His Majesty the King v. Ammar Patel, 2025 ONSC 3362

CITATION: R. v. Patel, 2025 ONSC 3362

COURT FILE NO.: CR-23-267

DATE: 20250605

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

AMMAR PATEL

Applicant

Meredith Gardiner, Andrea Mason and Vanessa Decker, for the Crown

Myles Anevich and Katie Scott, for the Applicant

HEARD: April 9, 2025

reasons for charter s. 11(b) ruling

justice h.a. rady

Introduction

1On September 10, 2021, Lynda Marques was shot to death by two masked individuals while she was seated in a vehicle usually driven by her fiancé that was parked in the driveway to their home. The two assailants fled in a car that is alleged to have been driven by the accused Ammar Patel.

2Following an investigation by the London and Toronto Police Services, the applicant was charged with first degree murder. The first information charging only the applicant was sworn on April 29, 2022. A replacement information was sworn on May 9, 2022 charging the applicant and Osman Afandy with first degree murder.

3The case moved through the Ontario Court of Justice (OCJ) and was remitted to the Superior Court of Justice (SCJ) on November 14, 2023. At the November 12, 2024 Assignment Court, a trial date was scheduled to commence June 9, 2025 for five weeks with a jury and challenge for cause. A total of five pre-trial motions were scheduled to be argued on behalf of the two accused commencing March 31, 2025 for two weeks.

4The case against Mr. Afandy has now been resolved. As a result, the anticipated length of the applicant’s trial has been reduced. The applicant proceeded with the pre-trial motions as scheduled. Only one week was required for that hearing. It bears observing that the applicant’s suggestion in his factum that the pre-trial motions were “almost certainly” going to be derailed because of an alleged late disclosure proved to be unduly pessimistic. They proceeded as scheduled.

5The applicant submits that there has been a systemic failure to ensure his Charter protected right to a timely trial was observed and he seeks a stay of proceedings. He submits that the delay was caused by the co-accused’s protracted delay in retaining counsel and the Crown’s refusal to consider a severance at an appropriate stage. He suggests that he was essentially held hostage by his co-accused’s inaction and the Crown’s recalcitrance.

6The total delay, he says, is 1156 days from the date that the information was sworn until the anticipated end of trial. The applicant expressly waived 127 days of delay, leaving a net delay of 1029 days or 34 months and 9 days.

7The Crown agrees that the total time between the swearing of the information until the anticipated last day of trial is 1156 days. It submits that defence delay is 211 days, which when subtracted from 1156 days leaves 945 days or 31.07 months. The Crown deducts a further 91 days for exceptional circumstances, leaving a net delay of 854 days or 28.08 months and therefore below the Jordan ceiling.

8On May 16, 2025, I dismissed the Application with reasons to follow. These reasons explain why I have concluded that the applicant’s right to trial within a reasonable time has not been breached and the application must be dismissed.

The Law

9The case law that has emerged following the release of R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 is well developed and it is possible to distill a number of principles that help guide the Court’s analysis.

1. All justice participants share the responsibility to move cases promptly forward to trial: Jordan supra at paras. 112-116. All counsel are expected to take steps to avoid delay: R. v. Cody, 2017 SCC 31 at paras. 35-36; R. v. Thanabalasingham, 2020 SCC 18 at para. 9.

2. The framework for calculating delay was developed in R. v. Coulter, 2016 ONCA 704, at paras. 34-41. First, the total delay is tallied, less defence delay including delay that is waived by the defence. This yields the net delay. It is compared to the presumptive ceiling. If the net delay exceeds the ceiling, the Crown must establish exceptional circumstances. If it cannot, a stay must follow. Exceptional circumstances are divided into two categories – discrete events and particularly complex cases. Exceptional circumstances are deducted leaving the final calculation of delay. If it exceeds 30 months, a stay of proceedings necessarily follows. If the figure is less than 30 months, the burden shifts to the defence to establish that the delay is nevertheless unreasonable. See also Jordan supra at paras. 47-48, 69; and R. v. Khattra, 2020 ONSC 7894. Defence delay is delay caused solely by the conduct of the defence.

3. For the purpose of s. 11(b) calculations, the following formula should be used to convert days to months: Days ÷ 30.417 = months. See R. v. Chung, 2021 ONCA 188.

4. Delay has two components: periods that are waived explicitly or explicitly. Waiver must be clear and unequivocal: R. v. Jordan supra at paras. 60-66.

5. Defence actions legitimately taken to respond to the charges will not count against the defence. Examples of defence caused delay include frivolous applications and requests, and times when the Court and Crown are available and ready to proceed but the defence is not: Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 at paras. 60-66; Coulter supra at paras. 72-77.

6. In Jordan, supra, at para. 64, the Court directed that when calculating delay, the defence will have “directly caused the delay if the Court and the Crown are ready to proceed, but the defence is not”. See also R. v. Williamson, 2016 SCC 28, at paras. 21-22; and R. v. Malozzi, 2017 ONCA 644, at para. 34.

7. However, there is no “bright line rule” that all delay following defence unavailability for a date is attributable to the defence. A contextual approach is required and all relevant circumstances should be considered to determine how to apportion delay: R. v. Hanan, 2023 SCC 12, at para. 9.

8. Most recently in R. v. Jones, 2025 ONCA 103, at para. 9, the Court instructed that:

In my view the application judge erred in failing to characterize any portion of this delay as defence delay. While Hanan rejects a bright-line rule apportioning the defence with all of the delay after it rejects an available date, it did not adopt an inverse bright-line rule apportioning the defence with none of the delay. Instead, it directs courts to consider “all relevant circumstances” to apportion the delay among the parties.

9. Similarly, an individualized approach must be taken to the attribution of defence-caused delay in cases of jointly charged accused: R. v. Gopie, 2017 ONCA 728 at paras/ 128-136; R. v. Jacques-Taylor, 2024 ONCA 458 at paras. 7-8, leave to appeal to SCC granted 2024 CanLII 125010.

10. Exceptional circumstances lie outside the Crown’s control because they are either reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable and the Crown cannot reasonably remedy the delays that arise as a result: Jordan supra at paras. 69-72.

11. Discrete events include medical or family emergencies or cases with international dimensions. The list is not closed. The COVID-19 pandemic has been found to be a discrete event: See Jordan supra at paras. 72-74; R. v. Agpoon, 2023 ONCA 449 at paras. 33-34.

12. Any claim that the effects of the pandemic has had a ripple effect on a particular case demands careful examination: R. v. Hotaki, 2023 ONCJ 261 at para. 55.

13. Complex cases include those that require an inordinate amount of trial or preparation time. Hallmarks of complexity include multiple accused, voluminous disclosure, a large number of witnesses, significant expert evidence or charges covering a long time: Jordan supra at paras. 77-78.

The Parties’ Positions

10The Crown and defence both filed facta and charts setting out their respective calculations of delay as the case moved through the OCJ and the SCJ. There was an express waiver of delay made by the applicant on July 11, 2023, from that date until November 14, 2023 for a total of 127 days. The defence also appears to concede a further delay of 23 days from December 12, 2023 to January 3, 2024 as a result of a change in counsel, for a total admitted defence delay of 150 days. As a result, the re-calculated net delay from the defence perspective should be 1006 days or 33.1 months. The applicant attributes no delay for the time the case was in the OCJ.

11In coming to its conclusion that defence delay is 211 days, the Crown sets out its analysis as follows:

i. June 15, 2022 – September 8, 2022: 85 days – the result of seven defence adjournments for the purposes of retaining counsel;

ii. May 15, 2023 – May 29, 2023: 14 days – the result of the defence being unavailable for preliminary inquiry dates offered, but all other parties were available;

iii. June 6, 2023 – June 20, 2023: 14 days – the result of the defence being unavailable for preliminary inquiry dates offered. All other parties were available;

iv. November 14, 2023 – December 12, 2023: 29 days – the result of the defence requesting an adjournment to the next Assignment Court for the purpose of getting off the record.

v. December 12, 2023 – January 3, 2024: 23 days – because of Ms. Scott’s first availability for a JPT. The Crown had filed its Form 17 in July 2023 and had been ready to proceed to a JPT in the SCJ from the time of the applicant’s first appearance. This is the 23 day delay that the defence has also conceded;

vi. January 3, 2024 – January 9, 2024: 6 days – delay from the cancelled January 3, 2024 JPT to the next Assignment Court;

vii. March 11, 2024 – March 27, 2024: 16 days – delay as a result of the applicant’s counsel’s unavailability for earliest JPT that was offered;

viii. August 6, 2024 – August 9, 2024: 3 days – delay as a result of the applicant’s counsel being unavailable for JPT dates offered;

ix. March 10, 2025 – March 31, 2025: 21 days – delay as a result of the applicant’s counsel being unavailable for Pre-trial Motions on the earlier dates offered. All other parties were available the weeks of March 10 and March 17, 2024.

Analysis – Defence Delay

12As a preliminary matter, I am puzzled by the Crown’s calculation. As noted, the Crown and defence agree that the starting point for the analysis is a total delay of 1156 days. The defence deducts 127 days for admitted defence delay. For reasons not apparent to me, the Crown does not follow suit. It conducts its analysis and calculates 211 days of defence delay. But I see nothing in its calculation where it accounts for the defence’s admitted and explicitly waived delay. In other words, it deducts its 211 days from the 1156 rather than 338 days (i.e. 211 + 127). Ultimately, it does not matter because regardless, the delay falls below the Jordan ceiling.

13My analysis attempts to divide the chronology into six periods: the initial appearances in the OCJ and retainer of counsel; the date setting for the preliminary hearing; the first appearance in the SCJ; the termination of counsel’s retainer and appointment of new counsel; the scheduling and rescheduling of a pretrial; and the scheduling of pretrial motions and trial. The calculation of the delay arising from exceptional circumstances follows.

(i) Initial Appearances in OCJ and Retainer of Counsel

14The applicant first appeared in the OCJ on May 4, 2022. The case was adjourned to June 15, 2022 to enable him to confirm Legal Aid. There followed nine further attendances to permit him to secure counsel, culminating in the retainer of Ms. Hue by the time of the appearance on September 8, 2022.

15The delay in securing a Legal Aid Certificate and counsel seems surprisingly long in the circumstances.

16However, by July 21, 2022, it appears Legal Aid was in place. The applicant was waiting for Ms. Hue to accept the certificate. That did not occur until September 8, 2022, which arguably is defence delay. However, I have no evidence that this delay was inordinate, unusual or in fact, customary. Accordingly, I am not persuaded any allowance for defence delay is warranted for this period.

17The defence requested and the Crown began to provide disclosure promptly once Ms. Hue was on the record. As of November 17, 2022, disclosure was in hand and a JPT was scheduled. It proceeded on November 30, 2022 before Justice Skowronski.

18A further JPT was conducted on December 16, 2022 by Justice Carnegie, who directed that another should be scheduled.

(ii) Date Setting for Preliminary Hearing

19On December 22, 2022, counsel appeared to set dates for a preliminary hearing. The Court and Crown were available but the defence was not for the times offered on May 15 and 17. The applicant and the Crown were not available on May 29 or for June 6, 7, 9, 12 to 15. Ultimately, the hearing was scheduled for June 20-23, 2023. The Crown calculates the delay to be 28 days in total comprised of 14 days (May 15-29) and 14 days (June 6-20). I agree this delay is properly attributed to the defence.

20While I recognize that counsel are not expected to clear their calendar to accommodate any date offered by the court or to keep their calendars open in perpetuity, nevertheless there is a shared responsibility to make oneself reasonably available. While any criminal charge is a serious matter, a first degree murder charge is of such obvious gravity that all participants must act with particular dispatch and make reasonably necessary arrangements to be available as early as possible.

21Another JPT was conducted with Justice Carnegie on March 31, 2023. On April 20, 2023, counsel for the applicant and the Crown appeared and requested an adjournment to May 8 for judicial intensive case management. A focus hearing was scheduled for May 2, 2023 but Mr. Afandy’s counsel was not available. As a result, it was rescheduled to June 6, 2023. It proceeded at that time and the case adjourned to the preliminary hearing date that had already been scheduled. The preliminary hearing proceeded on June 20-22, 27 and 28.

22Lurking in the background was an issue that had arisen respecting Mr. Afandy’s representation. Mr. Bryant had been retained. The Crown took the position that he was in a position of conflict and could not continue to act. The Crown brought a motion to have him removed from the record. That motion was heard on July 11 and 12, 2023.

23On July 17, 2023, the motion Judge, Sigurdson J. ruled that there was no disqualifying conflict of interest for Mr. Bryant. Then Ms. Israel assumed carriage of the file. On September 19, 2023, a further motion was heard by Sigurdson J. respecting whether she was in a position of conflict.

24On September 21, 2023, the day on which the decision was to be rendered, Mr. Bryant appeared and advised the Court that he was again acting for Mr. Afandy and that it was unnecessary to have a decision on the conflict issue. Mr. Bryant had already been ruled not to be in a position of conflict and therefore, his retainer was unobjectionable to the Crown. All of this occurred during the interval for which delay had been waived by the applicant and so it had no direct bearing on the progress of his case to that point. Nevertheless, it is significant for reasons that will become apparent.

(iii) First Appearance in SCJ

25In the meantime, the two accused first appeared in the SCJ on July 11, 2023, the Crown having preferred an indictment respecting Mr. Afandy in order for both accused to proceed in tandem. The matter was adjourned to November 14, 2023, a period of 126 days, for which there was an express waiver on the record by the applicant.

26On November 14, 2023, Ms. Hue appeared and the case was adjourned again to December 12, 2023, because her retainer had been terminated and the accused was in the process of retaining new counsel. This resulted in a further delay of 29 days, which is properly attributed to the defence.

(iv) Scheduling of JPT

27By December 12, 2023, Ms. Scott was on the record for the applicant. Her first availability for a JPT was January 3, 2024, a delay of 23 days according to the Crown. As already noted, the defence appears to concede this delay in its application record, and I agree that it is properly characterized as defence delay.

28In any event, Ms. Israel appeared at that time, and she advised she was back on the record. Consequently, the Crown signalled its intention to renew its motion to remove Ms. Israel as counsel. That motion was ultimately heard on February 5, 2024 and the decision reserved. The motion Judge released her decision on February 12, 2024 disqualifying Ms. Israel from acting. Mr. Afandy was self-represented from then until August 13, 2024. The motion Judge noted that any delay occasioned by the motion should not be visited on the applicant and I have not done so. However, the issue is revisited under exceptional circumstances.

29In the meantime, the JPT scheduled for January 3, 2024 date was cancelled because neither defence counsel had filed their Form 17. The case was adjourned to the January 9, 2024 Assignment Court. I make no allowance for defence delay because the case had to be spoken to at that time even if the JPT had proceeded. There was another adjournment to February 6, 2024 and again to March 5, 2024 (while the conflict motion was under reserve).

30At the March appearance, Mr. Afandy advised that Mr. Foda had been retained. Accordingly, it was possible to set a new date for a JPT. Counsel’s first availability on behalf of the applicant was March 27, 2024. The Crown and the Court were available on March 11 and 15. Accordingly, the Crown submits that the time between March 11 and 27 is defence delay. I am unable to conclude that this is defence delay given the uncertainty about Mr. Foda’s retainer. There is no information respecting his availability in any event.

31However, the JPT scheduled for April 12, 2024 before Justice Pomerance was not productive because Mr. Afandy remained self-represented. According to him, he was still attempting to find counsel with no success. The Crown advised the Court that Mr. Foda had contacted their office to say he was being retained. However, Mr. Afandy suggested that he had been waiting to hear from Mr. Foda and he had not yet been retained. The Court expressed its skepticism about Mr. Afandy’s representations. Crown counsel acknowledged at this time that a severance might be a consideration.

32Seven appearances followed between April 12, 2024 and August 13, 2024, during which Mr. Afandy was allegedly attempting to secure counsel. A review of the relevant transcripts certainly supports the conclusion that his efforts were less than diligent. Finally, Ms. Monaco was retained by the time of the August 13, 2024 Assignment Court. Ms. Monaco was awaiting disclosure which Ms. Scott described as large. The matter was adjourned to the September 10, 2024 Assignment Court. The presiding judge observed that there was no apparent prejudice to the applicant in the one month delay. Ms. Scott did not disagree.

33On September 10, 2024, a JPT was scheduled for October 3, 2024. Justice Heeney presided. He prepared a JPT report that noted in regard to the Jordan date “for Patel, counsel agrees it is May 31, 2025.”

(v) Scheduling of Pretrial Motions

34During the October 8, 2024 Assignment Court, counsel attempted to schedule the anticipated pretrial motions. The Jordan date was initially identified once again to be May 31, 2025. However, Ms. Scott subsequently suggested an April date was the correct one. There was a lengthy discussion about pretrial and trial dates. Eight days of pretrial motions had to be scheduled 120 days before trial, as had been discussed during the October JPT. And the trial had to begin on April 28, 2025 to be Jordan compliant.

35Ms. Monaco’s availability and that of the Court were pressing challenges and Ms. Scott advised the Court that since the JPT the week prior, her previously available dates had been filled up. The Crown indicated it was not prepared to sever the co-accused. The Court explained the significant scheduling challenges presented by the case. The Court offered and the Crown, the police and Mr. Afandy were available the weeks of March 10, 17 and 24. Only Ms. Scott was not available before March 31, 2025, which I find to be defence delay of 21 days (March 10-31, 2025).

36At the Crown’s suggestion, a further JPT was arranged with Justice Heeney who agreed to make himself available as early as October 9, 2024. The JPT proceeded on October 25, 2024. Counsel appeared again on November 12, 2024. A discussion about severance and a possible s. 11(b) application on behalf of the applicant followed. The Court noted its frustration that Ms. Scott had not advised the Court about the applicant’s intention re s. 11(b) in advance of the appearance as directed by Justice Heeney. In response to the Court’s observation that the Crown should have considered a severance earlier, the Crown reiterated its willingness to make itself available no matter what.

37An 11(b) JPT proceeded on December 5, 2024. Justice Heeney directed counsel to exchange their calculations by December 9, 2024. The Crown complied. The defence did not.

38The parties returned to Assignment Court on December 10, 2024 at which time the Court was advised that Mr. Afandy’s charges were resolving.

39The parties appeared again on December 18, 2024. Ms. Scott advised that she was only proceeding with a s. 10(b) pretrial motion. Accordingly, the time required for pretrial motions was reduced by one week. Two further appearances for the applicant occurred on February 11, 2025 and March 4, 2025 to set a date for the s. 11(b) application. The defence had not yet filed its material by the February date. An adjournment request by the applicant for the pretrial motion was dismissed by Justice Moore on March 19, 2025.

(vi) Conclusion re Defence Delay

40According to my calculation, a total of 227 days is properly characterized as defence delay. Deducted from 1156 days leaves 929 days, which is just 17 days over the Jordan threshold. I move on to a discussion of exceptional circumstances.

Analysis – Exceptional Circumstances

(i) COVID

41The Crown suggests a modest deduction of seven days for the impact of COVID on Mr. Afandy’s attempts to retain counsel. His access to a telephone was curtailed during a lockdown at the institution where he was being held because of an outbreak of COVID. In my view, the Crown’s suggestion is entirely reasonable.

42If I had been asked, I might have been persuaded that more than one week for COVID delay was appropriate. The fact is that even in 2023 and 2024, the Court was still dealing with the fallout from the pandemic and its effect on trial scheduling. Justice Moore’s decision in R. v. Hawke et al, 2024 ONSC 3306, helpfully outlines the circumstances in London in 2023.

43The Court also noted during the October 8, 2024 Assignment Court appearance the significant scheduling challenges posed by this case and the complex factors impacting the scheduling of pretrial motions and trial. For example, the presiding judge noted that identifying a trial judge was difficult because judges’ schedules had essentially been set by that time. Neither Justice Pomerance nor Justice Heeney could try the case because they had pre-tried it. Furthermore, by then Justice Carnegie had been appointed to the SCJ. He could not be the trial judge because he had pre-tried the case while he presided in the OCJ, further narrowing the pool of available trial judges.

(ii) Conflict Issue

44The conflict issue respecting Ms. Israel has already been outlined above. The Crown moved expeditiously once the issue arose. A number of appearances followed until the day scheduled for Sigurdson J’s. ruling. On that day, Mr. Bryant reappeared. He advised the Court that he was assuming carriage of the defence and as a result, a ruling was unnecessary. The Crown had no objection given that Mr. Bryant had already been ruled not to be in conflict on July 17, 2023.

45However, Ms. Israel appeared again in the SCJ on December 12, 2023 and advised the Court that she intended to resume acting. This was, without doubt, a remarkable development and one that could not have been reasonably foreseen by the Crown or the Court. The Crown moved quickly to have the conflict issue adjudicated. It arranged an urgent JPT and attempted to secure a hearing date as soon as reasonably possible and certainly earlier than the late February date being offered by Mr. Bryant.

46The issue was argued before Justice Gorman on February 5, 2024 and her decision was released on February 12, 2024. In the meantime, the case was adjourned from January 9, 2024 to February 6, 2024 because no JPT could be scheduled while the issue was extant. The case was adjourned again from February 6, 2024 to March 5, 2024 while Justice Gorman’s decision was under reserve. The record reveals that Ms. Scott agreed to the March 5, 2024 date, noting that the case could not proceed until Mr. Afandy had counsel.

47While conflict issues inevitably arise from time to time in the criminal court, this situation was unique. At the risk of understatement, Ms. Israel’s re-appearance in SCJ was unusual and unforeseeable given the way the conflict issue had played out in the OCJ.

48Ultimately, on February 12, 2024, Justice Gorman ruled that Ms. Israel was in conflict and she was removed from the record. In the circumstances, I find that the 85 day period between December 12, 2023 and March 5, 2024 is a discrete event and should be subtracted from the calculation of 929 days of defence delay, leaving 837 days and comfortably below the Jordan ceiling.

(iii) Joint Prosecution

49I am satisfied that this case was of moderate complexity. The circumstances of the offence were unusual. Two police services were involved in the investigation and the resulting disclosure was significant, as counsel for the applicant acknowledged during a SCJ appearance in August 2024. No complaint about the timeliness of disclosure is made.

50I have already commented on the scheduling challenges posed in the case – for example, Justice Carnegie’s appointment to the SCJ. Having conducted a JPT in the OCJ, he would be unavailable to preside at a trial. So too were Justices Pomerance and Heeney who conducted JPTs. It is important to bear in mind as well, the real difficulty that arises from other cases in the system, many with multi-stage applications, all competing for precious Court time.

51The defence is critical of what it says is the Crown’s refusal to proceed with a severance. I consider the criticism to be misplaced. First, there are strong policy reasons favouring joint trials in cases involving multiple accused arising from the same event or series of events. The mischief that can be occasioned by multiple trials is obvious: the risk of inconsistent verdicts, the extra cost and attendant delay, and the requirement for witnesses to testify more than once. See R.v. L.G., 2007 ONCA 654 at para. 63; R. v. Gopie, supra, at paras. 138-142. It has been observed that severance is not a panacea when delay arises in a multi-party indictment. See, for example, R. v. Singh, 2016 BCCA 427.

52Further, in R. v. Vassell, 2016 SCC 26, at paras. 6-7, the Court observed that “[I]n many cases, delay caused by proceeding against multiple co-accused must be accepted as a fact of life and must be considered in deciding what constitutes a reasonable time to trial.” See also Jordan supra at paras. 77-80.

53In the July 11, 2023 Assignment Court, the Court inquired about a s. 11(b) waiver and afforded the agent for the applicant’s counsel an opportunity to speak with the applicant to obtain instructions. Unfortunately, counsel had not been given any information on the issue from the applicant’s lawyer ahead of time.

54In October 2023, the Crown preferred an indictment against Mr. Afandy in order to have his case move in tandem with the applicant who was already before the SCJ.

55In November 2023, the Crown suggested a non-customary way to arrange a JPT other than at an Assignment Court, given the scheduling difficulties being encountered. The Crown also responded quickly when the conflict issue with Ms. Israel resurfaced.

56By April 2024, the Court directed that the April 12, 2024 JPT would proceed with or without counsel. During that JPT, the Crown requested that Mr. Afandy’s case return every two weeks so that his efforts to secure counsel could be monitored. The possibility of a severance was something the Crown said it was prepared to consider at that time.

57It is fair to say that the Crown and the Court were skeptical of Mr. Afandy’s resolve to retain counsel. The Crown secured Mr. Afandy’s telephone records and they undermined his contention that he had been unable to speak to counsel. In fact, he made 301 calls in March and 187 in April. He had access to a phone daily and made no calls on but six days in those two months.

58By May 2024, the Crown requested and the Court was prepared to set trial dates with or without counsel. Other steps were also taken to facilitate Mr. Afandy’s retainer of counsel, for example by offering to provide him with a list of local counsel and to have him brought to Assignment Court so he might meet with potential lawyers.

59In my view, the Crown and the Court attempted to move the case forward during the time that Mr. Afandy was not represented, recognizing however, the inherent difficulties involving a self-represented litigant.

60I also note that the applicant was not compliant with filing deadlines, the detail of which is set out in the Crown’s factum at para. 59(x) and referred to above. Notably, the applicant did not abide Justice Heeney’s request that the parties exchange their s. 11(b) calculations in advance of the December 5, 2024 JPT. When the defence advised its revised date, it provided no articulation for its basis. This speaks to the applicant’s lack of commitment or indifference to moving the case forward.

61In all of the circumstances, I find that the Crown took reasonable steps to ensure the case proceeded in a reasonably timely way with due consideration of the applicant’s Charter rights, recognizing the difficulties posed by the self-represented co-accused and the considerable scheduling challenges. In the circumstances, I am unpersuaded that the applicant was held hostage by his co-accused or that the Crown fell short in its responsibility with respect to his right to a timely trial.

Conclusion

62The application is dismissed. The total delay falls below the Jordan ceiling and is not otherwise unreasonable.