CITATION: Huang v. The Windfields Place, 2025 ONSC 2809
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 798/24
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
DIVISIONAL COURT
RE: Ying Huang Tenant/Appellant
AND:
The Windfields Place Landlord/Respondent
BEFORE: Justice O’Brien
COUNSEL: Ying Huang, for the Tenant/Appellant
Kristin A. Ley, for the Landlord/Respondent
Sabrina Fiacco, for the Landlord Tenant
HEARD: Motion via videoconference on May 12, 2025
ENDORSEMENT
1The appellant Mr. Huang appeals from two decisions of the Landlord and Tenant Board addressing the respondent landlord’s request to increase rent above the “guideline.” The guideline, as determined by the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17 (the Act) is measured against the consumer price index. An application to increase rent above the guideline amount is known as an “AGI order.”
2The Board in this case granted an AGI order permitting the landlord to increase the rents for units in the residential complex by 3.58% above the guideline. Under s. 126(1) of the Act, a landlord may apply for an AGI order where, among other things, it has incurred “eligible capital expenditures.” In its initial order, dated November 8, 2024, the Board found that the landlord’s work in replacing windows and doors, exterior leak repair, and lighting retrofit constituted eligible capital expenditures.
3Mr. Huang sought a review of the initial order, which was dismissed. The Board was not satisfied there was a serious error in the proceeding. It found the absence of a date on the notice of hearing to be immaterial. It also dismissed Mr. Huang’s argument that a “tenants’ association” was not a proper party to the proceeding, reasoning the association was a group of tenants who joined together to retain counsel. Finally, the Board dismissed the argument that granting an extension of time to the landlord to file reply submissions while denying the tenant’s request for an extension was an error.
4In this court, Mr. Huang submits the replacement of the windows and doors were not “eligible capital expenditures” because they were part of regular maintenance. Further, his own rent should not have been increased because his windows and doors were not replaced. He also alleges procedural unfairness in that the notice of hearing was undated, the tenants’ association should not have been permitted to participate in the hearing, and the tenants should have been allowed an extension to file submissions.
5Under s. 210 of the Act, an appeal from a decision of the Board is limited to questions of law, for which the standard of review is correctness: Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 ONSC 29, 470 D.L.R. (4th) 328, at paras. 27, 30. I do not find any errors of law in this case.
6The Board was entitled to find the replacement of the windows and doors were capital expenditures. The definition of capital expenditure in s. 126(7) of the Act includes an expenditure that is “necessary to protect or restore the physical integrity of the residential complex or part of it. Subsection 18(1) of Ont. Reg. 516/06 (the Regulation) defines “physical integrity” to include exterior doors and exterior windows. The doors and windows were over fifty years old and the work cost the landlord over $600,000. Although Mr. Huang submitted the expenditure needed to be “extraordinary,” that word is only used in s. 126(1)(1) of the Act and not in s. 126(1)(2), which is the relevant provision addressing eligible capital expenditures. There was no error of law in finding the work on the doors and windows to be eligible capital expenditures as defined in the Act.
7In response to Mr. Huang’s submission that he should not pay increased rent since his own doors and windows were not replaced, s. 126(1) of the Act permits an AGI order “for any or all of the rental units in a residential complex.” Since the doors and windows were replaced to protect the physical integrity of the building, the Board did not err in finding the AGI order could apply to all units rather than only to the ones receiving the new doors and windows.
8I also dismiss the allegations of breaches of procedural fairness. The Board was entitled to find the absence of a date on the notice of hearing was immaterial. The notice of hearing gave Mr. Huang the date his written submissions were due. Mr. Huang received the notice of hearing on June 27, 2023 and his written submissions were due over a month later, on July 31, 2023. He filed his submissions in time for the deadline. The absence of a date on the notice of hearing did not prejudice Mr. Huang. He has not demonstrated a breach of procedural fairness.
9There was similarly no error in allowing the “tenants’ association” to make submissions. The association consisted of a small group of tenants who had banded together to retain a lawyer. The parties to a proceeding before the Board include any affected tenants: Act, s. 187(1). The Act also does not preclude the right of tenants to organize themselves into associations: Act, s. 83(3)(d). The Board may add or remove parties to a proceeding as it considers appropriate. Act, s. 187(2).
10Mr. Huang submits that this association was not elected and not authorized to represent the tenants in the affected buildings. Assuming this to be the case, the group’s participation did not prevent other tenants from representing themselves individually. Several did so, including the appellant. Mr. Huang essentially disagrees that the tenants who banded together were entitled to name themselves a tenants’ association when they only had authority to represent themselves. But he has not shown any basis on which their participation impacted him.
11Finally, the Board did not err in denying Mr. Huang’s request for an extension of time for the other tenants to file reply submissions. Although Mr. Huang stated he made this request twice – once before the July 31 deadline for tenants`submissions, and once after the landlord received an extension for its reply submissions – I was only pointed to the second request in the record. The Board also only formally addressed the second request in a September 8, 2023 endorsement and in the two orders under appeal. The Board denied the request for two reasons: The first was because Mr. Huang had already filed his submissions and did not have authorization to request an extension for all tenants. The second was that to permit submissions after reply submissions would “foster endless litigation.”
12Regardless of whether the Board received a first request from Mr. Huang before July 31, there was no breach of procedural fairness. The Board correctly noted that Mr. Huang did not represent other tenants and he himself filed his submissions on time. He was not impacted by the Board’s decision and cannot succeed on this ground of appeal.
Disposition
13The appeal is dismissed. The landlord is entitled to partial indemnity costs in the amount of $5,000 all-inclusive.
O’Brien J
Released: May 15, 2025