Myles Anevich

The appellant appealed a criminal conviction upheld by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard the appeal and delivered an oral judgment the same day, unanimously dismissing the appeal and upholding the conviction.

Short reasons were indicated to follow.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding phone records.

The appellant, a driving instructor, sexually assaulted the complainant in his office.

At trial, the defence argued the appellant's phone records did not show calls to the complainant on the day of the offence.

The trial judge accepted the complainant's evidence that the appellant had multiple phones.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence and noting that the issue of how the parties arranged to meet was peripheral to the trial judge's reasoning.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary and the result of ineffective assistance by his trial counsel.

He alleged that his counsel forced him to sign a damaging affidavit for a s. 276 application and improperly advised him about the trial judge's potential bias.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that trial counsel's strategic decisions were reasonable given the overwhelming evidence against the appellant, including text messages and counselling records.

The court concluded that the appellant failed to establish professional incompetence or a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant was convicted of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and possession of a loaded restricted or prohibited firearm.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the verdicts were inconsistent with his acquittals on other firearm charges, and appealed his 13-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding it was open to the jury to find constructive possession of the fentanyl and one firearm while having a reasonable doubt about the other.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to apply the principle of restraint for a youthful first-time offender.

The sentence for the drug offence was reduced from 13 years to 10 years.

The appellant challenged admission of drug evidence after a found s. 10(b) breach, arguing exclusion under s. 24(2).

The court found no reviewable error in the trial judge’s Grant analysis and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant, convicted of one count of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference against his adopted daughter and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment, sought release pending appeal pursuant to s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

The motion judge found the appeal was not frivolous, as there was a serious issue regarding whether the trial judge materially misapprehended the relevance of the complainant's admitted fabrication of a prior criminal allegation against her mother.

Despite the seriousness of the offences and the length of the sentence, the reviewability interest outweighed the enforceability interest given the arguable ground of appeal challenged the credibility evaluation central to the conviction.

Public safety concerns were mitigated by the applicant's three-year compliance with his bail plan.

The motion was granted and the applicant was ordered released on conditions.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual interference against two children under the age of 16 years.

The trial judge found that the appellant had committed sexual offences against both complainants in a park in Brantford on a single occasion in August 2019, and that he had also sexually abused one complainant over an extended period in the family home prior to the park incident.

The appellant was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on three grounds: alleged errors in the W.(D.) analysis, uneven scrutiny of evidence, and misapprehension of DNA evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in requiring proof that the offence occurred within a specific one-hour window after the accused raised an alibi defence.

The accused cross-appealed his conviction for assault, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the exact time of the offence was not an essential element and the alibi did not freeze the Crown's case to the time estimated by the complainant in cross-examination.

A conviction for sexual assault was substituted.

The accused's cross-appeal was dismissed, as the trial judge's treatment of the defence evidence was not inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Ashir Mahmood’s conviction and sentence appeals for sexual assault.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by not giving a post-offence conduct instruction regarding a text message, by providing insufficient instructions on prior consistent statements, and by delivering an unbalanced charge.

The court found the jury was properly instructed and that the trial judge considered all relevant sentencing factors, including the appellant’s youth and lack of criminal record.

The conviction and sentence were upheld.

The appellant, Loveneet Kaur, appealed her conviction for impaired operation and operation with blood-alcohol concentration over 80, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence.

The court reviewed the trial judge’s findings, including the rejection of the appellant’s evidence and the application of the statutory and common law tests for care and control.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court finding no error in the trial judge’s analysis or application of the law.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder alongside a co-accused, brought a pre-trial motion seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from the swearing of the information to the anticipated end of trial was 1156 days.

The court deducted periods of defence delay, including time taken to retain counsel and unavailability for scheduled dates, as well as exceptional circumstances arising from the co-accused's counsel's conflict of interest and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The net delay fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan, and the court found the Crown took reasonable steps to move the joint prosecution forward.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant, S.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended material evidence and failed to provide sufficient reasons regarding the complainant’s credibility and motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge’s assessment of the evidence or in her reasons, holding that the findings were open to her on the record and that the reasons were sufficient for appellate review.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her convictions for fraud, uttering forged documents, and breach of probation arising from the purchase of jewellery using fraudulent cheques.

On appeal, she sought to introduce a bank statement as fresh evidence to show she believed she had sufficient funds.

The Court of Appeal declined to admit the fresh evidence, finding it was not genuine based on a sworn statement from a bank investigator.

The Court also rejected the appellant's argument that the trial judge failed to conduct a proper analysis of the circumstantial evidence regarding her mental state, concluding the evidence of her fraudulent intent was overwhelming.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The moving party, a youth offender convicted of assault causing bodily harm, sought bail pending his appeal.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the moving party's extensive history of breaching pretrial release conditions, including fleeing police and possessing weapons, demonstrated he would not surrender into custody.

Furthermore, the court held that his detention was necessary in the public interest due to significant public safety concerns and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, sexual exploitation, sexual assault, and uttering a threat, arguing the trial judge made three errors in the jury charge.

The appellant contended the trial judge failed to provide a Villaroman instruction regarding circumstantial evidence, failed to instruct on a motive to fabricate, and failed to instruct that the accused did not have to explain the complainant's motives.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a Villaroman instruction was not required as the case was not wholly or substantially circumstantial, and that the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the burden of proof without reversing it.

The appellant appealed her convictions for fraudulent personation and offences related to a forged certificate of stay of probation.

She argued the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove she prepared and sent the documents, and that the trial should have been heard in Superior Court because a testifying lawyer allegedly acted as a second prosecutor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded guilt was the only logical inference, and rejected the jurisdictional argument as meritless.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The accused, Jun-Feng Zhang, brought a second application for a stay of proceedings, alleging a breach of his s.11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The court applied the Jordan framework, specifically analyzing a 164-day delay that arose during the trial when the complainant required independent legal advice regarding privacy rights in redacted text messages.

The court found this delay to be a discrete exceptional circumstance, as it was unforeseen and the Crown made reasonable efforts to remedy it.

Consequently, the total net delay remained below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice, and the application was dismissed.

The appellant, S.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred by misapprehending the complainant's evidence regarding her alleged financial motive to fabricate and by failing to properly consider the implausibility of the assaults given the proximity of sleeping children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge and concluding that the trial judge adequately addressed the implausibility argument.

The court affirmed the trial judge's entitlement to believe the complainant's testimony.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment and his nine-month sentence.

The conviction appeal raised issues regarding the trial judge's findings on "lawful authority" for the appellant's actions and the objective reasonableness of the complainant's fear.

The sentence appeal argued that the sentence was disproportionate and that the trial judge erred by relying on inapt comparator cases and failing to adhere to the "step-up" principle.

The court dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's conclusions on lawful authority or the objective reasonableness of the complainant's fear, and no error in principle regarding the sentence, which was deemed fit given the appellant's criminal record and lack of remorse.

The appellant, Asim Shabbir, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, alleging fundamental errors in the trial judge's jury instructions.

The grounds of appeal included the failure to provide a "Villaroman" instruction regarding circumstantial evidence (specifically, the complainant's alleged drugging), inadequate instructions on assessing evidence inconsistencies, and a "Laboucan" error concerning the accused's credibility.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions, when read as a whole and in context, were functionally adequate.

The court noted the defence counsel's failure to object to the instructions at trial and that closing submissions could address certain gaps.

The court also found no error in the instruction regarding separate consideration of co-accused.