Sabrina Sara Fiacco

The accused was charged with five offences arising from an alleged assault on February 26, 2014, including choking, uttering death threats, assault with a weapon (knife), and subsequent breaches of probation by contacting the complainant.

The Crown relied on the complainant's testimony and 74 pages of photographed text message screenshots purporting to be from the accused's phone.

The accused denied committing the assault and denied sending the text messages.

The court admitted reply evidence in the form of the accused's cell phone records from the service provider after the accused testified, finding the second exception to the rule against reply evidence was satisfied.

The court found the accused guilty of the two probation breach counts but acquitted him of the substantive offences due to reasonable doubt arising from credibility concerns regarding the complainant's evidence and employment records suggesting the accused was at work during the alleged assault.

The accused was charged with refusing a roadside screening demand after being pulled over for traffic violations.

The Crown alleged the accused unequivocally refused to provide a breath sample.

The court found that while the accused was legally obliged to comply with the demand, she was operating under a mistaken understanding of her legal rights and was confused rather than defiant.

The accused repeatedly requested access to counsel, which was not facilitated.

The court found a reasonable doubt existed as to whether the refusal was complete and unequivocal, particularly given the accused's confusion, her requests for legal advice, and the availability of counsel that could have clarified her obligations.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused brought a section 24(2) application to exclude breath testing evidence following a finding that the police violated his Charter right to counsel of choice.

The police followed standard institutional procedures that systematically channeled the accused to consult with on-call duty counsel rather than facilitating access to private counsel of choice as requested.

The court applied the Grant framework, balancing the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct, the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court found that the systemic nature of the violation, the importance of the right to counsel of choice, and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice outweighed society's interest in prosecuting the drinking and driving charge.

The breath test evidence was excluded and the charge dismissed.

The accused was charged with driving over 80 mg/100 mL of blood alcohol.

During a RIDE spot-check, the accused was directed to a secondary investigation area without explanation, and subsequently arrested after failing a screening test.

The accused sought to contact his counsel of choice but was ultimately directed to duty counsel instead.

The court found two Charter breaches: (1) a violation of section 10(a) for failure to inform the accused of the reason for detention when directed to the secondary area, and (2) a violation of section 10(b) for failure to adequately facilitate access to counsel of choice.

The court found that the Toronto Police Service's institutional practice of controlling access to counsel and channeling accused persons to duty counsel, combined with inadequate resources and efforts to locate private counsel, resulted in the accused being denied a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal advice from counsel of his choice.