Samuel G. Walker

The accused, former legal counsel to the Thunder Bay Police Service, was charged with obstruction of justice and breach of trust by a public official.

The Crown alleged she made intentional false or misleading statements during an Ontario Civilian Police Commission investigation regarding her knowledge of a criminal investigation into the police services board chair.

The Superior Court of Justice found that while some of the accused's statements were inaccurate, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she intentionally made false statements or material omissions.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery-related offences, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to stay the proceedings due to excessive force used by an officer during his arrest.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge, who had noted the excessive force and the officer's testimonial dishonesty but declined to stay the proceedings.

The Court upheld the trial judge's choice of a six-month sentence reduction under s. 24(1) of the Charter, concluding this was not one of the clearest of cases requiring a stay.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the Crown’s appeal from a stay of proceedings entered after a trial judge found that correctional officers, including Officer Warburton, used excessive force and then colluded to cover up the incident by filing false reports and giving misleading testimony.

The trial judge found a violation of the respondent’s Charter rights and determined that a stay was the only appropriate remedy to protect the integrity of the justice system.

The appellate court held that the trial judge’s findings were supported by the evidence, her legal analysis was correct, and her remedy was justified in the circumstances.

The appellant, convicted of break and enter, theft, and weapons offences, appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for a stay of proceedings based on alleged excessive force by the arresting officer.

The appellant claimed misapprehension of evidence regarding the "one plus one policy" and his "want to die" statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusions on reasonable force, stating the "one plus one policy" was not misused and the appellant's statement did not alter the emergency situation.

The court affirmed the appellant failed to prove the force used was unreasonable.

The defendant, Robert Konashewych, brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his s. 7 rights (solicitor-client privilege) and s. 8 rights (unreasonable search and seizure) by police.

The alleged breaches arose from police taking possession of a presumptively privileged letter and other documents provided by his former spouse.

The court found a s. 7 breach due to police inaction regarding the privileged document but determined it did not warrant a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) as the consequences were minor and did not impact trial fairness.

The court also found no s. 8 breach, as the documents were voluntarily provided by a private citizen, not obtained through state search or seizure.

The application for a stay was dismissed, but the privileged letter was ruled inadmissible unless privilege was waived.

The defence sought to exclude specific evidence related to the accused's infidelity and attempts to conceal it, arguing its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value in a circumstantial evidence case involving alleged will forgery.

The Crown contended this evidence was crucial to demonstrate the accused's motive and actions to prevent discovery of the alleged fraud.

The court dismissed the defence's application, finding the evidence highly relevant to the Crown's theory and that any prejudicial effect could be adequately mitigated by proper jury instructions.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter as a party to a common unlawful purpose under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code, arising from a failed robbery attempt of an illegal gambling club where a co-perpetrator shot and killed one of the owners.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in extending party liability, particularly given the shooter's possible motive of frustration or anger.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the shooting was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of carrying out the common unlawful purpose, and that the specific mode or motive of harm does not negate foreseeability under s. 21(2).

The applicant, I.S., convicted of various sexual offences and uttering threats, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing the appeal was frivolous and that detention was necessary in the public interest due to the seriousness of the offences and residual public safety concerns.

The court, applying the criteria under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, found that the appeal was not frivolous, meeting the "very low bar" established by R. v. Oland.

Despite the serious nature of the offences, the court determined that public safety and flight concerns were negligible, and the public interest in reviewability outweighed the interest in enforceability.

The application for bail pending appeal was granted.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving and aggravated assault and appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal for dangerous driving.

However, the sentence imposed for aggravated assault was found to be unlawful due to a postponed commencement of the jail term.

The court allowed the sentence appeal for aggravated assault, varying it to a suspended sentence, considering the appellant's positive contributions, employment, and successful completion of a prior conditional sentence and probation.

The appellant, M.F., appealed his convictions for three counts of sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his seven-and-a-half-year sentence.

The conviction appeal argued that the trial judge erred in failing to properly consider evidence of the appellant's physical incapacity (shoulder injury and erectile dysfunction).

The sentence appeal argued errors in imposing escalating consecutive sentences and insufficient consideration of the appellant's age as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence or insufficient reasons by the trial judge.

While granting leave to appeal sentence, the Court dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the total sentence fit despite an error in escalating individual sentences, given the serious nature of the assaults and the complainant's vulnerability.

The appellant, a traditional Chinese medicine practitioner, appealed his sexual assault conviction.

The appeal centered on whether the trial judge erred by introducing a new theory of liability (removal of a towel exposing genitals) late in the trial, which differed from the Crown's primary theory (vaginal examination).

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's introduction of this new theory, and subsequent conviction based on it, was unfair to the appellant as it constituted a drastic change made too suddenly and too late, prejudicing the defence.

The court held that while judges are not confined to parties' theories, trial fairness considerations may preclude new bases of liability inconsistent with how the case was litigated.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his fraud convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his pre-trial s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay and in refusing to allow a second s. 11(b) application post-trial but pre-sentencing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's calculation of delay, confirming that time runs from the date the information is sworn, not the arrest date, and that incomplete disclosure did not cause the delay.

The Court also found no error in the trial judge's refusal to adjourn sentencing for an unperfected second delay application.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant, Kimani Phillips, appealed his convictions for two firearms-related charges.

The appeal raised three grounds: the trial judge's alleged failure to adequately address Constable Brunato's evidence, a misapprehension of evidence regarding the bedroom temperature, and an improper reference to a witness's knowledge of Charter s. 13 rights.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence concerning Constable Brunato or the temperature.

While the trial judge erred in using the witness's (Kia Sampson's) knowledge of s. 13 rights to buttress her credibility regarding her denial of throwing the gun, the error was deemed harmless.

The court reasoned that Kia's denial, which implicated the appellant, was credible due to her strong disposition to favour the appellant, making any evidence against him reliable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of assault against his wife, A.B., based on her testimony corroborated by date-stamped photographs, despite the trial judge having reasonable doubt on related firearm charges due to credibility concerns with the complainant and another witness.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge's reasons were insufficient, claiming an illogical result from incompatible findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that while the trial judge's reasons could have been clearer in explaining the differing credibility findings across distinct charges, it was permissible for the judge to accept parts of a witness's testimony when supported by other evidence.

The court affirmed that the verdict was not unreasonable under the Beaudry/Sinclair test, as the findings were distinct and supported by the evidence.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant, George Olivetti, appealed a four-year sentence for possessing and accessing child pornography, which was imposed following a joint submission.

The appeal court found the original sentence to be fit, considering the large collection of child pornography and a prior criminal record for similar offences, despite the appellant's age, guilty plea, and expressed remorse.

The court dismissed the appeal, stating that updated personal and medical information did not justify a reduction and that such issues are best addressed by the Parole Board of Canada.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible, appealed a detention order issued by the Ontario Review Board (ORB).

The ORB's decision was based on the appellant's diagnosis of bipolar disorder with psychotic features, ADHD, and substance abuse disorder, which led to the index offences and posed a significant risk to public safety due to lack of insight and medication non-compliance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the ORB properly determined a detention order was the necessary and appropriate disposition, as a conditional discharge lacked an air of reality given the conceded significant risk and the appellant's condition.

In a judge-alone historical sexual assault trial, the Crown sought to adduce evidence that the complainant, as a child, engaged in sexual touching with her younger brother while making statements allegedly linking that conduct to what the accused had shown her.

The court held that Crown-led evidence of the complainant's other sexual activity remained subject to common law screening analogous to s. 276 principles and admitted the conduct because it did not invite twin-myth reasoning and had probative value outweighing prejudice.

The alleged statements were admitted as pure narrative and as narrative as circumstantial evidence to explain delayed disclosure, rebut fabrication, and assist in assessing in-court testimony, but not for the truth of their contents.

The court found the principled hearsay exception did not apply because admission for truth was not reasonably necessary and would offend the rule against prior consistent statements.

The accused was tried on historical sexual offence charges arising from allegations that he sexually abused a child relative at family gatherings in the early 1980s.

The court conducted a detailed credibility assessment of the complainant, the accused, and several family witnesses, including consideration of delay in disclosure, prior statements, and evidence from the complainant's brother about separate sexual touching between siblings.

Applying the child-witness guidance in W.(R.) and the burden-of-proof framework in W.(D.), the court found significant difficulties with aspects of both the complainant's and the accused's evidence.

The surrounding evidence did not sufficiently corroborate the allegations, and alternative explanations remained reasonably available.

The Crown therefore failed to prove any count beyond a reasonable doubt.

During a jury trial for drug trafficking and firearms offences, the accused sought to introduce the criminal record of a third-party suspect.

In response, the Crown brought an application to introduce the accused's prior youth conviction for assault causing bodily harm as rebuttal evidence of disposition.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, holding that because the accused's youth sentence had ceased to have effect, section 82 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act deemed him not to have been convicted of the offence, rendering the record inadmissible at that stage of the trial.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, driving over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood, and driving while suspended.

The defence brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of breath test results, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to stop the vehicle and make the breath demand, that the detention was not arbitrary, and that while the right to counsel issue was potentially troubling, the accused failed to exercise appropriate diligence in communicating his preference for his own counsel.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts.