Caitlin Jamie Sharawy

The appellant, Rasha Al-Enzi, appealed her 11-year sentence for kidnapping with a prohibited firearm and robbery with a restricted firearm, both arising from home invasions.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the aggravating and mitigating factors considered by the sentencing judge, including the seriousness of the offences, the presence of children, and the appellant’s personal circumstances.

The appellant argued for concurrent sentences and raised concerns about the treatment of her parenthood as an aggravating factor.

The Court found no error in the sentencing judge’s exercise of discretion, held that consecutive sentences were appropriate, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, Krishan Arora, appealed his sentence of seven years and two months for four counts of forcible confinement and one count of extortion.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge’s approach to aggravating and mitigating factors.

The court held that the sentencing judge did not double count aggravating circumstances and properly considered the appellant’s guilty plea, remorse, and gambling debts.

The sentence was found to be fit given the seriousness of the offences and their impact on the victims.

The appellant appealed his convictions for eleven charges arising from an armed robbery of a cryptocurrency exchange business.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing circumstantial evidence and failed to consider reasonable inferences inconsistent with guilt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the Villaroman principles and reasonably concluded that the appellant's participation in the robbery was the only plausible inference based on the totality of the evidence, including DNA on clothing used in the robbery.

The appellant, Kyle Robert Bancroft, appealed his convictions for two frauds, arguing that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient assistance to him as a self-represented accused, particularly regarding the distinction between evidence and argument and the proper procedure for impeaching witnesses.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did err in not providing adequate assistance and in refusing to allow the appellant to recall witnesses or introduce banking records.

However, the court concluded that these errors were not material to the outcome, as the evidence against the appellant was overwhelming and corroborated by independent witnesses.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, R.M., appealed convictions for attempted abduction of his son and assault of another boy.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the actus reus of attempted abduction by failing to apply s. 24(2) of the Criminal Code, which designates this as a question of law for the judge.

The court quashed the attempted abduction conviction and substituted it with a conviction for unlawful confinement, lifting the conditional stay on that charge.

The appeal against the assault conviction was dismissed, as were arguments regarding unlawful confinement jury instructions.

The appellant, Robert Casarsa, appealed his conviction for two counts of sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The conviction appeal raised issues regarding the trial judge's assessment of collusion risk between complainants and the alleged reversal of the onus of proof concerning corroborating evidence.

The sentence appeal sought to introduce fresh evidence of job loss and challenged the denial of a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no material errors in the trial judge's reasoning on conviction and concluding that the fresh evidence or conditional sentence arguments would not have altered the imposed sentence.

The appellant sought to withdraw his guilty plea to one count of uttering threats, claiming he was pressured due to being in custody and unable to afford trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the plea was informed and voluntary.

The court noted that while pressures exist when pleading guilty in custody, the plea comprehension inquiry conducted by the trial judge, coupled with the appellant's representation by counsel and lack of voiced concerns at the time, indicated a clear and informed waiver of his right to trial.

The appeal against sentence was also dismissed as the sentence had already been served.

The appellant, a youth at the time of the offence, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder and his sentence as an adult to life imprisonment with a ten-year parole ineligibility period.

The conviction appeal raised issues regarding the admission of text messages, the reasonableness of the verdict, the lack of a Vetrovec warning, and jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors by the trial judge and concluding the verdict was reasonable.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in relying on unproven aggravating factors to impose an adult sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the adult sentence, finding the Crown had rebutted the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness and that a youth sentence would be insufficient to hold the appellant accountable.

The appellant, Terrence Rivard, appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and a 6-year sentence.

The trial judge had acquitted him of assault with a weapon but convicted him of aggravated assault on Daniel Shaver, rejecting his self-defence claim regarding Shaver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and factual findings, supported by independent evidence, were sound.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, noting the appellant's significant criminal record and the severe impact on the victim.

The appellant appealed a conviction for invitation to sexual touching involving a young child, arguing that the trial judge made improper credibility findings, shifted the burden of proof, and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The Crown's case relied largely on a video-recorded statement given by the complainant as a child, which was admitted under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code and adopted at trial.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence, including discrepancies and defence testimony, and repeatedly reminded himself of the Crown’s burden of proof.

Although some factual inconsistencies were not expressly resolved, the trial judge considered them within the reasonable doubt analysis.

The appellate court concluded that the verdict was reasonably supported by the evidence and disclosed no reversible error.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession, making available, and making child pornography, raising four grounds: unfair trial due to admission of child pornography, undermined defence, breach of s. 10(b) Charter rights regarding right to counsel, and breach of s. 8 Charter rights regarding a strip search.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on all grounds, finding that the trial judge properly balanced the probative value and prejudicial effect of the evidence, did not err in charging the jury, and correctly applied Charter principles regarding the right to counsel and the reasonableness of the strip search.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for arson, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to continue her conditional discharge with reduced requirements, seeking an absolute discharge.

The Board had determined she remained a "significant threat" to public safety due to partial insight into her illness, attempts to negotiate medication reductions, poor sleep hygiene, and a recent involuntary hospitalization with symptoms similar to her index offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's conclusion was reasonable and amply supported by the evidence, and that the Board properly considered all evidence, including factors favouring the appellant's absolute discharge, and reduced restrictions accordingly.

The appellant, Marc Jean, appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed due to a lack of awareness regarding the significant immigration consequences.

The respondent conceded the appeal should be allowed based on fresh evidence supporting the uninformed plea.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding a reasonable possibility that the appellant would have proceeded differently had he understood the consequences.

The conviction was set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Jemaal Wilson, appealed his convictions for human trafficking, receiving material benefit, making and distributing child pornography, and procuring, as well as his global seven-year sentence.

The Crown conceded an acquittal for the procuring conviction and a conditional stay for one material benefit conviction (Kienapple principle).

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in applying an overly narrow definition of "control" for human trafficking but upheld the conviction by amending the indictment to include "direction or influence," finding no prejudice to the appellant.

The Court dismissed the appeal regarding the fault element of human trafficking and the complainant's credibility.

On sentencing, the Court found the global seven-year sentence fit, despite the trial judge's error in considering a subsequent manslaughter conviction as an aggravating factor, and clarified that pre-sentence custody should apply to all counts.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault and forcible confinement, appealed his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no reviewable error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence, credibility, and application of the burden of proof.

The court upheld the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's implausible account and acceptance of the complainant's evidence, despite minor inconsistencies.

The sentence appeal was allowed only to quash the unconstitutional victim surcharge order, with the balance of the sentence remaining in effect.

The appellant, I.W., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, sexual interference, and sexual exploitation.

The central issue at trial was whether the sexual relationship with the complainant began before she turned 16, as she could not legally consent before that age.

The appeal raised three grounds: the trial judge's instruction regarding the complainant's outbursts, the admission of a prior consistent statement, and the correction of a Crown misstatement of facts.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and the fresh evidence application, upholding the convictions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, common assault, and mischief, and sought leave to appeal his global sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals against the sexual assault and common assault convictions, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of DNA evidence, resolution of inconsistencies, or consideration of post-offence conduct.

However, the mischief conviction was quashed due to insufficient analysis by the trial judge.

The sentence appeal was allowed only to correct a pre-sentence custody credit error, with the overall sentence upheld as appropriate given the nature of the offences and the appellant's record.

The appellant, Grant Litt, appealed his conviction for breaking and entering, touching a person under 16 for a sexual purpose, and attempting to choke a person to commit sexual assault, stemming from a home invasion.

The sole issue at trial was identity.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's assessment of evidence, particularly expert evidence on a boot print, and the dismissal of a Charter application to exclude evidence.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence: a revised expert opinion on the boot print, downgrading its association with the appellant's boot.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it met the cogency and due diligence criteria, as the trial judge had heavily relied on the original expert opinion and failed to sufficiently scrutinize other circumstantial evidence.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, J.L., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sexual interference against his daughter, C.L. The appeal challenged the trial judge's admission of three out-of-court statements made by C.L.: two under the principled exception to the hearsay rule and one under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that the video-recorded statement was not made within a reasonable time and not adopted by the complainant, and that the first two statements failed the necessity and threshold reliability criteria, particularly regarding potential influence from the mother and alternative explanations for the abuse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the hearsay exceptions, including the assessment of reasonable time, adoption, necessity (distinguishing from cumulative hearsay), and substantive reliability (ruling out speculative alternative explanations and addressing concerns about maternal influence).

The Crown appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that ordered a new trial after the trial judge made a factual error regarding the year the accused underwent sexual offender treatment.

The majority of the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence had an impact on the conviction and resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The Supreme Court of Canada restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge's error regarding the specific year of the sex offender treatment did not have any material impact on the trial judge's overall assessment of the similar fact evidence or the accused's credibility when the trial judge's reasons were considered as a whole, and that no miscarriage of justice occurred.