Frank J. McLaughlin

This motion concerned the approval of a proposed settlement and counsel fees in a national class action against pharmaceutical companies.

The class action alleged that the atypical antipsychotic medications ABILIFY and ABILIFY MAINTENA caused various compulsive behaviours due to inadequate warnings.

The court approved a $14.75 million settlement fund, which includes compensation for class members suffering psychological harm, residual catastrophic injury, and financial loss, as well as honoraria for representative plaintiffs and class counsel fees.

The court found the settlement to be fair and reasonable, falling within the 'zone of reasonableness' despite objections from some class members regarding compensation adequacy and counsel fees.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's decision to reduce prejudgment interest on non-pecuniary damages from the presumptive 5% to 1.3%.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by misinterpreting the statutory scheme under the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, failing to consider all mandatory factors under s. 130(2), and misinterpreting "changes in market interest rates." The Court clarified that the 5% rate is presumptive and can only be deviated from in unusual or special circumstances, with the onus on the party seeking deviation.

The appeal was allowed, and the 5% rate was reinstated.

This is an appeal in a medical malpractice case where the appellant, Dr. Marshall Zaitlen, challenged a jury's verdict finding him liable for damages to Sean Henry due to a delayed diagnosis of a spinal dural arteriovenous (SDAV) fistula.

The appellant argued that the jury's finding on the standard of care was unreasonable, their explanations for conclusions revealed non-judicial conduct, and the future income loss award was improper.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the jury's verdict.

The court held that the jury's conclusions on breach of standard of care and causation were reasonable and supported by expert evidence, emphasizing the high deference accorded to civil jury verdicts and their explanations when read holistically.

The court also found the damages award for future income loss to be reasonable and consistent with the evidence, allowing for a finding of early retirement due to the injuries.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against the manufacturers of the antidepressant Celexa, alleging it is a teratogen that causes congenital malformations.

The plaintiffs proposed common issues regarding general causation (whether Celexa is or may be teratogenic) and duty to warn.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that the proposed common issues failed to satisfy the commonality requirement under s. 5(1)(c) of the Class Proceedings Act, as they would not advance the litigation without individual trials for each specific congenital malformation.

The court also found that a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure due to the overwhelming number of complex individual issues.

This is a costs endorsement following complex grouped appeals and a cross-appeal concerning claims by 28 former residents of the Oak Ridge Division of the Mental Health Centre against His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario and two physicians.

The Court of Appeal had largely upheld the trial judge's findings on liability for breach of fiduciary duty and battery, with minor reductions in damages.

The appellants sought a significant reduction in the respondents' costs for the appeal and a reduction in the trial costs.

The court awarded the respondents the full amount of their claimed appeal costs, finding that despite mixed success, the trial judgment remained largely intact and the costs claimed were reasonable given the complexity.

The court also declined to vary the trial costs, deeming the overturned $1,000 judgment a minor part of the overall proceedings.

In a medical malpractice trial against a single defendant neurologist for delayed diagnosis, the parties disagreed on the formulation of jury questions regarding causation and damages.

The trial judge ruled that the causation question must use the 'but for' test rather than 'caused or contributed', as the latter could confuse the jury in a single-defendant case.

The judge also ordered the jury to provide reasons for its finding on causation to ensure a rational analysis.

On damages, the judge ruled that mitigation and collateral benefits should be addressed in jury instructions rather than separate questions.

Finally, the judge removed the Estate's claim for past value of care from the jury due to insufficient evidence, but allowed the claim for past value of loss of housekeeping to proceed.

This decision provides reasons for rulings made during a medical malpractice jury trial concerning the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 53 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court addresses objections from both the plaintiffs and the defendant regarding whether expert opinions proffered in testimony exceeded the substance of their expert reports.

The rulings clarify the application of the 'latency' principle, which permits experts to explain and amplify opinions 'latent in' or 'touched on' by their reports, but not to introduce new fields of opinion without leave, especially where it would cause prejudicial surprise or undue delay.

The Plaintiffs sought costs after successfully certifying a class action and dismissing a stay motion.

The court awarded the Plaintiffs $700,000 in all-inclusive costs, comprising $366,149.88 in disbursements and $333,850.12 in fees.

The court emphasized the discretionary nature of costs, the importance of certification motions in class actions, and the need for unsuccessful parties to provide their own bills of costs for comparison.

A portion of the costs ($30,000) was specifically allocated to two defendants (Bristol-Myers and Otsuka) for the stay motion, which the third defendant (Lundbeck) did not participate in.

The plaintiffs in a long-standing medical malpractice action sought an adjournment of an 8-week jury trial, scheduled to commence April 15, 2019, due to a recent breakdown in counsel-client relationship and subsequent change of solicitors.

The defendants opposed the adjournment, emphasizing the age of the action, extensive trial preparation, and the significant delay a new trial date would entail.

The court, while expressing reluctance and noting that the change of counsel at the eleventh hour did not constitute an "exceptional circumstance" under the Toronto practice direction, ultimately granted the adjournment on terms.

This decision was influenced by the complexity of the medical negligence case and the involvement of a party under disability, necessitating new counsel sufficient time to review the file and address critical issues like Medicare and Medicaid.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against the manufacturers of the antidepressant Celexa (citalopram), alleging the drug caused congenital malformations when ingested by pregnant women and that the defendants failed to warn of this risk.

The court found that while the pleadings disclosed a cause of action and there was an identifiable class, the proposed common issue regarding the duty to warn lacked commonality because the risk of birth defects varied widely and individual causation issues would dominate.

The court concluded a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure due to the inevitability of complex individual trials, and dismissed the certification motion.

A Teva employee fraudulently requisitioned and deposited 63 cheques into accounts under names matching or resembling real customers.

The majority held the collecting banks were liable in conversion because the payees were neither fictitious nor non-existing under s. 20(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act.

The Court restored the motions judge’s decision and rejected the banks’ false-payee defence.

The Plaintiffs' medical negligence action against the Defendants was dismissed after a jury found breaches of standard of care but no causation.

The Defendants, as successful parties, sought costs.

The court, exercising its discretion under the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, rejected the Plaintiffs' arguments for no costs based on "divided success," access to justice concerns, or the Canadian Medical Protective Association covering the physicians' costs.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis to the Defendant Physicians and the Defendant Hospital, fixing specific amounts.

While the main Plaintiff, Jordan Sacks, was held liable for the bulk of the costs, the Family Law Act claimants (Jordan's wife and parents) were held liable for apportioned, rather than joint and several, amounts to ensure fairness given the derivative nature and comparatively modest value of their claims.

In a medical negligence action arising from alleged delayed diagnosis of a postoperative complication leading to catastrophic injuries, the defendant physicians brought a motion seeking permission for one defendant physician to testify at trial by videoconference.

The physician was on maternity leave in another province and argued that attending in person would cause expense and inconvenience.

The court considered Rule 1.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the efficiency principles articulated in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The court held that the request was inappropriate because the proposed witness was a party defendant whose credibility and conduct were in issue, and the plaintiff had a fundamental right to have the parties attend court for trial.

The inconvenience to the defendant did not constitute sufficient hardship to override due process considerations.

A pharmaceutical company brought summary judgment motions against banks for conversion after an employee fraudulently issued corporate cheques payable to entities with names similar to legitimate customers and deposited them into accounts he controlled.

The banks asserted statutory defences under the Bills of Exchange Act, including the fictitious payee rule and the holder in due course provision, and advanced negligence-based counterclaims and equitable set-off.

The court held the payees were plausibly identifiable real entities and therefore not fictitious or non‑existent for the purposes of s. 20(5) of the Act.

It further found that s. 165(3) did not apply because the cheques were not delivered to authorized persons entitled to them.

The negligence-based counterclaims and related defences were barred by the strict liability regime governing cheque conversion.

Following dismissal of a proposed pharmaceutical class action certification motion, the successful defendants sought $1.2 million in costs.

The plaintiffs argued that no costs should be awarded due to public interest considerations relating to individuals with mental illness or, alternatively, that costs should be limited to $75,000.

The court held that although individuals with mental illness may constitute a historically disadvantaged group, the evidentiary record did not engage the public interest considerations under s. 31 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

Applying the principles governing certification motion costs and considering the complexity of the proceeding, the plaintiffs’ litigation conduct, and comparable awards, the court fixed fees at $475,000 and allowed most disbursements subject to a reduction in travel expenses.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against the defendants, the manufacturers of the antipsychotic drug Seroquel.

The plaintiffs alleged that Seroquel caused various health risks, including weight gain and diabetes, and that the defendants were negligent in their design, testing, marketing, and failure to warn, particularly regarding off-label uses.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy any of the criteria under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act.

The statement of claim was found to be fundamentally deficient, failing to disclose a valid cause of action.

Furthermore, the court found no identifiable class, a lack of common issues capable of being assessed in common, that a class action was not the preferable procedure, and that the proposed representative plaintiffs were unsuitable.