sooner, delaying the decision to intubate, and failing to ensure the most experienced clinician performed the procedure.

The court also found that these breaches caused the plaintiff's brain injury.

Judgment was granted for the plaintiffs.

This decision addresses an evidentiary dispute during a trial regarding the admissibility of post-assessment medical reports through a defendant fact witness, Dr. McPherson.

The defendants sought to introduce reports created after Dr. McPherson's last assessment of the plaintiff, Jeremy Veran, to demonstrate improvement in symptoms.

The plaintiffs objected, arguing Dr. McPherson had not seen these documents and was not an expert witness.

The court ruled that documents not seen or received by Dr. McPherson, and not directly relevant to his care of the plaintiff, could not be introduced through him as a fact witness, even if they were part of the joint book of documents.

The defendants brought a motion to address two issues: the admissibility of opinions in two plaintiff expert reports (Miyanji and Levin) and the admissibility of evidence from five lay witnesses.

The court ruled that portions of the Miyanji and Levin reports that did not respond to specific "Defence Expert Reports" or introduced new standard of care issues were inadmissible due to late service and lack of reasonable explanation.

The motion to exclude the lay witnesses was dismissed as premature, with the court stating that the admissibility of their evidence, particularly any opinion evidence, should be assessed at the time it is tendered at trial.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action.

The trial judge found that the respondent breached the standard of care by discharging the appellant without reviewing an MRA, but concluded that this negligence did not cause the appellant's second, severe stroke.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the admission of expert evidence and agreeing that the appellants failed to establish a prima facie case on causation, as the evidence did not show that treatment with Heparin would have been more effective than Aspirin in preventing the second stroke.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking several orders before trial, including dismissal of claims against certain defendants, leave to amend their statement of claim, preliminary determination of jury questions, and exclusion of expert evidence.

The court granted the dismissal of claims against the "Released Defendants" without costs, as it was previously agreed upon.

Leave was granted to file a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, as the proposed amendments were extensive and did not remove admissions.

The court also determined the format for jury questions, largely adopting the plaintiffs' approach for damages and requiring explanations for answers, emphasizing standard of care and "but for" causation.

The issue of expert evidence was adjourned to a later date.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to preclude the defendants from introducing evidence from fifteen expert reports served late in a medical malpractice action.

The court considered the admissibility under Rule 53.08, assessing whether there was a reasonable explanation for the late service and if granting leave would cause irreparable prejudice or undue delay.

The court allowed some reports as supplementary or responding reports, finding a general reasonable explanation for delay due to discovery issues and prior party understanding.

However, it excluded a vocational report that introduced new scenarios without prior notice and a neuropsychological report, reiterating a previous ruling that no neuropsychological impairment issue was pleaded or supported by evidence, and its introduction would cause significant prejudice and necessitate trial adjournment.

The defendants (appellants) brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of W.D. Newton J. dated August 28, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As the plaintiffs (respondents) did not file a Bill of Costs, the court made no order as to costs.

The plaintiff suffered a life-altering stroke and sued the defendant physician for medical malpractice.

The defendant admitted to breaching the standard of care by failing to review a critical imaging report before discharging the plaintiff, which delayed the diagnosis of a vertebral artery dissection.

The sole issue at trial was causation: whether the delayed administration of anticoagulant therapy (Heparin) caused the plaintiff's second stroke.

After weighing competing expert medical evidence, the court found that while the defendant's negligence delayed the administration of Heparin, the plaintiffs failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that earlier treatment would have prevented the second stroke.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff suffered a fractured femur and a pulseless leg following a motorcycle accident.

He was treated in the emergency room by the defendant physician, who failed to urgently transfer him to a trauma centre or communicate the pulseless nature of the limb to the trauma team leader.

Due to the delay in transfer, the plaintiff's leg became unsalvageable and was amputated.

The court found the defendant physician breached the standard of care and that this breach caused the amputation.

The court awarded the agreed-upon damages without deduction for statutory accident benefits or OHIP subrogated claims.

This is an appeal in a class action concerning an infectious disease outbreak at a pain care centre.

The appellant, Dr. Stephen James, challenged the trial judge's findings of negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and the application of the limitation period, as well as the award of punitive damages and costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's conclusions that Dr. James breached the standard of care by failing to consistently use aseptic technique and to report/investigate infections.

The court affirmed the use of statistical evidence to establish a rebuttable presumption of causation for the class, and found no error in the breach of fiduciary duty or the appropriateness of punitive damages.

The appeal on costs, including the order for Dr. James to pay the successful co-defendant nurses' costs, was also dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against a pathologist for failing to diagnose appendiceal cancer from an appendectomy specimen in 2011.

The patient was later diagnosed with stage IV cancer in 2015 and died in 2016.

The court found that the pathologist breached the standard of care, as the cancer was obvious and should have been identified.

The court also found that but for the delayed diagnosis, the patient would likely have been cured with standard treatment.

The court awarded pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages to the estate and family members.

The plaintiff physician brought an action against the defendant hospital and individuals for damages arising from a de facto suspension of his hospital privileges and alleged breach of a prior settlement agreement.

The defendants moved to strike the claim for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the plaintiff had not exhausted his remedies under the Public Hospitals Act (PHA), and on grounds of res judicata and abuse of process.

The court found that while the action was premature because the plaintiff had not exhausted his PHA remedies regarding the de facto suspension, the appropriate remedy was to stay the action rather than strike it.

The court dismissed the defendants' arguments on res judicata and abuse of process, but struck certain paragraphs of the statement of claim that made unfounded attacks on the hospital's legal counsel, with leave to amend.

Following a five-week common issues trial in a medical malpractice class action, the plaintiff was entirely successful against the main defendant doctor.

The doctor had crossclaimed against several nurse defendants, but those claims were entirely unsuccessful.

The court ordered the doctor to pay the plaintiff's agreed-upon costs within 30 days, rejecting his argument to defer payment until individual trials were completed.

The court also made a Sanderson/Bullock order, requiring the doctor to pay the costs of the successful nurse defendants on a partial indemnity scale up to the date of their offers to settle, and on a substantial indemnity scale thereafter.

The plaintiff brought a class action against an anesthesiologist, a pain clinic, and its nursing staff following an outbreak of bacterial meningitis and epidural abscesses among patients who received epidural injections.

The court found that the anesthesiologist breached the standard of care and his fiduciary duties by failing to use proper aseptic techniques, failing to report and investigate infections, and misinforming patients about the risks.

The court drew an inference of causation linking the anesthesiologist's substandard infection prevention and control practices to the patients' infections.

The claims against the nursing staff were dismissed as there was no evidence they breached the standard of care.

The court also found the anesthesiologist's conduct warranted punitive damages.

This appeal concerned proposed class actions against auto insurers for improperly deducting HST from statutory accident benefits (SABs) and against the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) for alleged regulatory failures.

The motion judge had dismissed claims against insurers due to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) under s. 280 of the Insurance Act, but allowed claims against FSCO to proceed.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming the LAT's exclusive jurisdiction over SAB disputes and affirming the court's jurisdiction over tort claims against the regulator.

The court also refused leave to appeal the motion judge's costs order, finding it within his discretion.

The Plaintiff brought a motion for directions regarding the continuation of the cross-examination of a Defendant, Dr. Fenton, on his affidavits.

The cross-examination was terminated by the Plaintiff due to alleged persistent interruptions and interference by Defence counsel.

The Plaintiff sought orders for Dr. Fenton to re-attend, for the examination to be video-recorded, and for specific rules of conduct for Defence counsel, along with costs.

The Defendants argued the cross-examination was properly ended and sought costs.

The court found Defence counsel's repetitive commentary obstructive, justifying the termination.

It ordered the continuation of the cross-examination with strict rules for counsel's objections and awarded costs to the Plaintiff.

However, the request for video recording was denied, as it is an exception under the Rules of Civil Procedure and not justified by the circumstances.

The plaintiff underwent bariatric surgery performed by the defendant.

The defendant took down a prior fundoplication without the plaintiff's informed consent, causing severe acid reflux that ultimately required the removal of the plaintiff's stomach.

The court found the defendant breached the standard of care by performing a contraindicated surgery without adequate experience and without obtaining informed consent.

The limitation period defence failed as the plaintiff only discovered the cause of her injuries later.

The court awarded general damages and Family Law Act damages to the plaintiffs.