Catherine Hsiangqi Fan

The applicant, a former graduate student, sought judicial review of Toronto Metropolitan University's decisions rejecting his grade appeal, denying a reassessment of his coursework, and dismissing his discrimination complaint.

The Divisional Court found that the university's decisions under its academic policies and human rights procedures were reasonable and that the applicant was afforded procedural fairness throughout the process.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant, a university student, sought judicial review of an interim decision by the University of Toronto's Academic Appeals Committee (UTAAC) which found it had no jurisdiction to enforce the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) against the Toronto School of Theology (TST).

The TST brought a motion to quash the application for judicial review as an abuse of process.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the application was an impermissible collateral attack on a prior decision of the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC), which had already determined that the TST was not an institution subject to FIPPA.

The application was dismissed with costs.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review of a university grading decision.

During the hearing, the respondent university argued that the applicant had not formally raised the Associate Dean's decision not to reassess his course work in the Notice of Application.

To ensure procedural fairness, the Divisional Court adjourned the hearing, permitted the applicant to amend his Notice of Application to include the reassessment decision, and allowed the university to assemble a complete record on that issue.

The Union brought a request for production of documents, and the Employer brought preliminary motions regarding the scope of four active grievances and the arbitrability of one allegation.

The Arbitrator held that the scope of the grievances must be construed narrowly, limiting the evidence to the specific incidents set out in the grievance forms, given the contrast with a previously settled, broadly drafted grievance.

The Arbitrator found the grievor had standing to arbitrate an incident involving a coworker, as it could constitute harassment directed at the grievor.

Production of documents was ordered only to the extent they fell within the narrowed scope of the grievances, and requests for similar fact evidence and broad communications were denied to prevent a fishing expedition.

The union filed a grievance alleging the grievor was improperly denied vacation credits while on Long Term Income Protection (LTIP).

The employer raised a preliminary objection that the grievance was untimely, having been filed over two years after the grievor ought to have known she was not accumulating vacation credits.

The union argued the employer waived its right to object by participating in the grievance process and taking fresh steps.

The arbitrator found the grievance was untimely and declined to extend the time limits under the Labour Relations Act.

The arbitrator also held that the employer did not waive its right to object, as it had reserved its rights while seeking necessary particulars to understand the vague grievance.

The grievance was dismissed.

This costs endorsement followed a decision on an appeal and cross-appeal.

Given the divided success of the parties on both the appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal ordered that each party bear its own costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the university's Senate Appeals Committee, which upheld his withdrawal from a Masters program for failing to complete his thesis within the maximum allowable time.

The applicant argued the committee failed to accommodate his disability, excluded relevant evidence, and unreasonably denied him a further extension or the right to re-apply.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the committee lacked jurisdiction over discrimination claims, reasonably excluded irrelevant evidence, and made reasonable factual findings that the applicant was unlikely to complete his thesis even with an extension.

The applicant moved before a panel of the Divisional Court to review a single motions judge's decision that reconstituted his appeal as an application for judicial review and denied a stay pending the hearing.

The panel found no error in principle in the motions judge's conclusion that there would be no irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favoured respecting the university's autonomy in managing academic affairs.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

The parties entered into a contract in 1999 for the provision of market pricing data.

The appellant, a custodial bank, redistributed the data to its numerous affiliates without authorization.

The respondent discovered the breach in 2016 and sued.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the contract and awarded damages based on a rateable approach, but also awarded damages for sharing data with a specific affiliate.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the liability finding, concluding the contract only authorized the appellant itself to access the data.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's decision to change his unentered judgment and rejected the appellant's limitations defence.

On damages, the Court struck the award relating to the specific affiliate as double compensation but otherwise upheld the damages assessment, including an adverse inference drawn against the appellant for spoliation of evidence.

The employer raised a preliminary objection regarding the scope of evidence the union could adduce concerning a previously settled grievance.

The settlement allowed the grievor to speak to the settled grievance for background purposes only.

The arbitrator held that while the union could not relitigate the underlying facts or establish a course of conduct reaching back to the settled grievance, the grievor could refer to the facts for context.

The union's particulars and investigation reports were admitted to explain how the active grievances referenced the settled incidents, but no findings of fact would be made regarding the settled grievance.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of an Integrity Commissioner's report finding she breached the Code of Conduct, and the municipal council's subsequent decision to suspend her remuneration and restrict her email communications.

The Divisional Court upheld the Integrity Commissioner's findings that the applicant's communications with the Chief Administrative Officer were abusive and breached the Code.

However, the Court found the council's decision to restrict the applicant from emailing all municipal staff for 14.5 months was overbroad, punitive, and unreasonable.

The application was granted in part, quashing the email restriction.

During a trial of an issue on damages arising from an application, the applicant objected to numerous pieces of viva voce evidence introduced by the respondents.

The court had previously directed that the damages trial proceed on the closed record as it existed when the application was initially argued.

The court applied a bright-line test, ruling that any evidence not actually found in the underlying application record was inadmissible to prevent trial by ambush.

The court sustained the majority of the applicant's objections, rejecting the respondents' arguments that the new evidence was merely a permissible amplification of the existing record or a necessary response to the applicant's expert.

The appellants, The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation and CIBC Mellon Global Securities Services Company, sought an order staying a lower court judgment pending appeal.

They argued that the application judge's amendments to his reasons for judgment created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The motion judge, Lauwers J.A., dismissed the motion, finding that the appellants failed to demonstrate a real likelihood or probability of bias.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay (serious issue, irreparable harm, balance of convenience) and the overarching interests of justice, concluding that a stay was not warranted.

Leave was granted to file a Supplementary Notice of Appeal.

The Respondents brought a motion seeking the recusal of the presiding judge and a declaration of mistrial, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The allegations stemmed from the judge's conduct and rulings in three prior decisions related to the ongoing application, specifically claiming predisposition towards the Applicant, disparagement of the Respondents, and insinuation into the appeal process.

The Court dismissed the motion, finding that, when viewed realistically and in full context, the judge's actions did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The decision emphasized that adverse rulings, even if potentially erroneous, do not equate to bias and should be addressed through the appeal process.

Costs were awarded to the Applicant.

The applicant sought to vary a previous judgment regarding contract beneficiaries and liability for knowing receipt.

The court declined to change the finding on beneficiaries (para 19) as it was an intentional commercial interpretation.

The court did remove an erroneous finding of breach of contract against CIBC Mellon, but declined to substitute it with a finding of knowing receipt, as that relief was not sought in the initial application.

The court granted the applicant's request to introduce evidence of damages related to data sharing by all custodial entities of Mellon Financial Corporation at the time of the agreement, despite the previous finding that those entities were entitled to receive the data.

The Court of Appeal heard a motion to review a single motion judge's order that dismissed requests to expedite an appeal and waive the requirement to file a formal liability order.

The panel upheld the motion judge's decision not to expedite the appeal, finding no error in principle or misapprehension of evidence.

However, the panel varied the order to relieve the moving parties from the obligation of filing a formal liability order to perfect their appeal, noting that the liability order was a final order.

The motion was otherwise dismissed, and costs were fixed to be awarded to the successful party on the appeal.

The applicant brought an application for judicial review of an arbitrator's interpretation of schedules to two expired collective agreements.

Prior to the hearing, the parties ratified new collective agreements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the matter moot as there was no longer a live controversy between the parties.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot case, emphasizing that it does not provide advisory opinions and that the applicant had an obligation to bargain scheduling issues rather than await a court decision on expired agreements.

The appellants moved to expedite their appeal of a liability decision and to be relieved from filing a formal order, arguing that an early appeal could render a subsequent damages trial unnecessary.

The respondent opposed, contending that the appeal should not be scheduled until the damages trial was adjudicated, allowing for a single, comprehensive appeal.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing the principle of judicial economy and the ordinary practice of pursuing a single appeal encompassing both liability and damages.

The court found that fragmenting the appeal would likely delay the overall administration of justice and that any potential costs thrown away could be addressed in a costs award.

The applicant claimed damages of over $889 million for breach of two Data Services Agreements, alleging the respondents improperly shared market pricing data within their corporate group.

The respondents argued the agreements allowed sharing across their 'line of business' or brand.

The court found the respondents breached the agreements, as the contracts, factual matrix, and parties' conduct indicated the data was restricted to the named entities.

Defences of waiver, estoppel, and limitation periods were dismissed.

However, the court found the paper record insufficient to assess damages and directed the issue of damages to a trial.