Montford v. Canadian College of Naturopathic Medicine et al, 2026 ONSC 4273

CITATION: Montford v. Canadian College of Naturopathic Medicine et al, 2026 ONSC 4273

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-26-00000283-00JR

DATE: Jul 23, 2026

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

DIVISIONAL COURT

RE:

Sean Montford

Applicant

AND:

Canadian College of Naturopathic Medicine, Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

Respondent

BEFORE:

Justice O’Brien

COUNSEL:

Sean Montford Self-represented

Sean Kissick Counsel for the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

Claire Browne Counsel for the Canadian College of Naturopathic Medicine

HEARD:

In Writing

ENDORSEMENT

1This endorsement provides my reasons for dismissing this application under r. 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194.

2The applicant, Mr. Montford, has brought an application for judicial review of two decisions of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (“Tribunal”), dated November 17, 2025 and March 10, 2026. His application to the Tribunal alleged discrimination by the respondent College on the basis of race, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin and citizenship. Mr. Montford is a Black man. He alleged that while he was a student at the College, the College inserted a completed assignment of another student into his web portal. The College then accused him of submitting the assignment as his own and suspended him for plagiarism.

3In the November 17 decision, the Tribunal found that Mr. Montford had not provided facts that could link the respondent’s conduct to grounds under the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 19. The adjudicator stated that the issue before the Tribunal was whether Mr. Montford had made allegations, which, if accepted, were capable of leading to the inference that he was treated differently and unfairly in comparison to other students.

4However, In the March 10 decision, the Tribunal granted Mr. Montford’s request that it reconsider the November 17 decision. The same adjudicator found that his previous reasoning may have been inconsistent with Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence stating that a comparator group is not needed to establish discrimination. In the same decision, the adjudicator dismissed the applicant’s request that he recuse himself.

5Following a case conference with the parties, I asked the Registrar of the Divisional Court to issue a notice under r. 2.1. I also issued directions advising the parties I was concerned the application in this court was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process for the following reasons:

1. Although the Tribunal initially dismissed Mr. Montford’s application, it subsequently allowed a request to reconsider that decision. As a result, the Tribunal process is ongoing.
2. Absent exceptional circumstances, the court will not interfere in tribunal processes until they are complete.
3. Allegations of bias or other procedural unfairness do not usually on their own demonstrate exceptional circumstances that would justify the court’s intervention.
4. If Mr. Montford is unsuccessful when the Tribunal issues its final order, he would have the opportunity to seek judicial review of that decision, including the interim decisions and procedures.

6I asked Mr. Montford to address the concerns raised above in his submissions responding to the r. 2.1 notice.

7Mr. Montford filed detailed submissions raising a multitude of issues. He did not directly address the concerns described above about the court’s reluctance to interfere with ongoing administrative proceedings. Mr. Montford’s most pertinent submissions can be summarized as follows:

• The Tribunal is statutorily mandated to resolve claims of discrimination in a timely way and this matter was filed over a year ago.
• The Tribunal’s process was flawed and perpetuated systemic racism by granting an unrequested deadline extension to the respondent and refusing to rule on the applicant’s default motions.
• The Tribunal erred in a number of ways in its November 17 decision, including by failing to grapple with the central issue and omitting material facts.
• The Tribunal erred in the March 10 decision by failing to grant his request for the adjudicator to recuse himself when there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.
• The Tribunal failed to remove the adjudicator, even after Mr. Montford filed a complaint against him.
• The Tribunal forced an unlawful mediation after the reconsideration decision, on May 22, 2026.

8I disagree that Mr. Montford has shown a basis for this court to interfere in the Tribunal’s ongoing process.

9Mr. Montford correctly states that r. 2.1 is reserved for the clearest of cases: Scaduto v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733. But r. 2.1 also “must be interpreted robustly so that a motion judge can effectively exercise his or her gatekeeping function to weed out litigation that is clearly frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process”: Scaduto, at para. 8; Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2020 ONCA 690, at para. 8. This means, in appropriate cases, proceedings can, for example, be dismissed under r. 2.1 for lack of jurisdiction: Seo v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2026 ONCA 246; Chowdhury v. Unity Health, 2025 ONCA 90, at para. 4.

10Absent exceptional circumstances, courts should not interfere in ongoing administrative proceedings until after they are completed or until effective remedies are exhausted. This is a principle “scrupulously” followed in this court to avoid the fragmentation of proceedings: Awada v. Allstate, 2021 ONSC 8108, at paras. 7-9. The Court of Appeal has upheld this court’s dismissal of an application under r. 2.1 as premature where the tribunal process was ongoing and even though the applicant had alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Court of Appeal stated: “There were no exceptional circumstances that justified the court’s intervention before the Tribunal’s proceedings were exhausted. This is settled law, and the Divisional Court was right to dismiss the application on this basis.”: R (H.C.) v. Ontario Special Education Tribunal, 2026 ONCA 419, at para. 5.

11The same analysis applies here. Mr. Montford’s allegations of bias are for the Tribunal to deal with at first instance. The court may review the Tribunal’s findings once its process is complete, but that has not yet happened. Moreover, according to Mr. Montford’s submissions, the appointment of the adjudicator he complained about has expired and the adjudicator will no longer be at the Tribunal. Mr. Montford’s other allegations about the processes followed by the Tribunal can similarly be addressed if he challenges the Tribunal’s final decision on judicial review. Mr. Montford’s allegations about the merits of the Tribunal’s November 17 decision also may become moot after the Tribunal completes its reconsideration process. Finally, the Tribunal process has not been excessively delayed. The timing does not provide a basis for this court’s interference while the process is ongoing.

12The Tribunal must be permitted to complete its process to avoid fragmentation and so that this court has the benefit of the Tribunal’s final reasoning and decision, should one of the parties seek judicial review once the Tribunal process is complete. The current application is patently premature and is dismissed.

Shaun O'Brien, J.