ODC 2026

The moving party, General Motors of Canada Company, brought a motion to strike an affidavit filed by the responding party in a judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision.

The affidavit disputed the Tribunal's recollection of the responding party's oral testimony regarding her knowledge of a settlement.

The court dismissed the motion, noting that the affidavit evidence would be admissible under the Keeprite principles to fill a gap in the record if no transcript was available.

The court suggested that seeking an order for the production of the hearing transcript would be the most efficient way to resolve the evidentiary dispute.

The applicants sought judicial review of an administrative directive redirecting frozen racing funds to the benefit of the Ontario racing industry rather than re-distributing them race by race.

The court held that the applicants had no remaining right or interest to challenge the directive because the earlier forfeiture order had finally disposed of the entire frozen account and any argument that some funds were from non-purse sources should have been raised in the original proceedings.

The court also held that judicial review is discretionary and declined relief because the application was perfected more than six years after commencement, the delay was excessive and inadequately explained, and prejudice was presumed.

The application was dismissed with agreed costs.

The 92-year-old appellant suffered catastrophic injuries in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits to modify her daughter's home, where she intended to move to receive 24-hour care.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal denied the claim, holding that the appellant first had to prove her existing condominium could not be modified.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the LAT erred in law by imposing an unlegislated threshold and adopting an unduly narrow interpretation of 'existing home' under section 16 of the SABS.

The appeal was allowed, and the insurer was ordered to pay the claimed benefits immediately.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding $35,000 in defamation damages to each respondent after the appellant referred to them as 'House Negroes' in a blog post.

The appellant argued the trial judge should have recused himself for bias, erred in rejecting defences of fair comment and truth, and awarded excessive damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, upholding the trial judge's findings that the term was derogatory and not protected by fair comment, and concluding the damages were within a reasonable range given the respondents' public standing and the seriousness of the defamation.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Trimble J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $2,500 to the responding party.

The moving party brought a motion for a stay pending the appeal of a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Akazaki J. dated January 14, 2026.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal, without costs.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the decision of Corthorn J. dated January 28, 2026.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The appellant sought a panel review of a single judge's order dismissing a motion to stay an eviction.

At a case conference, the court addressed procedural matters and set a timetable for the panel review and a motion for a continued stay.

The court granted an interim-interim stay of the eviction pending the return of the stay motion.

The court also temporarily permitted the appellant's boyfriend to act as her agent for the case conference due to alleged disabilities, but urged her to seek legal advice or appoint a litigation guardian.

The appellant's license to practice law was revoked following findings of professional misconduct.

She appealed to the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division, but failed to perfect her appeal for 11 months.

A single adjudicator of the Appeal Division dismissed the appeal for delay without a formal motion from the Law Society.

The appellant appealed to the Divisional Court, arguing the adjudicator lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal without a motion and that a five-person panel was required.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's rules permit it to control its own process, initiate procedural steps, and dismiss an unperfected appeal via a single adjudicator's procedural order.

The moving party brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to review an order of a single judge quashing his motion to hold a Landlord and Tenant Board member in contempt.

The moving party argued the single judge lacked jurisdiction to quash the motion.

The Divisional Court held that the single judge had jurisdiction under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the proceeding as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting that a finding of contempt against a Board member is precluded by adjudicative immunity.

Finding no error in the single judge's decision, the court dismissed the motion.

The moving party, General Motors of Canada Company, brought a motion to strike an affidavit filed by the responding party in an application for judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision.

The affidavit disputed the Tribunal's recollection of the responding party's oral testimony regarding her knowledge of a settlement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to strike, noting that the affidavit evidence could be admissible under the Keeprite principles to fill a gap in the record, as the Tribunal had declined to provide a transcript without a court order.

The court directed the parties on the process for seeking production of the transcript.

The moving party tenant brought a motion for a stay of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order.

During the hearing, the self-represented parties reached a settlement.

The court issued a consent order staying the eviction and the underlying intended application, conditional on the tenant paying ongoing monthly rent and making scheduled payments towards $4,250 in rent arrears.

If the tenant defaults, the landlord may request the stay be lifted; if the arrears are paid in full, the tenant may request the eviction order be quashed on consent.

The applicant, a PhD student, was withdrawn from her program after receiving two unsatisfactory progress reports.

She appealed the withdrawal to the Faculty and then to the Senate Appeals Committee, both of which dismissed her appeals.

She sought judicial review, arguing procedural unfairness and unreasonableness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no manifest unfairness in the university's robust evaluation process and holding that the Senate Appeals Committee decision was reasonable and sufficiently grappled with the central issues.

The appellant appealed an interlocutory order requiring the production of the deceased's counselling records from 2005 to 2009 in a will challenge alleging undue influence.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in law by applying a low threshold that permitted a fishing expedition for sensitive personal information.

The court also found a palpable and overriding error in relying on the absence of evidence of undue influence in the two years prior to the will's execution to justify broader disclosure.

The order for production was set aside, and costs were awarded to the appellant.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal, which found it lacked jurisdiction to hear their appeal regarding the cancellation of their income support.

The Director had cancelled their benefits and denied an extension of time to request an internal review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness in the Tribunal's decision to hold an in-writing hearing and concluding that the Tribunal correctly applied binding precedent in determining it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a denial of an extension of time for an internal review.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision summarily dismissing her complaints of discrimination against a canoe club.

The HRTO had found most complaints were out of time and all had no reasonable prospect of success.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the HRTO adequately accommodated the applicant's disability-related needs, the hearing was procedurally fair, there was no reasonable apprehension of bias, and the summary dismissal was reasonable.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interlocutory costs order made by a Deputy Judge of the Small Claims Court, naming the Deputy Judge and the Small Claims Court as respondents.

The Ministry of the Attorney General brought a motion under Rule 2.1 to dismiss the application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applicant's preliminary objection that MAG could not bring the motion without filing a Notice of Appearance.

The Court granted the Rule 2.1 motion and dismissed the application, finding it was improperly framed by failing to name the civil defendant and by improperly naming the Deputy Judge, who is protected by judicial immunity.

The moving party, a former paralegal, sought an extension of time to file an application for judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that dismissed his application as abandoned.

The moving party filed his notice of application nine months after the HRTO decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to establish apparent grounds for relief because he provided insufficient evidence to show the HRTO's decision was unreasonable.

The court also noted the nine-month delay was unexplained.