Pino J. Cianfarani

The respondent suffered injuries after slipping and falling on ice in a parking lot while reaching for his vehicle's door handle.

He received statutory accident benefits (SABs) after a LAT adjudicator found the incident was an 'accident' under the SABs Schedule.

He subsequently sued the parking lot owner and winter maintenance provider for occupiers' liability.

The appellants moved to determine whether any damages awarded must be reduced by the SABs received under s. 267.8 of the Insurance Act, and whether OHIP's subrogated claim was barred under s. 30(5) of the Health Insurance Act.

The motion judge found the tort claim did not arise directly or indirectly from the use or operation of an automobile, meaning the statutory deductions and subrogation bars did not apply.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's substantive approach or her conclusion that the context and purpose of the LAT proceeding differed from the tort action, precluding abuse of process or issue estoppel.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action for damages arising from a trip and fall on a municipal sidewalk.

The trial judge had found the municipality was not liable under s. 44(3)(a) of the Municipal Act, 2001, as it did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to know about the state of repair.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to assess the adequacy of the inspections, failed to weigh business record evidence, and reversed the onus of proof.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the inspection adequacy, weighing of evidence, or application of the burden of proof.

The court considered costs submissions following the successful summary judgment motion of the defendants, Nancy Flagler-Wilburn and F.R. Jordan & Associates Appraisal and Management Services (1977) Inc. The plaintiff, Dennis Paul Rivest, accepted that costs were owed but argued for a significant reduction due to curative steps required by the defendants' failure to plead witness immunity.

The court found some merit in the plaintiff’s argument but rejected the 40% reduction estimate as unfounded.

Ultimately, the court fixed costs at $40,945.80, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and H.S.T., to be paid by the plaintiff within 30 days.

The Corporation of the Township of Augusta brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss a claim by residential landowners (plaintiffs) alleging the Township breached a duty of care and acted in bad faith regarding site plan approvals for an adjacent trucking terminal.

The plaintiffs contended the Township's decisions were operational, not policy, and demonstrated bad faith by approving a non-permitted use and later an expanded site plan despite ongoing nuisance complaints.

The court found the Township's decisions were policy decisions, protected by statutory and common law immunity, provided they were made in good faith.

The plaintiffs failed to meet the high burden of proving bad faith, which requires demonstrating arbitrary, capricious, dishonest, or ulterior motives, or actions so patently unreasonable as to exceed governmental discretion.

The court dismissed the claims against the Township, but noted the plaintiffs could still pursue claims against the trucking company for negligence and nuisance.

The plaintiff commenced an action against the automobile defendants for damages under the Family Law Act arising from a motor vehicle accident that injured his mother.

He also sued his mother's former lawyers in the alternative for failing to advance his claim in the original tort action.

The automobile defendants crossclaimed against the lawyer defendants for contribution and indemnity.

The plaintiff moved to discontinue his claim against the lawyer defendants, which was granted.

The lawyer defendants moved to strike the crossclaim.

The court struck the crossclaim without leave to amend, finding that the lawyer defendants and automobile defendants were not concurrent tortfeasors who caused the same damage, and therefore no right of contribution and indemnity existed under the Negligence Act.

This is an appeal of an arbitration decision concerning a priority dispute between two insurance companies, Intact and Gore Mutual, regarding statutory accident benefits for a claimant injured in an Alberta automobile accident.

The claimant, an Alberta resident, submitted an Ontario claim.

The arbitrator found Gore Mutual in greater priority under both Ontario and Alberta law and ordered reimbursement to Intact.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, finding the arbitrator's decision on Ontario law unreasonable because the claimant was not an "insured person" under Gore Mutual's Ontario policy.

The court also held that the arbitrator exceeded jurisdiction by determining priority under Alberta law and ordering reimbursement based on it, as the arbitration agreement was limited to Ontario legislation.

The appellant contractor scratched approximately 180 windows while performing cleaning services at a newly constructed commercial building and reimbursed the building owner about $134,000 for the damage.

It sought indemnification under its commercial general liability policy, but the insurer denied coverage relying on “your work” exclusions.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action.

The Court of Appeal held that the occurrence causing the property damage was the scratching of the windows during the cleaning operation and that the damage arose out of the insured’s work.

Because the property damage fell squarely within the policy’s exclusions, coverage was properly denied and the appeal was dismissed.

Following a summary judgment motion with divided success regarding unidentified motorist coverage, both parties sought costs.

The defendant was successful in dismissing the claim under the OPCF 44R endorsement, while the plaintiff successfully resisted the dismissal of the standard coverage claim under the OAP.

Considering the divided success and the factors under Rule 57.01, the court ordered that each party bear its own costs.

The insurer moved for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims for unidentified motorist coverage following a single‑vehicle collision where the plaintiff alleged she swerved to avoid an unknown vehicle.

The insurer argued there was no corroborative evidence required under the OPCF 44R Family Protection Endorsement and that the plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed entirely.

The court held that statements repeated by ambulance personnel, hospital staff, and police did not constitute independent witness evidence and that there was no physical evidence indicating the involvement of another vehicle.

Partial summary judgment was granted dismissing the plaintiff’s OPCF 44R claim for excess coverage.

However, the court found that the standard unidentified motorist coverage under the Ontario Automobile Policy did not require corroboration and that credibility issues regarding the alleged unidentified vehicle required a trial.

A former solicitor brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a professional negligence claim arising from an alleged failure to pursue statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff alleged the solicitor negligently failed to challenge the insurer’s termination of income replacement benefits within the two-year limitation period under the Insurance Act.

The court found the insurer had abandoned any limitation defence and that the benefits had not actually terminated during the solicitor’s retainer.

Claims relating to attendant care and housekeeping benefits were also untenable because the solicitor was retained more than 104 weeks after the accident, beyond the maximum eligibility period under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

In addition, the plaintiff had produced no expert evidence regarding the applicable standard of care for professional negligence.

The action against the solicitor was dismissed on summary judgment.

The applicant sought interim attendant care and housekeeping benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer opposed the motion, alleging the applicant's wife did not suffer an economic loss and raising late allegations of misrepresentation based on undisclosed surveillance evidence.

The arbitrator found the applicant established a prima facie case for interim benefits and refused to consider the ambush surveillance evidence.

However, because the applicant failed to attend a requested examination under oath, the arbitrator held that benefits were suspended under the Schedule.

The motion for interim benefits was denied and suspended pending compliance with the examination under oath.

The appellants owned a rental property that was destroyed in an explosion caused by a tenant unlawfully producing cannabis resin.

The respondent insurer denied the appellants' claim under their residential insurance policy, relying on an exclusion clause for dwellings used in the processing or manufacture of marijuana.

The trial judge dismissed the appellants' action to enforce the claim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the interpretation of the exclusion clause and concluding that the clause was neither unjust nor unreasonable.

The appellants, subcontractors on a school construction project, appealed a trial judgment limiting their construction lien recovery to the general contractor's 10 per cent statutory holdback.

The general contractor had posted a lien bond to vacate one of the liens before the primary subcontractor abandoned the project.

The appellants argued that posting security made the full bond amount available to all lien claimants in addition to the statutory holdback, relying on previous case law.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that posting security under section 44 of the Construction Lien Act does not enlarge a contractor's liability beyond the statutory holdback and proper set-offs.

The court explicitly rejected the prior ruling in Francon, confirming that a contractor's liability to lien claimants is restricted to the amount fixed by the Act.