Brandon Michael Kain

The Court of Appeal heard two appeals concerning the enforceability of termination clauses in employment contracts.

In both cases, the employees argued that provisions allowing termination without cause 'at any time' or 'for any reason' violated the Employment Standards Act (ESA) by theoretically permitting termination in circumstances prohibited by statute, such as after a leave or as a reprisal.

The Court rejected this literal interpretation, holding that employment contracts must be read in context to determine the parties' objective intentions.

Given the contracts' express commitments to comply with ESA minimums, the 'at any time' language simply meant the termination would be legally effective regardless of when it occurred, not that the employer could violate statutory prohibitions.

The Court also upheld a 'with cause' provision that defined cause more broadly than the ESA's 'wilful misconduct' standard, because it expressly preserved the employee's right to ESA minimums if terminated for cause.

The appeal in Baker was allowed, and the appeal in Li was dismissed.

Four organizations brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the certification of a class action against the Province of Ontario and 49 Children's Aid Societies regarding the use of 'Birth Alerts'.

The appeal engages the continued application of the Ragoonanan principle, which requires a representative plaintiff to have a cause of action against each defendant.

The motion judge granted leave to intervene to the Class Action Clinic and Women of Class, and granted leave on limited issues to the Ontario Chamber of Commerce and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, finding their perspectives would be useful to the court.

The proposed intervener coalition sought leave to intervene in an employment-contract appeal concerning enforceability of termination provisions.

The court held the coalition would provide a distinct perspective on the effects of termination clauses on vulnerable and low-wage workers and granted leave on terms aligned with a prior intervener order.

In an administrative law appeal concerning federal telecommunications regulation, the Court interpreted the term “transmission line” in ss. 43 and 44 of the Telecommunications Act and the scope of the CRTC’s access-regime jurisdiction over public property.

The majority held that “transmission line” refers to wireline infrastructure and does not include 5G small cell antennas, so the CRTC cannot adjudicate access disputes for antenna siting under that regime.

The Court emphasized text, context, legislative history, and statutory purpose, including Parliament’s allocation of antenna site-approval powers under the Radiocommunication Act.

A two-judge dissent would have interpreted the term to include 5G small cells based on ordinary meaning, statutory coherence, and technological neutrality.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to specified respondents.

This decision concerns an appeal under section 45(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, from an arbitral award regarding four disputes arising out of a major public-private partnership infrastructure project (Highway 427 expansion).

The appellant, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario (as represented by the Minister of Transportation and Ontario Infrastructure and Lands Corporation), challenged the arbitral tribunal’s interpretation of the Project Agreement on four issues: the Crossfall Dispute, the Zenway Boulevard Dispute, the 407 ETR Dispute, and the 2014-2016 Dispute.

The court held that the tribunal correctly identified and applied the principles of contractual interpretation, found no extricable errors of law, and dismissed the appeal.

This costs endorsement followed a decision on an appeal and cross-appeal.

Given the divided success of the parties on both the appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal ordered that each party bear its own costs.

The parties entered into a contract in 1999 for the provision of market pricing data.

The appellant, a custodial bank, redistributed the data to its numerous affiliates without authorization.

The respondent discovered the breach in 2016 and sued.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the contract and awarded damages based on a rateable approach, but also awarded damages for sharing data with a specific affiliate.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the liability finding, concluding the contract only authorized the appellant itself to access the data.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's decision to change his unentered judgment and rejected the appellant's limitations defence.

On damages, the Court struck the award relating to the specific affiliate as double compensation but otherwise upheld the damages assessment, including an adverse inference drawn against the appellant for spoliation of evidence.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to certify a class action against the manufacturers of the prescription drug Celexa.

The proposed class action alleged a failure to warn that the drug is or may be a teratogen causing congenital malformations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Class Proceedings Judge's findings that the proposed common issues lacked sufficient commonality due to the hundreds of potential congenital malformations with unique etiologies, and that a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure because individual issues would overwhelm any common issues.

Stelco Inc. sought leave to appeal an order from the Superior Court of Justice requiring it to complete the severance and conveyance of a parcel of land (the "Reconveyance Parcel") to Legacy Lands Limited Partnership's nominee, in accordance with a 2018 reconveyance agreement.

Ernst & Young Inc., as court-appointed Monitor in the U.S. Steel Canada Inc. CCAA proceeding, and DGAP Investments Ltd., a purchaser of the land, opposed the motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Stelco's motion for leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge did not err in concluding the CCAA applied, and that the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious nor did it raise issues of significance to insolvency practice.

The court upheld the motion judge's discretionary decision to grant specific performance and his finding regarding waiver of MOECC consent.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against the manufacturers of the antidepressant Celexa, alleging it is a teratogen that causes congenital malformations.

The plaintiffs proposed common issues regarding general causation (whether Celexa is or may be teratogenic) and duty to warn.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that the proposed common issues failed to satisfy the commonality requirement under s. 5(1)(c) of the Class Proceedings Act, as they would not advance the litigation without individual trials for each specific congenital malformation.

The court also found that a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure due to the overwhelming number of complex individual issues.

The appellants, The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation and CIBC Mellon Global Securities Services Company, sought an order staying a lower court judgment pending appeal.

They argued that the application judge's amendments to his reasons for judgment created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The motion judge, Lauwers J.A., dismissed the motion, finding that the appellants failed to demonstrate a real likelihood or probability of bias.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay (serious issue, irreparable harm, balance of convenience) and the overarching interests of justice, concluding that a stay was not warranted.

Leave was granted to file a Supplementary Notice of Appeal.

The applicant sought to vary a previous judgment regarding contract beneficiaries and liability for knowing receipt.

The court declined to change the finding on beneficiaries (para 19) as it was an intentional commercial interpretation.

The court did remove an erroneous finding of breach of contract against CIBC Mellon, but declined to substitute it with a finding of knowing receipt, as that relief was not sought in the initial application.

The court granted the applicant's request to introduce evidence of damages related to data sharing by all custodial entities of Mellon Financial Corporation at the time of the agreement, despite the previous finding that those entities were entitled to receive the data.

Cineplex and Cineworld entered into an Arrangement Agreement for Cineworld to acquire Cineplex for $2.8 billion.

Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and mandated theatre closures, Cineplex deferred payments to landlords and suppliers to manage liquidity.

Cineworld terminated the agreement, alleging Cineplex breached the ordinary course covenant.

The court found that Cineplex's cash management measures were commercially reasonable and did not breach the agreement, noting that the pandemic risk was allocated to Cineworld under the Material Adverse Effect clause.

Cineworld's termination was a repudiation, and Cineplex was awarded $1.24 billion in damages for lost synergies and transaction costs.

The defendants appealed a decision certifying an Ontario national class action and dismissing a motion to stay the action as an abuse of process due to a parallel, certified Quebec class action.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

The motion judge properly considered the history of the proceedings, including the defendants' failure to oppose the Quebec authorization after last-minute amendments, and reasonably concluded the Ontario action was not an abuse of process and was the preferable procedure.

The respondents in the underlying application (BNY) brought a motion to adjourn a damages trial until after the disposition of their pending appeal on liability, to adduce further evidence, and to settle the form of judgment on liability.

The court had previously found BNY liable for breach of contract and ordered a viva voce trial on damages due to the complexity of the record.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that an adjournment would effectively impose a bifurcation not agreed to by the parties, contrary to Rule 6.1.01, and that the balance of convenience favoured proceeding with the damages trial to allow a single appeal on both liability and damages.

The court also declined to allow new evidence or settle the form of judgment at this stage.

The plaintiffs moved for an interlocutory injunction to prohibit the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) from enforcing the deemed terminations of 34 Feed-In Tariff (FIT) contracts and discontinuing payments.

The court found that the motion was an impermissible collateral attack on prior court orders that had deemed the contracts terminated.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs sought a mandatory injunction but failed to establish a strong prima facie case, as the issues of termination had been decided in prior litigation.

The court also found the plaintiffs' evidence of irreparable harm to be speculative.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.

The appellant contractor brought an action for breach of contract after the respondent condominium corporations exercised a contractual termination clause following months during which the respondents knowingly misled the appellant into believing the agreement would not be terminated.

The majority held that the duty of honest performance, as formulated in Bhasin v. Hrynew, precludes active deception and applies to the exercise of all contractual rights, including termination rights; the respondents breached that duty by failing to correct the false impression they had created, which was directly linked to performance of the contract.

A concurring minority agreed on liability but differed on the measure of damages, holding that the duty of honest performance vindicates the reliance interest rather than the expectation interest.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal on the ground that the respondents' conduct did not materially contribute to the appellant's mistaken belief and did not constitute the active dishonesty required for a breach of the duty of honest performance.

The appeal was allowed and the trial judge's award of damages was reinstated.

The moving parties sought a stay of two orders of the Court of Appeal pending their application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The underlying dispute involved the respondent's termination of 36 standard-form Feed-in Tariff Contracts for solar power facilities.

Applying the three-part test for a stay, the motion judge found that the proposed appeal raised serious questions of law regarding contractual interpretation, that the moving parties would suffer irreparable harm if the contracts were terminated and their loans called, and that the balance of convenience favoured preserving the status quo.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The defendants brought motions for leave to appeal an order certifying a class action.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, but limited it to two specific questions: whether the motion judge erred in applying the preferable procedure requirement under s. 5(1)(d) of the Class Proceedings Act given a parallel authorization in Quebec, and whether the judge erred in applying the abuse of process doctrine.

Costs of the motion were fixed at $5,000 and left to the discretion of the panel hearing the appeal.

The appellants, renewable energy companies, appealed the dismissal of their application for a determination of their rights under Feed-in Tariff (FIT) Contracts with the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO).

The IESO terminated the contracts after the appellants failed to achieve commercial operation of their solar facilities by the Milestone Date for Commercial Operation (MCOD).

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the contracts made time of the essence and permitted termination for failure to meet the MCOD.

The Court also agreed that the IESO was not estopped from terminating the contracts, as there was no shared assumption or promise that the IESO would waive its termination rights.