J. Michael Hickey

The Corporation of the Township of Augusta brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss a claim by residential landowners (plaintiffs) alleging the Township breached a duty of care and acted in bad faith regarding site plan approvals for an adjacent trucking terminal.

The plaintiffs contended the Township's decisions were operational, not policy, and demonstrated bad faith by approving a non-permitted use and later an expanded site plan despite ongoing nuisance complaints.

The court found the Township's decisions were policy decisions, protected by statutory and common law immunity, provided they were made in good faith.

The plaintiffs failed to meet the high burden of proving bad faith, which requires demonstrating arbitrary, capricious, dishonest, or ulterior motives, or actions so patently unreasonable as to exceed governmental discretion.

The court dismissed the claims against the Township, but noted the plaintiffs could still pursue claims against the trucking company for negligence and nuisance.

The applicant sought a declaration regarding the continued validity and use of a registered right of way over the respondents' properties.

The respondents argued the right of way was extinguished or abandoned due to the construction of an alternate public road, abuse of right, or implied release, and sought to modify or extinguish it.

The court found the right of way remained in full force and effect, rejecting the respondents' arguments for extinguishment or abandonment.

However, the court permitted the respondents to erect unlocked gates and signs to restrict use to deeded owners and their guests.

The plaintiffs entered into an agreement of purchase and sale with a builder to construct a home on a lot.

The builder was not the registered owner of the lot, but had a development agreement to purchase it from the registered owners.

After the builder abandoned the project, the plaintiffs terminated their agreement and registered a purchaser's lien against the property to secure their deposit.

The registered owners brought a motion to determine if the lien was properly registered.

The court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to register the lien because they did not have a contract with the registered owners, and their agreement with the builder expressly provided that no interest in land was created until certain conditions were met.

This costs endorsement arises from a property boundary dispute between neighbours concerning a minor encroachment.

The court found that the litigation was unnecessary and driven primarily by the applicants, as the respondents had already taken steps to remediate the issue in a timely manner, funded by their title insurer.

The remediation work was completed to the satisfaction of both parties before the application's merits were heard.

The court declined to award costs to either party, finding that the applicants pursued excessive litigation steps and that the respondents, while perhaps lacking initial sensitivity, had resolved the substantive issue.

A non-lawyer sought leave under Rule 15.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to represent a corporate defendant in an action involving a purchaser's lien.

The court applied the Extend-A-Call factors and denied leave, finding that the proposed representative was not an officer, director, or shareholder, lacked understanding of the litigation process, and took positions contrary to the corporation's pleadings.

The motion was dismissed, and the corporation was ordered to be represented by a lawyer.

The appellant appealed a Discipline Committee decision awarding $35,000 in costs to the respondents after dismissing professional misconduct charges against them.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Committee majority erred in law and made palpable and overriding errors by failing to apply the correct legal test, ignoring relevant expert evidence, and considering irrelevant factors such as the complainant's motivation.

The costs award was set aside.

The Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario alleged that the Member and his firm committed professional misconduct by failing to maintain minimum standards, failing to comply with the Ontario Building Code, and engaging in unprofessional conduct regarding two small-scale residential projects (a stone veneer installation and a deck).

The Discipline Committee dismissed all charges, finding that the Member's brief reports and use of engineering judgment were appropriate for the scale of the projects, did not compromise public safety, and met the standard of a prudent practitioner in the circumstances.

The applicant, who has a mobility impairment, alleged discrimination in employment on the basis of disability against her former employer.

She claimed the employer failed to accommodate her needs by providing insufficient taxi chits and denying remote computer access, and that the manner of her termination was discriminatory.

The Tribunal found that the applicant failed to communicate a disability-related need for additional taxi chits or remote computer access, and that the employer had reasonably responded to her requests.

The Tribunal also found no evidence that the termination process disadvantaged the applicant on the basis of her disability.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant moved to set aside a noting in default in a libel action arising from an inaccurate student newspaper article that remained accessible online for years.

Applying the discretionary framework governing relief from default, the court held the claim was not simple, the defendant had consistently manifested an intention to defend, any delay was not inordinate, and the plaintiff had shown no meaningful prejudice beyond having to prove the case on the merits.

The court also found the plaintiff should not have initiated default proceedings without warning known defence counsel.

The noting in default was set aside, leave to file a statement of defence was granted, and no costs were awarded.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Kingston Area Taxi Commission revoking his taxi licenses.

The Divisional Court found that the applicant was denied procedural fairness because he received only 6 days' notice instead of the required 14 days, and the Commission continued the hearing on a later date without notifying him or his representative.

The court set aside the Commission's decision and remitted the matter for a new hearing before a differently constituted panel.