COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Huscroft, Monahan and Dawe JJ.A.
BETWEEN
R (H.C.)
Applicant (Moving Party)
and
Ontario Special Education Tribunal*, Toronto District School Board*, and Ministry of Education
Respondents (Responding Parties*)
H.C., acting in person (M56911 & COA-25-OM-0411)
Olivia Filetti, for the responding party Ontario Special Education Tribunal (M56911)
Olivia Filetti and Valerie Crystal, for the responding party Ontario Special Education Tribunal (COA-25-OM-0411)1
Nicola Elizabeth Simmons and Alex Smith, for the responding party Toronto District School Board (M56911 & COA-25-OM-0411)2
Heard: in writing
Determination pursuant to r. 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 with respect to a motion for leave to appeal from the order of Justice Shaun O’Brien of the Divisional Court, dated October 6, 2025, with reasons reported at 2025 ONSC 5677 (COA-25-OM-0411).
Determination pursuant to r. 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 with respect to a motion to reopen the decision of Rouleau, Thorburn and Favreau JJ.A. of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, dated April 1, 2026, with reasons reported at 2026 ONCA 249 (M56911 (COA-25-OM-0411)).
REASONS FOR DECISION
Overview
1H.C. is the moving party in two motions in this court. The first is a motion for leave to appeal from the order of O’Brien J., sitting as a single judge of the Divisional Court (COA-25-OM-0411). That order dismissed the moving party’s application for judicial review of two decisions of the Ontario Special Education Tribunal pursuant to r. 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194. The second is a motion to reopen the decision of a panel of this court, dated April 1, 2026, which dismissed the moving party’s motion to set aside Wilson J.A.’s order to deny his motion for a stay of Divisional Court proceedings (M56911).
2On April 23, 2026, this court notified the moving party that it was considering dismissing both motions pursuant to r. 2.1.02 on the basis that they are frivolous, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process, and invited him to file written submissions. The moving party’s written submissions were filed on May 6, 2026.
3Dismissal under r. 2.1 applies only to “the clearest of cases where the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading and there is a basis in the pleadings to support the resort to the attenuated process”: Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, 343 O.A.C. 87, at para. 8, leave to appeal refused, [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 488. Both of the moving party’s motions are the clearest of cases.
4For the reasons that follow, both motions are dismissed as an abuse of process.
The motion for leave to appeal cannot succeed
5The judicial review application challenged the Tribunal hearing panel’s interim decision not to recuse itself for a reasonable apprehension of bias as well as its decision not to stay its own proceedings while the moving party applied for judicial review. The application for judicial review of these rulings was plainly premature because the proceedings before the Tribunal were ongoing, and no final decision had been made on the moving party’s appeal. There were no exceptional circumstances that justified the court’s intervention before the Tribunal’s proceedings were exhausted. This is settled law, and the Divisional Court was right to dismiss the application on this basis. There is no prospect that leave would be granted to appeal that determination to this court.
6The moving party seeks to expand his motion for leave to appeal by arguing that the Divisional Court erred by dismissing his application without determining whether the Tribunal had erred in deciding it lacked jurisdiction to grant the education placement he sought for his child. However, the Tribunal’s jurisdictional ruling was not part of the application for judicial review before the Divisional Court because the moving party decided to bring the application before the Tribunal’s proceedings were complete. It cannot now be appealed to this court.
The motion to reopen the panel’s decision cannot succeed
7A party seeking to reopen a matter after the decision has been rendered must demonstrate it is in the interests of justice to withdraw the reasons and rehear the case. This is a high standard that will rarely be met: see Meridian Credit Union Limited v. Baig, 2016 ONCA 942, 6 C.P.C. (8th) 33, at para. 7; McGrath v. Joy, 2023 ONCA 46, 166 O.R. (3d) 302, at para. 15. It is not met here. The motion to reopen the panel’s decision upholding the single judge motion decision is bound to fail.
8The moving party argues that the court applied the test for mootness and the factors guiding the court’s discretion to decline to decide a moot case incorrectly, and that this led the court to dispose of the motion on the basis of mootness rather than the issues he raised. He argues that he was not given the opportunity to respond to the respondents’ mootness submission.
9This argument must be rejected. There is no right to file a reply factum. Leave is required to do so and leave was not sought. In any event, it is apparent from the face of the moving party’s materials that the legal errors he asserts do not meet the high standard required to reopen. Reopening the court’s decision is not in the interests of justice.
Conclusion
10Accordingly, the motions are dismissed.
11There is no order as to costs.
“Grant Huscroft J.A.”
“P.J. Monahan J.A.”
“J. Dawe J.A.”