Stephen W. Ronan

The appellant physician appealed a trial judgment finding her liable for the respondent's catastrophic brain injury following an acute asthmatic attack.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the standard of care by delaying intubation and failing to call for help sooner.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge improperly relied on a critical care note containing double hearsay and opinion evidence regarding the respondent's hypoxemia, and erred in his causation analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding the note was admissible under the business records exception and as a party admission, and that the trial judge's causation findings were supported by the expert evidence.

The plaintiff suffered a severe asthma attack and was admitted to the hospital.

The defendant internist assumed care but failed to promptly consult an intensive care specialist or arrange for timely intubation by an experienced clinician.

The plaintiff was eventually intubated by a respiratory therapist after multiple attempts and suffered a hypoxic brain injury, rendering her an incomplete quadriplegic.

The court found the defendant breached the standard of care by failing to consult a specialist sooner, delaying the decision to intubate, and failing to ensure the most experienced clinician performed the procedure.

The court also found that these breaches caused the plaintiff's brain injury.

Judgment was granted for the plaintiffs.

The moving parties sought to review and set aside a chambers judge's order that dismissed their motion for an extension of time to review a previous order.

This previous order had also dismissed a motion for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal an action that was originally dismissed for delay.

The Court of Appeal, applying the standard of review for a panel review of a chambers judge's decision under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act, found no legal error or misapprehension of evidence by the chambers judge.

The court concluded that the request for an extension of time was properly denied at each stage and dismissed the motion.

The appellants sought an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision that upheld the dismissal of their action for delay.

The Court of Appeal applied the "justice of the case" test, considering the appellants' intention to appeal, the length and explanation for delay, prejudice to respondents, and the merits of the proposed appeal.

The court found that the appellants did not provide sufficient evidence for their delay or health claims, and critically, the proposed appeal did not raise an arguable question of law or public importance.

Consequently, the motion for an extension of time was dismissed.

The plaintiff, who suffered a perforated duodenum during an ERCP procedure, brought a motion to substitute the names of six specific physicians for the pseudonym 'Dr. Doe' in her statement of claim.

The court allowed the motion for five of the physicians, finding that the original pleading sufficiently pointed the 'litigation finger' at them based on the specific roles and acts of negligence described.

The motion was denied for the emergency room physician, as the original claim lacked specific allegations directing the litigation finger at him.

The plaintiff successfully defended a summary judgment motion brought by the City of Barrie, which sought to dismiss the claim due to late notice under the Municipal Act.

In this costs endorsement, the court considered the plaintiff's request for partial indemnity costs and the City's submission to reserve costs to the trial judge.

Citing the principle that costs may be reserved when issues raised on the motion remain live, the court found it just to reserve the costs of the motion to the trial judge, as the issue of prejudice to the City from late notice still needed to be determined at trial.

The appellant contractor scratched approximately 180 windows while performing cleaning services at a newly constructed commercial building and reimbursed the building owner about $134,000 for the damage.

It sought indemnification under its commercial general liability policy, but the insurer denied coverage relying on “your work” exclusions.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action.

The Court of Appeal held that the occurrence causing the property damage was the scratching of the windows during the cleaning operation and that the damage arose out of the insured’s work.

Because the property damage fell squarely within the policy’s exclusions, coverage was properly denied and the appeal was dismissed.

Following the granting of summary judgment dismissing the action as statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, the defendant physician sought costs of both the summary judgment motion and the action.

The self‑represented plaintiff argued that no costs should be awarded and that he should instead be compensated for expenses incurred responding to the motion.

The court reaffirmed the principle that costs generally follow the event and applied the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Finding the defendant’s legal fees and disbursements reasonable, including discovery transcript expenses, the court fixed partial indemnity costs for both the motion and the action.

The defendant physician moved for summary judgment dismissing a medical malpractice action arising from the removal of surgical staples following knee surgery.

The plaintiff alleged the doctor negligently broke a staple during removal, causing pain and infection.

The court held the claim was discovered in 2011 when the plaintiff believed the procedure had been performed improperly and sought medical treatment, triggering the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

Because the action was commenced in October 2014, it was statute‑barred.

The court further held that the plaintiff’s failure to produce expert medical evidence on the standard of care and causation independently justified summary judgment.