ODC 2025

The applicant brought a motion for an extension of time to file an application for judicial review of three interlocutory decisions made by a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice in a criminal proceeding.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, raising concerns that the proceeding was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process because the court lacks jurisdiction over criminal matters.

The court dismissed the motion, confirming that its judicial review powers under the Judicial Review Procedure Act do not extend to criminal orders, which fall under federal jurisdiction and the Criminal Code.

The court declined to make an order restricting the applicant's access to the courts at this time.

The respondents moved to quash the appellant's appeal from an order striking his statement of claim, which sought $6 million in damages.

The respondents argued the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction and the appeal was out of time.

The court granted the motion to quash, finding that under the Courts of Justice Act, appeals from final orders where the claim exceeds $50,000 must be brought to the Court of Appeal.

The court also noted the appeal was late, as time runs from the date reasons are signed, not when the order is issued, though it would have granted an extension had it possessed jurisdiction.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the fixed amount of $3,000.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) decision evicting him for late payment of rent.

During the hearing, the LTB member orally ruled that the landlord's N5 notice was invalid, leading the self-represented tenant to abandon evidence and arguments regarding retaliation under s. 83(3)(c) of the Residential Tenancies Act.

However, in the written decision, the member reversed this ruling without giving the tenant an opportunity to be heard.

The Divisional Court held that this reversal, combined with the member's refusal to hear the tenant's evidence regarding the landlord's conduct, resulted in a denial of procedural fairness.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a rehearing.

The appellant employer appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding that it had constructively dismissed the respondent employee and discriminated against her based on disability.

The trial judge found that the employer created a poisoned work environment by harassing the employee while she was on medical leave, including making an inappropriate unannounced visit to her home.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact were entitled to deference and that the employee had not condoned the conduct or abandoned her employment.

The award of damages for constructive dismissal and under the Human Rights Code was upheld.

The appellant father brought an urgent motion for a stay pending appeal of a trial order that permitted the respondent mother to permanently relocate to Croatia with their one-year-old child.

The appellant argued he was unfairly prevented from calling witnesses at trial.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried given the appellant's documented history of litigation abuse, disruptive behaviour, and failure to comply with court orders.

The court also found the appellant failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay, noting the respondent would suffer prejudice from further delay.

The applicant brought a motion under Rule 39.03 to compel the examination of a Vice-President at Infrastructure Ontario in the context of an application for judicial review challenging the expropriation of its properties.

The applicant sought to supplement the record with evidence regarding the scope, rationale, and scheme of the expropriations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no reasonable evidentiary basis that the proposed witness participated in briefing the decision-maker, nor did the proposed topics fall within the limited exceptions for supplementing a record on judicial review.

The appellant factoring company appealed a trial decision that dismissed its construction lien claim and found it jointly liable for damages caused by the contractor who abandoned the project.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's factual findings regarding the lack of authority to approve invoices.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the trial judge erred in using equitable and statutory set-off as a sword to award damages against the assignee factoring company that exceeded the value of its lien.

The damages award against the appellant was quashed.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of the lower court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $1,582.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal the decision of Tzimas J. dated August 1, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties fixed at $3,142.00.

The appellant contractor registered a construction lien against the respondent's property but failed to perfect it by registering a certificate of action in a timely manner.

The motions judge declared the lien expired and vacated it pursuant to the mandatory provisions of the Construction Act, and awarded substantial indemnity costs against the appellant.

On appeal, the Divisional Court affirmed the decision, holding that the failure to perfect a lien is a statutory breach that cannot be cured by procedural rules or equitable doctrines.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The Attorney General for Ontario sought judicial review of two Information and Privacy Commissioner decisions ordering the Cabinet Office to obtain and review entries from the Premier's personal cellphone call logs that related to government business.

The IPC had found that these specific call logs were under the control of the Cabinet Office pursuant to s. 10(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the IPC's application of the National Defence control test was reasonable and that the decisions appropriately balanced the public's right of access to government information with the protection of personal privacy.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which declined to review the College's decision to take no action on his complaint against the College's registrar.

The applicant's complaint alleged professional misconduct regarding the College's policies on COVID-19 vaccines.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board reasonably concluded the complaint was vexatious, an abuse of process, and a collateral attack on College policy.

The court also found no breach of procedural fairness or reasonable apprehension of bias.

The self-represented applicant requested an in-person ex-parte motion to appeal an order dismissing his application under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Divisional Court denied the request, noting that an appeal of the order lies to the Court of Appeal, not the Divisional Court.

Furthermore, pursuant to the previous order, the applicant required permission to file materials, which was denied because he sought to start his appeal in the wrong court.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision terminating her tenancy based on an agreement to terminate.

The tenant argued the Board erred in finding her initial notice of termination valid, in finding the parties agreed to a June 30, 2024 termination date, and in failing to consider refusing the eviction under section 83 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's conclusion on the termination agreement was a finding of fact supported by evidence, from which there is no right of appeal.

The Court also held that the Board properly considered section 83 when it decided to postpone rather than refuse the eviction.

The appellant tenant filed an appeal from a Landlord and Tenant Board decision ordering him to pay compensation for damages to a rental property.

The respondent landlords brought a motion to dismiss the appeal because the appellant failed to serve them with the required appeal documents and failed to perfect the appeal.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to dismiss the appeal due to the appellant's failure to take the necessary steps to advance or perfect it, and awarded costs to the respondents.

The moving party sought to set aside an interlocutory decision of Papageorgiou J. that declined to schedule appeals of interlocutory decisions made by Associate Justices.

The Divisional Court treated the request as a motion for leave to appeal.

The court denied leave to appeal without costs, noting that the proposed appeals of the Associate Justices' decisions were within the jurisdiction of a single judge of the Superior Court of Justice and had already been disposed of, with no further appeal proceedings available.

The applicant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision finding she was not catastrophically impaired following a motor vehicle accident.

At the hearing, the Tribunal admitted the respondent insurer's expert psychiatric reports but refused to issue a summons to compel the expert's attendance for cross-examination due to non-compliance with procedural rules.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal's strict application of its rules and refusal to facilitate the cross-examination of a key expert witness on a critical issue breached the applicant's right to procedural fairness.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal for a new hearing.