Colby Stuart Linthwaite

The defendant brought a motion to amend its defence and counterclaim and to add a third party claim, alleging that the plaintiff's asset sale violated the Fraudulent Conveyances Act and the Assignments and Preferences Act.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the proposed amendments and third party claim were statute-barred.

The court found that the defendant knew or ought to have known the material facts underlying the proposed claims more than two years before bringing the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the proposed claims were statute-barred and that adding them would cause non-compensable prejudice to the impecunious plaintiff.

The appellant appealed an order regarding cross-examination on his affidavit in a bankruptcy proceeding.

The respondent confirmed it would not attempt to cross-examine the appellant before the disposition of the bankruptcy trial, rendering the appeal moot.

The Court of Appeal declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal and dismissed it, awarding costs to the respondent.

The moving party, claiming to be a creditor, brought a motion to annul a bankruptcy proposal that had been accepted by creditors and approved by the court.

The moving party alleged injustice and fraud regarding the voting of contingent claims and the transfer of business opportunities to a related company.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it to be an abuse of process and a collateral attack on the court's approval order, as the moving party was aware of the material facts at the time of the creditors' meeting but failed to object or appeal.

The plaintiff, Daland Developments Ltd., brought a motion to compel re-attendance and answer questions during cross-examination on affidavits filed by the defendants (2075568 Ontario Inc., Idacris Investments Inc., and 163157 Ontario Inc.) in support of their Rule 21 motion to strike the action.

The defendants' counsel refused questions on grounds of relevance, arguing they related to the merits or events preceding a prior Vesting Order.

The court found it inappropriate and unfair for a party to file affidavits and then assert that their sworn testimony is not open to challenge, especially when the circumstances surrounding a previous order might impact its reliability.

Citing established case law, the court ruled that cross-examination on an affidavit is not confined to its four corners but can cover any matters relevant to the issues for which the affidavit was filed, including the merits, pre-Order events, and the defendants' legal position.

The plaintiff's motion was granted, requiring the witnesses to re-attend and answer all relevant questions.

The debtor brought a motion seeking to prohibit the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) from cross-examining him on an affidavit filed in a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) motion.

The CPL motion was part of a civil action related to an alleged fraudulent conveyance, which also formed the basis of RBC's bankruptcy application against the debtor.

The court granted the debtor's motion, affirming the `Re Debtor` principle that a petitioning creditor cannot compel evidence from a debtor to prove a disputed bankruptcy application.

The court held that civil procedure rules allowing cross-examination cannot be used to indirectly circumvent substantive bankruptcy law, especially when the debtor disputes the debt and alleged acts of bankruptcy.

The appellants appealed a costs award of $60,583.05 made against them following the dismissal of their application to assess the accounts of their former lawyers (the respondents), who were self-represented on the application.

The appellants argued the award was excessive because it failed to account for the respondents' self-represented status and should have been nominal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge erred in principle by treating the self-represented lawyers as if they were retained counsel and awarding costs on a partial indemnity basis without adjustment.

The court reduced the costs award to $20,000, all-inclusive, and awarded the appellants $10,000 for costs of the appeal.

The plaintiff estate sought leave to amend its statement of claim to add specific statutory particulars, including sections of the Statute of Frauds and other legislation, to support its claim for an interest in property.

The defendants opposed, arguing the amendments constituted new claims barred by a limitation period.

The court granted the motion, holding that the proposed amendments merely particularized existing factual allegations and did not introduce new causes of action, thus not being statute-barred.

The moving defendants sought an order for security for costs against the Estate of Gaetano Lo Faso under Rule 56.01(1)(d), arguing the Estate was a nominal plaintiff due to its status as a section 38 plaintiff under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and its lack of assets.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Estate, as the sole judgment creditor pursuing a claim assigned by the trustee, had a substantial interest in the litigation and was not a nominal plaintiff.

The court also considered access to justice, noting that denying the Estate the right to litigate due to lack of assets would be unjust.

A Teva employee fraudulently requisitioned and deposited 63 cheques into accounts under names matching or resembling real customers.

The majority held the collecting banks were liable in conversion because the payees were neither fictitious nor non-existing under s. 20(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act.

The Court restored the motions judge’s decision and rejected the banks’ false-payee defence.

This is a supplementary costs endorsement on appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The appellants challenged the costs awarded by the application judge.

The Court of Appeal vacated the costs awarded by the application judge and left the determination of costs of the application to the trial judge.

The appellants successfully appealed a decision from the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the appellants in the amount of $10,000.00 all inclusive, payable by the respondents.

The appellants appealed from a motion judge's order regarding control of a religious organization's premises.

The motion judge had declared a November 16, 2013 meeting of Torah V'Avodah Congregation invalid and set aside resolutions to remove trustees and close membership, finding that proper notice had not been given.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by not ordering the entire application to proceed to trial.

The court determined that fundamental questions regarding membership and trustee status should be resolved at trial before determining the validity of the meeting and resolutions.

The court set aside the motion judge's declarations but preserved the interim arrangement maintaining the status quo with the original trustees in office pending trial.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice dated October 7, 2016.

The appeal was abandoned by the appellants.

Costs of the appeal were fixed in the amount of $4,250.00 all inclusive against the Gottardos and Kleinridge.

An appeal by 2346193 Ontario Limited from a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice dated October 7, 2016, was stayed pursuant to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court declined to make an order for costs.

Hampton Securities Limited appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing its claim against Joseph Tassone for accumulated trading losses in an inventory account.

The motion judge found that the employment contract did not impose personal liability on Tassone for losses exceeding his personal reserve account.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's interpretation of the employment contract terms and rejection of an implied indemnity obligation.

The court distinguished the case from Refco Futures on its facts and rejected Hampton's arguments regarding industry practice and notice period issues.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a successful partial summary judgment motion brought by the Tassones against Hampton Securities Limited.

The Tassones had successfully dismissed Hampton's claims for over $600,000 in trading losses and relief under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

The court found the Tassones were entirely successful on the principal claims and awarded them partial indemnity costs, rejecting Hampton's arguments for divided success or disentitlement due to unproven allegations.

The quantum of costs, fixed at $48,500.54, was deemed fair and reasonable, considering the importance of the issues and the comparable legal expenses incurred by both parties.

The defendants, a former employee and his wife, brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff employer's claim.

The employer sued the former employee for over $600,000 in accumulated trading losses incurred during his employment as a trader.

The court had to determine whether the employee was contractually obligated to indemnify the employer for trading losses in excess of his personal reserve account upon termination of his employment.

The court found that while the employer was entitled to apply the balance of the personal reserve against the losses, there was no express or implied term in the employment contract requiring the employee to cover the remaining losses.

The defendants' motion for partial summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiff's claim for the excess losses was dismissed.

An employee of the respondent perpetrated a large-scale fraud by requisitioning cheques payable to six entities and depositing them into accounts he controlled.

Two of the entities were invented, and four were customers not owed money.

The respondent sued the appellant banks for conversion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the banks' appeal, finding they had a valid defence under s. 20(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act.

The court held that the two invented payees were non-existing, and all six payees were fictitious because the respondent's directing minds never formed an intention to pay them.

The appellants brought an action to enforce promissory notes and a claim for fraudulent conveyance.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the appellants on the promissory notes but dismissed their fraudulent conveyance claim.

On appeal, the appellants argued the motion judge erred in dismissing the fraudulent conveyance claim when the defendants had not moved for summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that summary judgment may be granted against a moving party.

The cross-appeal was allowed in part on consent to reduce the damages awarded on the promissory notes from $710,000 to $650,000.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its summary judgment motion, which sought to declare mortgages granted by the respondent parents to their children as fraudulent conveyances.

The motion judge found good consideration for the mortgages and no intent to defraud, dismissing the action against the children.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding the motion judge's factual findings were entitled to deference and rejecting the appellant's attempt to raise new claims on appeal.