Stephen W. Ronan

The appellant physician appealed a trial judgment finding her liable for the respondent's catastrophic brain injury following an acute asthmatic attack.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the standard of care by delaying intubation and failing to call for help sooner.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge improperly relied on a critical care note containing double hearsay and opinion evidence regarding the respondent's hypoxemia, and erred in his causation analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding the note was admissible under the business records exception and as a party admission, and that the trial judge's causation findings were supported by the expert evidence.

The plaintiff suffered a severe asthma attack and was admitted to the hospital.

The defendant internist assumed care but failed to promptly consult an intensive care specialist or arrange for timely intubation by an experienced clinician.

The plaintiff was eventually intubated by a respiratory therapist after multiple attempts and suffered a hypoxic brain injury, rendering her an incomplete quadriplegic.

The court found the defendant breached the standard of care by failing to consult a specialist sooner, delaying the decision to intubate, and failing to ensure the most experienced clinician performed the procedure.

The court also found that these breaches caused the plaintiff's brain injury.

Judgment was granted for the plaintiffs.

The moving parties sought to review and set aside a chambers judge's order that dismissed their motion for an extension of time to review a previous order.

This previous order had also dismissed a motion for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal an action that was originally dismissed for delay.

The Court of Appeal, applying the standard of review for a panel review of a chambers judge's decision under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act, found no legal error or misapprehension of evidence by the chambers judge.

The court concluded that the request for an extension of time was properly denied at each stage and dismissed the motion.

In a medical malpractice action, the plaintiffs brought a motion seeking production of the instructing letter and communications between defence counsel and their expert witness.

The plaintiffs argued that a factual assumption the expert was asked to make regarding the onset time of the deceased's chest pain contradicted the defendant doctor's discovery evidence, suggesting improper coaching.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence to support a reasonable suspicion that counsel improperly influenced the expert, and held that litigation privilege continued to protect the communications.

The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against two radiologists for failing to detect a lung lesion on three chest x-rays taken between April 2012 and June 2013.

The court found that both radiologists breached the standard of care by failing to identify the abnormality.

On causation, the court held that 'but for' the first radiologist's failure to detect the lesion in April 2012, the plaintiff would not have required adjuvant chemotherapy, suffered a recurrence of his lung cancer, or experienced the associated psychological harm.

However, the court found that the second radiologist's failure to detect the lesion in October 2012 did not cause the plaintiff's outcome, as the cancer had already progressed to a stage requiring the same treatment.

The first radiologist was found liable for the agreed-upon damages, and the action against the second radiologist was dismissed.

The appellants sought an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision that upheld the dismissal of their action for delay.

The Court of Appeal applied the "justice of the case" test, considering the appellants' intention to appeal, the length and explanation for delay, prejudice to respondents, and the merits of the proposed appeal.

The court found that the appellants did not provide sufficient evidence for their delay or health claims, and critically, the proposed appeal did not raise an arguable question of law or public importance.

Consequently, the motion for an extension of time was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision refusing to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing their medical negligence action for delay.

The action was dismissed in 2013, but the appellants did not learn of this until 2019 due to their former lawyer's conduct.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's decision, finding no error in the application of the Reid test.

The Master reasonably concluded that the defendants' interest in finality after a six-year delay outweighed the appellants' interest in a hearing on the merits, particularly given the appellants' potential claim against their former lawyer.

The plaintiff, who suffered a perforated duodenum during an ERCP procedure, brought a motion to substitute the names of six specific physicians for the pseudonym 'Dr. Doe' in her statement of claim.

The court allowed the motion for five of the physicians, finding that the original pleading sufficiently pointed the 'litigation finger' at them based on the specific roles and acts of negligence described.

The motion was denied for the emergency room physician, as the original claim lacked specific allegations directing the litigation finger at him.

The defendant doctors brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss a medical malpractice action on the basis that it was statute-barred.

The plaintiff had a plastic bulb syringe left in her vagina following a hysterectomy in November 2009, which was discovered and removed shortly thereafter.

The plaintiff did not commence the action until April 2015, arguing she did not know she had a cause of action until consulting counsel in 2013.

The court found that the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the material facts giving rise to the claim by December 2009 at the latest.

The motion was granted and the action against the defendant doctors was dismissed.

The plaintiff successfully defended a summary judgment motion brought by the City of Barrie, which sought to dismiss the claim due to late notice under the Municipal Act.

In this costs endorsement, the court considered the plaintiff's request for partial indemnity costs and the City's submission to reserve costs to the trial judge.

Citing the principle that costs may be reserved when issues raised on the motion remain live, the court found it just to reserve the costs of the motion to the trial judge, as the issue of prejudice to the City from late notice still needed to be determined at trial.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the action against them, the moving defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff did not provide costs submissions despite an extension of time.

The court noted the action had languished for years with little steps taken by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff had rejected without-costs settlement offers.

Applying the Rule 57.01 factors and the principle of reasonableness, the court awarded the moving defendants $25,000 in all-inclusive costs.

The appellant contractor scratched approximately 180 windows while performing cleaning services at a newly constructed commercial building and reimbursed the building owner about $134,000 for the damage.

It sought indemnification under its commercial general liability policy, but the insurer denied coverage relying on “your work” exclusions.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action.

The Court of Appeal held that the occurrence causing the property damage was the scratching of the windows during the cleaning operation and that the damage arose out of the insured’s work.

Because the property damage fell squarely within the policy’s exclusions, coverage was properly denied and the appeal was dismissed.

In a proposed class action regarding youth detention centres, the plaintiff sued the Crown for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and Charter violations, explicitly limiting the claim to the Crown's several liability.

The Crown issued third party claims against the NGOs that operated some of the centres.

The plaintiff and the NGOs moved to strike the third party claims.

The court granted the motions, applying the principle that where a plaintiff limits their claim to the defendant's proportionate degree of fault, a third party claim for contribution and indemnity is legally untenable.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his medical malpractice action against his former family doctor.

The appellant alleged the doctor negligently removed surgical staples from his knee, causing permanent injury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the action was statute-barred, as the appellant knew of the material facts giving rise to the claim more than two years before commencing the action.

The Court also agreed that the claim required expert medical evidence, as it was not one of the clearest of cases where such evidence could be dispensed with.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following the granting of summary judgment dismissing the action as statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, the defendant physician sought costs of both the summary judgment motion and the action.

The self‑represented plaintiff argued that no costs should be awarded and that he should instead be compensated for expenses incurred responding to the motion.

The court reaffirmed the principle that costs generally follow the event and applied the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Finding the defendant’s legal fees and disbursements reasonable, including discovery transcript expenses, the court fixed partial indemnity costs for both the motion and the action.

The defendant physician moved for summary judgment dismissing a medical malpractice action arising from the removal of surgical staples following knee surgery.

The plaintiff alleged the doctor negligently broke a staple during removal, causing pain and infection.

The court held the claim was discovered in 2011 when the plaintiff believed the procedure had been performed improperly and sought medical treatment, triggering the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

Because the action was commenced in October 2014, it was statute‑barred.

The court further held that the plaintiff’s failure to produce expert medical evidence on the standard of care and causation independently justified summary judgment.