Gary T. Trotter

The appellant, a lawyer, was convicted of criminal harassment, extortion, and two counts of uttering threats arising from his conduct toward a former client and a friend.

He was sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

He applied for bail pending appeal under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding that while the appeal was not frivolous, the appellant failed to meet the public interest component of the bail test on both public safety and public confidence grounds.

The appellant's paranoid and grandiose testimony at trial, combined with the gravity of the offences and the weakness of the appeal, supported detention.

The appellant appealed an indeterminate sentence imposed following convictions for assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, and carrying a concealed weapon.

The offences arose from the appellant's actions at the American consulate in Toronto, where she forced her way into the building and slashed a security guard with a box cutter.

The appellant argued the sentence was disproportionate given that she had never caused more than minor bodily harm and her violent offences were few and far between.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly applied section 753.01(5) of the Criminal Code and that there was no reasonable expectation a determinate sentence would adequately protect the public.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a jury trial and sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 15 years and 9 months.

He appealed both conviction and sentence on multiple grounds, including challenges to the trial judge's Corbett application ruling regarding his criminal record, the adequacy of jury instructions on propensity reasoning and post-offence conduct, the sufficiency of corrective measures following inflammatory Crown closing arguments, and the application of Gladue principles in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in principle by the trial judge and upholding both the conviction and sentence.

The applicant was convicted of sexual interference, internet luring, and two counts of failing to comply with a release order.

He was sentenced to six years and ten months imprisonment.

The applicant applied for bail pending appeal of his convictions.

The motion judge refused bail, finding that while the appeal was not frivolous, it barely met that threshold.

The enforceability considerations arising from the grave nature of the offences—ongoing sexual abuse of a 13-year-old child—outweighed the weak grounds of appeal.

The motion judge concluded that release would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario addressed outstanding issues in a motion brought by the respondent seeking orders under ss. 683(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code in support of an anticipated fresh evidence application.

The court considered two primary issues: (1) whether the Executive Legal Officer of the Superior Court should be required to provide a will-say statement and submit to cross-examination regarding communications with trial Crown counsel; and (2) whether counsel for the respondent could communicate with the now-retired trial judge to obtain clarification on matters raised in the trial judge's emails.

The court dismissed the motion for a will-say and cross-examination of the Executive Legal Officer, finding that while the communications were not themselves privileged, the risk of inadvertently disclosing matters subject to judicial immunity outweighed the limited probative value of the evidence sought.

The court also directed that neither counsel could communicate with the retired trial judge, holding that judges cannot waive judicial immunity and that the inquiries sought would necessarily disclose matters covered by judicial immunity.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of Canada's federal electoral system under sections 3 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

They argued that the Single Member Plurality (SMP) system violates the right to vote by creating disproportionality between votes cast and seats won, and violates equality rights by underrepresenting women, racial minorities, and small political parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the electoral system does not infringe either section 3 or section 15 of the Charter.

The court found that the right to vote is a right to participate in the electoral process, not a right to have votes translated into representation in any particular manner.

Electoral outcomes resulting from citizens' free choices cannot violate constitutional rights.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and incest against his daughter, committed between November 1998 and February 2002 when the victim was between 8 and 12 years old.

He was sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the fairness of the trial based on the Crown's closing address and the reasonableness of the incest conviction.

He also appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions, sufficient evidence to support the incest conviction, and that the sentence was fit and warranted given the appellant's prior conviction for similar offences against a young child.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Baba Ouedraogo’s appeal from sentence, except to vacate the sentencing judge’s recommendation for phallometric testing.

The appellant challenged the imposition of a second Long Term Supervision Order (LTSO), the finding of substantial risk of reoffence, the imposition of lifetime prohibition orders, and the recommendation for phallometric testing.

The court found no error in the sentencing judge’s approach to issue estoppel, risk assessment, or the imposition of prohibition orders, but held that a recommendation for phallometric testing was not legally available without the offender’s consent.

The appellant, Keldon Halstead, abandoned his appeal from convictions entered by Justice Shaun S. Nakatsuru of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario, constituted by Fairburn A.C.J.O., Trotter J.A., and Harvison Young J.A., noted the abandonment at Mr. Halstead’s request and dismissed the appeal.

The decision is subject to a publication ban on the identity of a witness under section 486.31(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the sentence of a young person, G.D., who committed serious offences at ages 15 and 16 and was sentenced as a youth at age 19.

The court reviewed fresh evidence of rehabilitation and determined that transferring G.D. to an adult correctional facility would undermine his progress.

The court set aside part of the custodial sentence and probation order, substituting shorter custody and a longer probation period, in the interests of justice.

The appellant, Tyson Peti, appealed the sentence imposed after pleading guilty to assault with a weapon, mischief, and failing to comply with an undertaking.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge’s decision to impose the Crown’s proposed sentence of 18 months, despite the judge’s reservations about its leniency.

The Court recognized the appellant’s rehabilitative efforts but concluded the sentence was fit given the seriousness of the offence and the appellant’s criminal record.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Ashton Turnquest, appealed a global four-year sentence, specifically challenging the three-year probation order imposed following his release from custody.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found no error in principle and held that, given the seriousness of the domestic offences, the three-year probation term was not demonstrably unfit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered an application by Raymond LeBlanc, who appealed convictions for robbery, forcible confinement, theft, theft of a motor vehicle, and possession of stolen property, as well as his sentence.

The appeal was adjourned to allow the applicant to pursue an application for production under s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The court also granted a s. 684(1) order appointing counsel for the limited purpose of this application, now characterized as a motion for directions.

The court determined that, due to complex privilege and confidential informant issues, the other grounds of appeal should be determined first.

The matter was converted to a solicitor appeal, with Michael Lacy appointed as counsel.

The Associate Chief Justice will case manage the matter as necessary.

The appellant, Sandra Forcier, appealed her convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge’s credibility findings or conclusions.

The court noted the assistance of amicus curiae due to the appellant’s brain injury and confirmed that the trial judge’s reasons were entitled to deference.

The appellant, Taylor Kuhni, appealed the imposition of a lifetime driving prohibition following guilty pleas to several offences, including dangerous operation of a conveyance.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in imposing a lifetime prohibition, as the maximum allowed by law was 10 years.

The court substituted a 10-year prohibition and dismissed the appellant’s request for an adjournment to consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellants, Andrew Smoke and Eric Smoke, appealed their convictions for the second degree murder of Andrew “Scruff” Davis.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the trial judge’s instructions to the jury regarding aiding and abetting, after-the-fact conduct, and the use of statements attributed to Andrew.

The court also found the verdict against Eric was not unreasonable, given the circumstantial evidence, including DNA and video evidence.

This decision concerns a Crown appeal from sentence, focusing on the tension between proportionality and public protection in sentencing a repeat violent offender.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to give sufficient weight to the respondent’s extensive criminal record and the seriousness of her recent offences, and by anchoring the analysis solely to a previous sentence.

The Court substituted a penitentiary sentence and imposed a 10-year Long-Term Supervision Order (LTSO), emphasizing the need for public protection and the proper application of sentencing principles.

The appellant, Rasha Al-Enzi, appealed her 11-year sentence for kidnapping with a prohibited firearm and robbery with a restricted firearm, both arising from home invasions.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the aggravating and mitigating factors considered by the sentencing judge, including the seriousness of the offences, the presence of children, and the appellant’s personal circumstances.

The appellant argued for concurrent sentences and raised concerns about the treatment of her parenthood as an aggravating factor.

The Court found no error in the sentencing judge’s exercise of discretion, held that consecutive sentences were appropriate, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, Baba Ouedraogo, appealed the imposition of a long-term supervision order following convictions for two serious sexual assaults on strangers.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the sentencing judge’s assessment, including expert evidence, justified the long-term offender designation and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of law enforcement agencies found liable for the negligent arrest and detention of two senior citizens at the Canada/U.S. border, based on inaccurate information in the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC) system.

The court held that, in the circumstances, the officers were required to verify the CPIC information before arresting the respondents.

The decision clarifies that the standard of care for police officers incorporates criminal law standards and that, depending on the context, officers may be required to verify database information before acting.

The court also rejected arguments that the law had changed since the incident or that the trial judge applied an inappropriately high standard.