Colby Stuart Linthwaite

Appeal and cross-appeal arising from a bankruptcy trustee's proof of claim, the chair's rulings at the first meeting of creditors, and subsequent voting at a reconvened second meeting.

The court held that the chair erred in law by entirely preventing a creditor with an objected and allegedly non-arm's length claim from voting, because ss. 108(3) and 109(6) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act require the vote to be taken subject to later invalidation or redetermination.

The court further held that filing the appeal did not automatically stay the effect of the vote or prohibit a second meeting under s. 115.1, but found that the second meeting nevertheless should not have been convened while the first appeal was pending.

The appeal was not moot, the second meeting resolutions were not nullities, and the court confirmed the uncontested resolutions nunc pro tunc while redetermining the contested vote to appoint the appellant trustee's representative as an inspector.

The applicant, Guy Gissin, as Foreign Representative of Urbancorp Inc., sought recognition and enforcement in Ontario of Israeli court judgments against the respondents for over 71 million NIS.

The respondents opposed, arguing recognition would be contrary to public policy and an abuse of process, including claims of double recovery and prior Canadian decisions on related facts.

The court found the Israeli judgments final, for a definite sum, and from a court of competent jurisdiction, and held that none of the narrow defences to enforcement (fraud, denial of natural justice, or public policy) applied.

The court rejected the double recovery argument, finding no evidence of over-recovery, and held that prior Canadian proceedings did not address or preclude the Israeli claims.

The application for recognition and enforcement was granted.

This decision is an appeal by Alan Saskin from the order of Associate Justice Ilchenko, sitting as Registrar in Bankruptcy, refusing an absolute discharge and imposing conditions under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court reviews the procedural history, the evidence, and the legal standards for discharge, including the meaning of "moral blameworthiness" under s. 173(1)(a) and the duties of a bankrupt under s. 173(1)(o).

The appeal is dismissed, with the court finding no error in the Registrar's factual or legal conclusions.

This decision concerns an appeal by Zeifman Partners Inc., as Trustee in Bankruptcy of Oragin Foods Inc., from the disallowance by KPMG Inc., as Trustee in Bankruptcy of Organic Garage (Canada) Ltd., of a proof of claim for $6,760,280.89.

The claim was based on alleged intercompany loans and a note payable.

The court allowed the appeal in part, admitting the "Current Liability Component" ($2,917,423.11) as a proven unsecured claim, but dismissed the appeal regarding the "Long Term Liability Component" and "Note Payable Component" finding insufficient evidence that these were debts rather than equity contributions.

The decision provides a detailed analysis of the distinction between debt and equity in the context of related-party transactions in insolvency, and the applicable standards of review.

The court denied the respondents' motion for leave under Rule 39 to deliver an expert report on Israeli law in a recognition and enforcement application.

The decision reviews the procedural history, the applicable test for leave under Rule 39.02(2), and finds that the respondents failed to satisfy any of the criteria for leave.

The court held that the expert report was not relevant, did not respond to a matter raised on cross-examination, would cause non-compensable prejudice, and was not adequately explained as to its late delivery.

The application was adjourned to March 27, 2025, and directions were given for the delivery of amended factums.

The appellant, Gurdeep Nagra, appealed an order from a motion judge that had dismissed his appeal from a Registrar in Bankruptcy's decision.

The Registrar had reduced Nagra's claim in Verinder Malhotra's bankruptcy by expunging a promissory note.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision, noting the deference owed to the Registrar's ruling and that the appellant's arguments, which were not raised before the Registrar, were unsuccessful.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff, Theodore Jiujias, brought an urgent, ex parte motion for leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against a property owned by defendants Michael Chun Ho Lau and Aaron Storr.

Jiujias, a creditor of Lau, alleged that Lau fraudulently conveyed his interest in the property to his spouse, Storr, and a company controlled by Storr (ASML Holdings Inc.), for nominal consideration, shortly after being served with a statement of claim in a prior mortgage action where Lau was in default of over $1.1 million.

The property was subsequently mortgaged for its market value and listed for sale.

The court applied the three-part Grefford test, finding a high probability of success in the underlying action, sufficient evidence of intent to defeat or delay creditors (noting numerous badges of fraud), and that the balance of convenience favored granting the CPL to prevent dissipation of equity.

The motion was granted.

The bankrupt, a former real estate developer, sought an absolute discharge from bankruptcy.

The discharge was opposed by the Trustee, the Canada Revenue Agency, and several creditors, who argued that the bankrupt's assets were less than 50 cents on the dollar for reasons he could be held responsible for, and that he failed to perform his duties under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court found that the bankrupt had engaged in an asset protection strategy, incurred significant personal liabilities without the means to pay them, and failed to disclose his true post-bankruptcy lifestyle and use of a corporate credit card.

The court declined to refuse the discharge entirely but imposed a substantial conditional order requiring the bankrupt to pay $960,000 and fulfill various outstanding duties.

The applicant creditor brought a bankruptcy application against the respondent debtor, alleging an unpaid debt of approximately $7.9 million USD for LED light bulbs supplied under a distribution agreement.

The debtor disputed the application and sought a stay, arguing it had a bona fide counterclaim for damages resulting from the applicant allegedly supplying patent-infringing goods.

The court found that the debt was clearly established and that the debtor had committed an act of bankruptcy by ceasing to meet its liabilities generally.

The court dismissed the debtor's motion for a stay, finding the counterclaim lacked merit and was not bona fide, and granted the bankruptcy order.

The moving party, a creditor, brought a motion to admit fresh evidence on its appeal from the trustee's disallowance of its proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding.

The trustee opposed the motion, arguing that the parties had previously agreed to limit the appeal record and that admitting the evidence would undermine the efficiency of the bankruptcy process.

The court found that no binding agreement precluded the evidence and that refusing to admit the newly discovered documents would result in an injustice to the creditor.

The court exercised its discretion to admit the fresh evidence, allowing the trustee to file responding documentation.

The appellant creditor appealed an order from the Registrar in Bankruptcy that significantly reduced his proof of claim against the bankrupt.

The claim, initially for $5.99 million and accepted by the Trustee at $2.58 million, was reduced to $85,000 by the Registrar.

The core of the dispute was a $3.5 million promissory note, which the bankrupt argued was contingent on a surplus from hotel sales that never materialized, and was part of a "Governing Agreement" made to influence the creditor's criminal sentencing in the US.

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Registrar's decision, finding that the Registrar properly considered extrinsic evidence (the factual matrix) in determining the note's contingency, and that the appellant's repeated attempts to re-introduce previously struck evidence constituted an abuse of process.

The bankrupt brought a motion to strike certain evidence filed by a creditor, Alpa Stairs and Railings Inc., in response to the bankrupt's motion to expunge Alpa's proof of claim.

The bankrupt sought to strike portions of an affidavit sworn by Alpa's representative, arguing it contained inadmissible hearsay, opinion, and argument, and relied on transcripts of examinations under s. 163 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act of individuals who were not parties to the proceeding.

The court struck several paragraphs and exhibits from the affidavit that violated rules against hearsay and opinion evidence.

However, the court held that the s. 163 examination transcripts themselves were admissible evidence on the expungement motion under s. 163(3) of the BIA.

The Bankrupt sought to expunge or reduce a creditor's claim, and the motion was entirely successful.

This endorsement addresses the costs of that expungement motion.

The court found the creditor's conduct in opposing the motion to be reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous, having taken inconsistent legal and factual positions across various proceedings.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the bankrupt due to the creditor's conduct and the complexity and importance of the issues.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment motion concerning a repudiated agreement of purchase and sale for a cottage.

The appellants challenged the motion judge's findings on mitigation of damages and the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding that the appellants failed to meet their onus to prove the respondents did not take reasonable steps to mitigate their losses, and that the motion judge did not err in her assessment of the evidence.

The Court also granted leave to appeal the costs order but ultimately dismissed the costs appeal, upholding the motion judge's application of Rule 49.10 and the award of substantial indemnity costs to the respondents, finding that an informal settlement discussion did not revoke a prior formal offer to settle.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's order setting aside the appellant's discharge from bankruptcy and vesting shares of a corporation (Bindaas Capital) in the trustee.

The motion judge found that the appellant, while an undischarged bankrupt, owned and operated Bindaas Capital, failed to disclose this asset, and fabricated documents to conceal his ownership.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings and the discretionary decision to annul the discharge.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the factual findings or the exercise of discretion, and upheld the trustee's authority to pursue the after-acquired property.

The trustee in bankruptcy brought a motion to annul the bankrupt's discharge and vest the shares of a corporation in the estate as after-acquired property.

The bankrupt claimed his wife had owned the shares since incorporation.

The court found the bankrupt owned the shares while undischarged, noting he had admitted ownership in another proceeding and had fabricated corporate records and tax returns to support his wife's claim.

The court annulled the discharge, vested the shares in the trustee, and awarded substantial indemnity costs jointly and severally against the bankrupt and his wife.

The Appellants (Niagara Radio Group Inc., Northguard Capital Corp., and Andrew Ferri) brought a motion for an extension of time to perfect a consolidated appeal.

They initially sought to set aside or vary a previous order, but acknowledged that a single judge of the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to do so.

The delay in perfecting the appeal was attributed to difficulties in issuing and entering court orders.

The Respondents (Hydro One Networks Inc. and Scargall Owen-King LLP) did not oppose the motion.

The motion was granted, extending the deadline for perfecting the appeal.

The court-appointed Receiver of Chieftain Metals brought a motion for discharge.

The secured creditor, West Face, supported the discharge but sought a provision allowing it to move for the re-appointment of a receiver at any time in the future to facilitate a potential sale of the mining project.

The Province of British Columbia and the Taku River Tlingit First Nation opposed an open-ended right, citing environmental remediation concerns and uncertainty.

The court granted the discharge but limited the secured creditor's right to seek re-appointment to a two-year period, balancing the commercial interests with the need for certainty for the Province and First Nation.

The Trustee in bankruptcy sought court orders for access to the bankrupt's leased premises and an extension of the three-month period under s. 38(2) of the Commercial Tenancies Act to elect to retain or assign the lease.

The Landlord opposed, arguing the Trustee had no right to access or assign the lease, and no legal basis existed to extend the period.

The court found that the Trustee, distinct from the Receiver, retained its rights under the CTA, including access for marketing the lease.

The court also held it had jurisdiction to extend the s. 38(2) period, not through inherent jurisdiction, but by applying s. 2 of Ontario Regulation 73/20 (the COVID-19 Suspension Order), which suspends periods for steps in proceedings.

The court granted a 90-day extension, subject to conditions regarding occupation rent, and ordered the parties to bear their own costs due to the mixed result.

The applicant, Zeifman Partners Inc., sought declarations that payments made by a now-bankrupt company (Discovery Electric Ontario Limited) to its principal's family and a related company (Tuscany Lighting and Furniture Ltd.) were transfers at undervalue, and payments to a third-party supplier (Boz Electric Supply Ltd.) were preferential.

The court found the payments to the Baldassare family members and Tuscany were void under s. 96(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), and the principal, Sam Baldassare, was held personally liable for these amounts.

The court dismissed the claim against Boz Electric Supply Ltd., finding those payments were made in the ordinary course of business, thereby rebutting the presumption of preference under s. 95(2) of the BIA.

A limitation period defence raised by all respondents was rejected, as the initiation of a Preference Motion was deemed the commencement of proceedings for the purposes of the Limitations Act, 2002.