Gregory Sidlofsky

The defendants, a lawyer and his law firm, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's solicitor's negligence claim.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants breached their duties while representing him in a partnership arbitration, specifically by failing to seek a dissolution of the partnership at the outset.

The court found that there was insufficient evidence to determine how the arbitration would have unfolded had the dissolution been sought early, and thus a genuine issue for trial existed regarding causation and loss of chance.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

In a will challenge action, the defendant estate trustees moved under Rule 21(1)(a) to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim that the deceased's wills were void for violating public policy on the basis of gender discrimination.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the defendants could not resile from a prior consent order directing a trial on that issue.

On the issue of disclosure, the court limited the plaintiffs' broad requests for financial and corporate records, ordering production only of documents relevant to the will challenge between 1998 and 2003.

The plaintiffs' cross-motion for costs thrown away was dismissed, but they were awarded $5,000 in costs for responding to the reconstituted motion.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment in a fraudulent conveyance action, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale against the defendants and the intervenor.

The court noted the defendants' delay tactics, unfounded allegations of fraud, and lack of credibility.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs of $175,000 against the defendants and $30,000 against the intervenor, finding the amounts reasonable given the complexity introduced by the defendants' failed defenses.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to declare the transfer of a property from the judgment debtor to his spouse as a fraudulent conveyance.

The transfer occurred shortly after a draft judgment of $1.5 million (U.S.) was released against the debtor.

The defendants argued the plaintiff lacked standing, the action was statute-barred, and counterclaimed for slander of title.

The court found the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance intended to defeat creditors, dismissed the defendants' motion to adduce new evidence, dismissed the counterclaim, and granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff, including a tracing order to a subsequently purchased property.

The applicant sought to challenge his deceased father's 2019 Will, which left the entire estate to the applicant's mother.

The respondents moved to dismiss the application for lack of standing, relying on a 1996 Will that also left the entire estate to the mother.

The court found that the applicant failed to present sufficient evidence to challenge the validity of the 1996 Will.

Consequently, even if the 2019 Will were invalid, the applicant would have no financial interest in the estate under the 1996 Will.

The court also rejected the applicant's argument that his separate civil claim for proprietary estoppel gave him independent standing under s. 23 of the Estates Act.

The motion was granted and the application dismissed.

In the midst of an oppression remedy trial, the applicant brought a motion seeking production of the respondent companies' fiscal 2014 financial statements under various sections of the Business Corporations Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the statutory provisions relied upon did not entitle the applicant to the financial statements and that the applicant had not established a strong prima facie case of oppression.

Furthermore, the court declined to grant leave for a mid-trial motion, noting that the requested documents would have no probative value without reopening the evidence to allow for supplementary expert reports.

The defendants successfully defended a summary judgment motion in a simplified procedure action where the plaintiffs claimed approximately $50,000.

The court dismissed the action and requested written submissions on costs.

The defendants sought costs on a partial and substantial indemnity basis, citing an unaccepted settlement offer and the plaintiffs' pursuit of the corporate director personally.

The plaintiffs argued for reduced costs due to the defendants' late production of documents and unnecessary examinations.

The court awarded the defendants $22,500 in costs, applying a hybrid scale that credited the settlement offer but made downward adjustments for both parties' cost-inefficient conduct.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment claiming the return of alleged overpayments and late penalties for delays in a commercial office renovation project.

The court dismissed the motion and the action, finding that the corporate plaintiff and individual defendant were improperly added as parties.

The court held that the delay penalty clause did not apply to the specific items claimed, and the delays were not the sole fault of the defendant.

The claim for overpayment was also dismissed as the plaintiff failed to establish that any payments were made under a mistake of fact or law.

The applicant and respondent are brothers who were involved in a website business directed toward immigrants from mainland China.

The applicant claimed that the business was operated as a partnership in which he held a 40% interest, or alternatively, that he was a 40% shareholder in the corporations owning the business, and sought dissolution or an oppression remedy.

The respondent cross-applied, seeking a declaration that he owned 85% of the shares and an order requiring the applicant to sell his 15% shareholding due to alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and oppression.

The court found that the applicant was an independent contractor, not a partner or employee, and dismissed his claims for partnership dissolution, wrongful dismissal, and oppression.

The court also dismissed the respondent's cross-application for a forced buyout of the applicant's shares, finding no breach of fiduciary duty or oppression by the applicant in his capacity as a director.

Both the application and cross-application were largely dismissed, save for some specific monetary accounting.

Following a successful appeal from a Master's order dismissing a motion to remove opposing counsel for conflict of interest, the court determined the appropriate costs disposition.

The defendant/appellant sought costs for both the motion before the Master and the appeal.

The court held it had authority to address costs at both stages.

While the quantum of the Master’s $3,000 costs award was maintained, the court ordered those costs payable forthwith rather than in the cause.

Additional partial indemnity costs of $4,250 were awarded for the appeal.

The defendant appealed a master's order dismissing a motion to remove the plaintiff's counsel for an alleged conflict of interest.

The issue was whether conflict rules applicable to law firm partnerships also apply where lawyers practise in a cost‑sharing association but hold themselves out publicly as a single firm.

The court held that where lawyers present themselves to the public as a firm, the same conflict principles apply, including the presumption that confidential information may be shared absent adequate screening mechanisms.

Because the lawyers shared branding, contact information, and facilities without evidence of protective measures or a shared conflicts system, a reasonable observer would perceive an appearance of conflict.

The master erred in relying on conclusory assurances rather than objective safeguards.

The appeal was allowed and the plaintiff’s counsel was removed from the record.

The moving parties sought an order requiring the plaintiffs by counterclaim to post security for costs under Rule 56.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The responding parties included an individual residing outside Ontario and a corporation alleged to lack sufficient Ontario assets, and the moving parties also argued the counterclaim was frivolous and vexatious.

The court held it was unnecessary to determine those grounds because the counterclaim was closely connected to the issues in the main action, particularly the claim for rescission of a share purchase agreement.

The success of the main action and the counterclaim depended on the same factual and credibility issues.

In these circumstances, security for costs should not be ordered.

The applicant sought to resign as trustee of a family trust.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer brought a cross-application to appoint a new independent trustee, arguing that the settlor's children, who intended to appoint themselves as trustees pursuant to the trust agreement, had abused their discretion as directors of the trust's holding company.

The court found no evidence of abuse of discretion that would justify interfering under s. 5(1) of the Trustee Act, and held that the executors could appoint the next trustees pursuant to the trust agreement.

In an estates dispute between co-executors, the court determined the issue of costs following prior litigation concerning the administration of the estate.

The court applied the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and concluded that one executor had been principally successful, though the result was somewhat mixed.

The court emphasized that estate litigation should not automatically result in costs being paid from the estate and that parties should ordinarily bear their own litigation costs unless the dispute was necessary to properly administer the estate.

Finding that this was not such a case, the court ordered costs payable personally by the losing parties.