Douglas A. Wallace

The applicants sought a declaration that the respondent insurer owed a duty to defend the applicant business owner in three underlying actions arising from a fire.

The fire allegedly started when the business owner used an insured truck to boost a forklift.

The respondent argued that boosting a forklift was not an ordinary use or operation of a motor vehicle.

The court applied the test for duty to defend and the test for use or operation of a motor vehicle, finding that using a truck to boost another vehicle is an ordinary and well-known activity to which motor vehicles are put.

The court declared that the respondent owed a duty to defend and ordered it to pay a one-half share of past and ongoing defence costs.

This is an appeal concerning an insurer's duty to defend.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for an assault due to a psychotic episode, sought coverage under his homeowner's policy.

The insurer denied coverage based on an exclusion for bodily harm arising from intentional or criminal acts.

The application judge found the negligence claim derivative of an intentional tort and that the exclusion applied.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the true nature of the claim was an intentional act, despite the appellant's mental state, thus affirming the applicability of the exclusion clause.

The applicant insurer appealed an arbitration award determining priority for Statutory Accident Benefits following a motor vehicle accident involving a catastrophically injured child.

The child's parents were separated, and the insurers disputed whether the child was principally dependent on her mother or father at the time of the accident.

The arbitrator found the child was principally dependent on her mother, utilizing a 12-month time frame for the dependency analysis rather than the 5.5-week period immediately preceding the accident when the child briefly resided with her father.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no extricable error of law or palpable and overriding error in the arbitrator's determination of the appropriate time frame or assessment of care dependency.

A pedestrian was catastrophically injured when struck by a vehicle whose owners had applied for automobile insurance.

The insurer issued a one-year policy but subsequently purported to rescind it based on material misrepresentation regarding one owner's driving record, sending a letter stating the coverage was "void from the inception date" approximately two months before the accident.

The injured plaintiff obtained judgment against the at-fault driver and owner but was unable to collect.

The plaintiff then sued the insurer under section 258(1) of the Insurance Act, which permits innocent third parties to recover directly from the at-fault driver's insurer.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the insurer had validly rescinded the contract at common law, making it void ab initio.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that an automobile insurer cannot rescind a contract at common law but must comply with the statutory scheme governing termination of automobile insurance contracts.

The appellants, a condominium developer and related entities, appealed a jury verdict awarding damages to the respondents for injuries sustained when an A-frame sign placed on a downtown Toronto sidewalk struck the plaintiff in the face during windy conditions.

The jury found both the developer and the sign contractor liable, apportioning fault 94% to the developer and 6% to the contractor.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's instructions on duty of care, apportionment of liability, and foreseeability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misdirection warranting intervention.

The cross-appellant's challenge to costs awards was also dismissed.

The plaintiffs obtained a $2 million judgment against an at-fault driver and vehicle owner for a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiffs then brought an action against the defendant insurer under s. 258(1) of the Insurance Act, arguing the vehicle was insured at the time of the accident.

The defendant insurer argued it had validly rescinded the insurance contract ab initio due to material misrepresentations in the application, two months prior to the accident.

The court held that the Insurance Act does not displace an insurer's common law right to rescind a contract for material misrepresentation.

The court found the insurer validly rescinded the contract before the accident occurred, meaning there was no contract providing indemnity at the time of the loss.

The plaintiffs' action was dismissed.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision and sued her auto insurers under the uninsured automobile coverage.

Her insurers issued a third-party claim against Aviva, alleging that Aviva insured the at-fault vehicle.

Aviva moved for summary judgment, arguing that the vehicle was fraudulently added to its policy after the collision occurred.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there were genuine issues for trial regarding whether the named insured owned the vehicle at the time of the collision and whether the policy was validly back-dated, noting that a trial was necessary to resolve the complex factual issues surrounding the alleged fraud.