Gary T. Trotter

The appellant appealed his convictions for incest and sexual interference against his daughter, as well as the lifetime SOIRA registration order imposed at sentencing.

He argued the trial judge erred in excluding evidence of a prior allegation, assessing the complainant's inconsistent testimony, and evaluating phone and DNA records.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence of the complainant's post-trial recantation to impeach her credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings and concluding the fresh evidence was not sufficiently cogent to have changed the result.

However, on consent of the Crown, the Court granted a Charter remedy reducing the lifetime SOIRA order to 20 years following the Supreme Court's decision in Ndhlovu.

The appellant was convicted of child sexual abuse material offences.

During the execution of a search warrant at his home, police detained him for hours without properly advising him of his right to counsel.

Upon arrest weeks later, he was subjected to a routine strip search.

The trial judge found breaches of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the computer evidence.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge erred by failing to consider the strip search in the section 24(2) analysis.

Conducting a fresh analysis, the Court excluded the evidence due to the seriousness of the breaches and police ignorance of Charter standards, quashing the convictions.

The appellants were convicted of misrepresentation offences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The trial judge delivered bottom-line guilty verdicts but delayed providing written reasons for over nine months.

The appellants appealed, arguing the delay rebutted the presumption of judicial integrity.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the lengthy, largely unexplained delay, combined with the trial judge's characterization of the post-verdict period as 'deliberation time', would cause a reasonable observer to apprehend that the reasons were an after-the-fact justification.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants defaulted on a commercial loan secured by a collateral mortgage.

The respondent lender invoked an acceleration clause to demand the outstanding principal and unaccrued future interest.

The appellants argued the contract did not permit accelerating future interest and that section 17 of the Mortgages Act capped their liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the contract's plain language included future interest in the accelerated indebtedness.

Furthermore, the Court clarified that section 17 of the Mortgages Act only applies to defaults in the payment of principal occurring after the contractual maturity date, not to defaults during the term of the mortgage.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed on the respondent for sexually assaulting his stepdaughter when she was a child.

The sentencing judge had imposed the conditional sentence primarily due to the collateral consequences incarceration would have on the respondent's dependent adult son.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the sentence demonstrably unfit given the high moral culpability of the offender and the gravity of the offence.

The Court substituted a three-year custodial sentence, noting that collateral consequences cannot overwhelm other sentencing principles such as denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a judge-alone trial.

The Crown had conceded it could not prove the appellant inflicted the fatal stab wound based on the evidence of a key witness alone, and advanced a theory of manslaughter.

The trial judge rejected this concession without notice and convicted the appellant of murder based on co-principal liability under s. 21(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's failure to clearly notify counsel that he was considering co-principal liability for murder, and his rejection of the Crown's concession without inviting submissions, deprived the defence of a meaningful opportunity to respond.

This lack of notice amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused appealed convictions for sexual assault and assault arising from a coercive sexual encounter, arguing that the jury was inadequately instructed on the use of discreditable conduct evidence.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, contending that a 20-month conditional sentence for sexual assault involving penetration was demonstrably unfit.

The court held that the jury charge, read functionally and as a whole, sufficiently guarded against impermissible propensity reasoning and punishment for bad character.

However, the sentencing judge failed to justify a major departure from the usual three-to-five-year range for serious sexual assault, and a penitentiary sentence of three years was substituted.

Because the offender had completed the conditional sentence and reincarceration would not serve the interests of justice, execution of the substituted sentence was stayed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and nine-year sentence for impaired driving causing death, criminal negligence causing death, and related offences.

The collision occurred after the appellant drove at excessive speeds and struck oncoming traffic.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in identifying him as the driver based on seatbelt marks, and in dismissing his Charter challenges regarding his arrest and right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly inferred the appellant was the driver and correctly held that police had reasonable grounds to arrest both occupants when they blamed each other.

The court also upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis and found the nine-year sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the high moral blameworthiness of the conduct.

The appellant, an investment adviser, was convicted of fraud, theft, and obstructing a police officer after misappropriating funds from his clients.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapplied the reasonable doubt standard and the W.(D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly instructed himself, made cogent factual findings supported by the evidence, and correctly concluded that the appellant knowingly deceived his clients and made evasive statements to the investigating police officer.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his application under s. 490 of the Criminal Code for the return of a seized cell phone.

The Court of Appeal held there was no error in the application judge’s refusal to order the phone returned, particularly because the appellant’s criminal trial was ongoing and the issue of ultimate return could be addressed by the trial judge.

The court further held it had no jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s request for access to and copies of material from the detained phone because s. 490(15) bars an appeal from decisions concerning access to and examination of detained items.

The appeal was dismissed, while noting that a more particularized future application for access might be available.

The appellant, convicted by a jury as a party to a commercial robbery for acting as the getaway driver, challenged both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the circumstantial evidence, including cellphone searches, call activity, her links to the robbers before and after the offence, and her role in transporting the robbers and stolen property, reasonably supported the inference that she knew in advance that a robbery involving violence or threats would occur.

The court also held that although Crown counsel's reconstructed dialogue in closing submissions was improper and should not be used, the tactic did not render the trial unfair in light of the qualifications given, the evidentiary foundation for the inferences, and the trial judge's corrective instruction.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed because no error in principle or factual error was shown and there was no basis to interfere with the custodial sentence.

The appellant appealed a 10-year penitentiary sentence imposed for a sexual assault committed with another person while the victim was threatened with an imitation firearm.

He argued that the sentencing judge failed to fairly weigh aggravating and mitigating factors and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The Court of Appeal rejected those grounds, finding no error in the sentencing analysis and no basis to interfere with the fitness of sentence.

With the respondent's consent, the court corrected a calculation error in presentence custody credit and adjusted the credit to 2,054 days.

Appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code concerning a person under the Board’s jurisdiction who had been approved for supervised community living but had not yet secured an appropriate placement.

The Board expanded the permitted geographic scope of community accommodation to Southern Ontario but declined to order an independent housing assessment, finding the request premature in light of ongoing placement efforts.

The Court of Appeal found no error in that approach and dismissed the appeal.

The court added that, if housing is still not secured by the next review hearing, the Board should engage its inquisitorial mandate and require further evidence, expert or otherwise, on the housing challenges.

The appellant appealed a twenty-month custodial sentence for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the sentencing judge should have imposed a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that although a conditional sentence may be available in unusual opioid-trafficking cases, denunciation and general deterrence will typically require incarceration.

The sentencing judge conducted a case-specific analysis, and the applicable deferential sentence-appeal standard disclosed no basis for appellate intervention.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and arson in relation to the death of his wife.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the hearsay utterances of a co-accused, obtained during a Mr. Big operation, who confessed to the murder and claimed the appellant hired him.

The co-accused refused to testify at trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the hearsay evidence and in his instructions to the jury regarding the hearsay evidence, bad character evidence, and the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's threshold reliability analysis or jury instructions.

The appellant appealed convictions for first degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and arson arising from a contract killing proved in significant part through confessions obtained in a Mr. Big operation.

He argued that undercover officers improperly discouraged him from consulting his lawyer before meeting a senior undercover operative, and that this conduct amounted to an abuse of process requiring exclusion of his statements.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge was entitled to find the confessions reliable and admissible under the Hart framework, and that the brief exchange about counsel did not coerce the appellant or otherwise undermine the integrity of the justice system.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment declaring the respondent the sole beneficial owner of a residential property and ordering its transfer, along with general and punitive damages.

The trial judge found the appellant held the property in trust for the respondent, her niece, who paid the deposit and carrying costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's interpretation of the trust documents or her rejection of the appellant's illegality defence.

The punitive damages award was upheld as the appellant's high-handed conduct, including failing to pay property taxes and maintain insurance, merited sanction.

The appellant bank appealed an order dismissing its motion regarding the character of a debt.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the motion judge's order was not a final order because it did not resolve the substantive dispute between the parties, leaving the issue open to be pursued before the Bankruptcy Court.

The appellant, a former lawyer, sued the respondent banks for freezing his accounts after he was charged with money laundering and fraud.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action and awarded $225,000 in substantial indemnity costs against the appellant.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial despite the respondents' delay in bringing the motion.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the costs award, reducing it to $175,000 on the basis that the unaccepted settlement offer should not have elevated costs incurred prior to the offer being made.

In a third addendum and costs decision, the Court of Appeal ordered that an unpaid $4,000 costs award be deducted from the damages payable to the respondent.

The court accepted the appellants' damages recalculation, correcting a minor addition error to fix the net profit at $939,898.64, with 50% amounting to $469,949.32.

As the results of the appeal were mixed, the court ordered that the parties bear their own costs.