Simon Kim

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and sexual exploitation of his daughter.

The trial judge was Justice Fletcher Dawson, sitting with a jury.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) that the trial judge erred in permitting cross-examination of the complainant's mother and sisters regarding uncharged abusive conduct; (2) that the trial judge made a section 276 error regarding evidence of the complainant's sexual activity; and (3) that the trial judge made a Browne v. Dunn error by failing to ensure that contradictory evidence was put to the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings for a retrial on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference against his stepdaughter, alleging that he was unlawfully overhold in custody for approximately sixteen hours after the Court of Appeal issued an order for his release.

The applicant argued that multiple Charter rights were breached, including rights under sections 7, 9, 10(a), and 11(e) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown opposed the stay, characterizing the overhold as an inadvertent or technical breach for which alternative remedies were available.

The court dismissed the application for a stay, finding that while the conduct was offensive and systemic problems existed in the correctional system's procedures, the circumstances did not warrant the drastic remedy of a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing that the trial judge's jury charge relating to after-the-fact conduct evidence failed to properly equip the jury to decide the case according to law and the evidence.

The Crown presented extensive evidence of the appellant's conduct in the hours following the killing, including exchanges with neighbours, apparent attempts at concealment, admissions to friends, and various activities at commercial establishments.

The trial judge failed to provide a limiting instruction restricting the jury's use of this evidence solely to the issue of intoxication and rational mindset, instead inviting the jury to consider it broadly in determining the appellant's mens rea for murder.

The trial judge also failed to address the risks of consciousness of guilt reasoning and invited the jury to infer callous disregard as evidence of intent to kill.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding three reversible errors in the jury charge.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm-related offences, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter challenge to the search warrant for his home.

The appellant contended there were no reasonable grounds to believe the firearm seen in a video would be found in his home or car.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the issuing justice could reasonably infer as a matter of common sense that the appellant would store the firearm in a comparatively private location like his home or car, given he did not know he had been videotaped with it four days earlier.

The appellant, B.W., appealed his conviction for multiple sexual offences and his six-year global custodial sentence, which included a lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order and a ten-year internet ban.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility assessment of the complainants, alleging collusion, unaddressed inconsistencies, and misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's credibility findings or assessment of collusion risk.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence, substituting the lifetime SOIRA order with a twenty-year order based on the unconstitutionality of the previous SOIRA provisions (R. v. Ndhlovu) and removing the ten-year internet ban, which was erroneously included in the prohibition order.

The appellant, J.A., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sexual interference following a judge-alone trial.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the appellant's and complainant's (S.M.) evidence, specifically regarding the implausibility of the appellant's film project as a ruse and the credibility of S.M. despite his criminal record and the timing of his disclosures.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's credibility findings, emphasizing the deference owed to trial judges in such assessments, and finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning or her reliance on common-sense inferences.

The appellant was convicted of multiple firearms-related offences.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in her s. 24(2) Charter analysis by refusing to exclude evidence (firearm and ammunition) despite a s. 10(b) right to counsel breach.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in downplaying the seriousness of the breach and its impact on the accused's Charter rights, as the police completely denied access to counsel for a prolonged period due to carelessness.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors afresh, the Court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and acquittals entered on all counts.