Myles Anevich

The appellant, P.S., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the imposed sentence of 18 months imprisonment followed by probation.

He sought to convert the remaining 90 days of his sentence to a conditional sentence, citing ailing health issues including COPD, hernia, anxiety, depression, and possible bladder surgery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the sentencing judge's decision, as there was no evidence that the appellant's medical conditions could not be accommodated in a carceral setting.

Marlon Downey applied to stay human trafficking proceedings, arguing his s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time was infringed, as the total delay exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The Crown opposed, attributing delay to the pandemic and defence unavailability.

The court found the primary reason for delay was a systemic lack of judicial resources, not solely COVID-19 backlog or defence actions.

The application was granted, and proceedings were stayed.

The appellant, Michael Loiselle, sought leave to appeal his 18-month sentence for four counts of fraud, arguing the sentencing judge erred by misunderstanding the effect of his 436 days of house arrest.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge should have acknowledged the house arrest, this oversight did not impact the sentence, as the imposed term was at the lowest end of the appropriate range.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of impaired driving causing bodily harm and failing to stop after an accident, appealed his 33-month sentence.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in principle by focusing on general deterrence to the exclusion of restraint.

The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding the sentencing judge properly considered all principles.

The appeal was dismissed, and the court clarified the commencement date of the driving prohibition under the Criminal Code.

The appellant, convicted of break and enter, theft, and weapons offences, appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for a stay of proceedings based on alleged excessive force by the arresting officer.

The appellant claimed misapprehension of evidence regarding the "one plus one policy" and his "want to die" statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusions on reasonable force, stating the "one plus one policy" was not misused and the appellant's statement did not alter the emergency situation.

The court affirmed the appellant failed to prove the force used was unreasonable.

The appellant, Kyle Robert Bancroft, appealed his convictions for two frauds, arguing that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient assistance to him as a self-represented accused, particularly regarding the distinction between evidence and argument and the proper procedure for impeaching witnesses.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did err in not providing adequate assistance and in refusing to allow the appellant to recall witnesses or introduce banking records.

However, the court concluded that these errors were not material to the outcome, as the evidence against the appellant was overwhelming and corroborated by independent witnesses.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, Jun-Feng Zhang, brought a motion to stay charges of sexual assault under section 271 of the Criminal Code, alleging a violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial completion was 23 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice set by *R. v. Jordan*.

The court analyzed the delay, attributing significant portions to defence inaction and miscommunication, ultimately calculating a net delay of 17.5 months, which falls below the *Jordan* ceiling.

Consequently, the application to stay the charges was dismissed.

The applicant sought to reopen his appeal from a conviction for robbery, which had been previously dismissed by a different panel of the Court of Appeal and for which leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was denied.

The applicant argued that the original appeal panel failed to consider one of his merit-based arguments (unreasonable verdict).

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to reopen an appeal after a formal order reflecting the disposition had been issued.

It held that such jurisdiction is narrow and exceptional, limited to cases not heard on the merits.

The court concluded that there is no jurisdiction to reopen an appeal where it was heard on the merits, even if the panel allegedly failed to consider an argument or incorrectly framed the issues, as this would amount to reviewing the correctness of a previous panel's decision, a power reserved for the Supreme Court of Canada.

The application to reopen was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal.

The only issue raised on the sentence appeal concerned the amount of credit allowed for stringent bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's discretionary decision to allow two months credit.

Consequently, the conviction appeal was dismissed as abandoned, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, K.B., appealed convictions for historical sexual offences against the complainant, EO.

K.B. argued that the trial judge misapprehended evidence and provided insufficient reasons by failing to adequately address contradictions between EO's testimony and that of a defence witness, LB, particularly concerning opportunities for the offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered all evidence, including contradictions, and provided sufficient reasons for her decision, noting the trial judge's finding that LB's testimony was tailored to assist her father.

The appellant, S.R., appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

The appeal raised two grounds: alleged misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge and improper use of the appellant's confession to corroborate the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence or the confirmatory use of the confession, affirming that evidence can provide confirmatory weight even if it does not directly implicate the accused, as long as it supports credibility or reliability.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a three-year penitentiary sentence imposed on the respondent for sexually assaulting a developmentally disabled woman.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to properly apply the Friesen principles, which dictate that sexual offences against vulnerable individuals akin to children are inherently wrongful and require substantial sentences.

The sentencing judge mistakenly reduced the respondent's moral culpability by considering factors such as the absence of overt sexual objectification and "generous" treatment of the victim.

The Court found the original sentence demonstrably unfit and increased it to six years, ordering the respondent's reincarceration despite his recent release on day parole.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed the trial judge's decision not to exclude computer evidence under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, despite a s. 8 breach.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, finding no error in the balancing of the Grant factors.

The court affirmed that the breach was not particularly serious, its impact limited, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits was high, especially given the evidence's probative value for the first-degree murder conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Mostafa Alkhalil, appealed his conviction for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, and sought leave to appeal his six-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The court found no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge regarding the victim's testimony.

It affirmed that the trial judge correctly considered the appellant's creation of an expectation of trust and the victim's lack of consent as aggravating factors.

The sentence was deemed proportionate and consistent with sentencing principles for serious sexual offences involving vulnerable victims.

The appellant sought leave to appeal an 8.5-year sentence for five counts of driving while disqualified.

The appellant had a lengthy criminal record, including numerous prior driving offences and a previous 10-year sentence for criminal negligence causing bodily harm.

The current offences were committed while the appellant was on parole and subject to multiple driving prohibitions, including a lifetime ban, and involved the use of a fraudulent driver's licence.

The Court of Appeal considered arguments regarding proportionality, parity, the jump principle, and the totality principle.

The court found no errors in principle by the sentencing judge, emphasizing the appellant's incorrigibility and the increased maximum sentence for driving while disqualified.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed, upholding the original sentence.

Dellen Millard and Mark Smich appealed their first-degree murder convictions for the death of Timothy Bosma.

The appeals raised issues concerning the admissibility and jury instructions on bad character evidence in a joint trial with antagonistic defences, jury instructions on planning and deliberation, and the propriety of closing addresses by the Crown and co-counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's decisions regarding evidence admissibility, jury instructions, or the sufficiency of corrective instructions for closing arguments.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and assault, sought a judicial stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the swearing of the information to the anticipated end of trial was 760 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R v Jordan.

The court analyzed periods of delay, finding that a 23-day period attributed to rescheduling a Crown Pre-Trial was due to late disclosure by the Crown, not solely the defence.

The court also attributed 60 days of delay to the "cascading systemic impact" of the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

Finally, the court apportioned the delay caused by an inaccurate trial time estimate (113 days) between the defence (56 days) and the Crown/State (57 days).

After deducting these periods, the net delay remained 644 days (21.17 months), still exceeding the Jordan ceiling.

Consequently, the court granted the s. 11(b) application and stayed all charges.

The applicant, convicted of four counts of sexual interference against young step-grandchildren and sentenced to 6 years 3 months, sought bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal assessed the three conditions for release under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code: whether the appeal was frivolous, the likelihood of surrender, and public interest.

While the appeal grounds regarding jury instructions on accused's bias and complainant collusion were deemed "not frivolous," they were considered weak.

Despite the applicant's prior compliance with release conditions, the court found that given the serious nature of the sexual offences and the weak appeal grounds, releasing the applicant would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, I.S., convicted of various sexual offences and uttering threats, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing the appeal was frivolous and that detention was necessary in the public interest due to the seriousness of the offences and residual public safety concerns.

The court, applying the criteria under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, found that the appeal was not frivolous, meeting the "very low bar" established by R. v. Oland.

Despite the serious nature of the offences, the court determined that public safety and flight concerns were negligible, and the public interest in reviewability outweighed the interest in enforceability.

The application for bail pending appeal was granted.

The appellants, Leopold and Matthiew Mercier, appealed their seven-year jail sentences for commercial drug trafficking and related offences, arguing the sentences were unfit given their Indigenous background and the absence of Gladue Reports at sentencing.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and admitted fresh Gladue Reports as evidence.

However, the court dismissed the appeals, finding that despite the Gladue factors, the original sentences, which were based on joint submissions and fell at the lower end of the applicable range for such serious commercial trafficking, remained fit, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.