Kevin Pitt

The appellant advanced two criminal appeals and sought an adjournment to retain counsel and add new grounds.

The court refused adjournment, found no reversible error in conviction or sentencing processes, and held the appellant had already received ample procedural accommodation.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted after a judge-alone trial of sexual assault contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code and sentenced to 38 months imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on the basis that the trial judge convicted him on a theory different from that advanced by the Crown, denying him the right to make full answer and defence.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal the sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in principle by treating his failure to address mental health issues as an aggravating factor and by failing to apply the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons addressed the case as presented by the Crown and that the conviction was based on the Crown's theory of sexual assault based on absence of subjective consent.

The Court granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, finding that while the trial judge made erroneous references, they had no material impact on the sentence imposed, which fell within the appropriate range for this type of offence.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence from the Ontario Court of Justice.

On the conviction appeal, the Court of Appeal found no basis for appellate intervention and dismissed the appeal.

Regarding the sentence appeal, the court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal on the merits.

The court found that the trial judge properly considered planning and deliberation as an aggravating factor without requiring a Gardiner analysis, as defence counsel at trial did not dispute the Crown's submission on this point.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting and killing Ryan Kabuya-Ntumba during a confrontation in Ottawa's ByWard Market on July 1, 2019.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant acted in self-defence.

The jury rejected the self-defence claim and convicted the appellant, who was sentenced to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 14 years.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence from an eyewitness and challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on self-defence and post-offence conduct.

The majority dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence, finding it not reasonably capable of belief, and dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

Justice Copeland dissented on the fresh evidence issue, concluding the evidence was reasonably capable of belief and warranted a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and incest against his daughter, committed between November 1998 and February 2002 when the victim was between 8 and 12 years old.

He was sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the fairness of the trial based on the Crown's closing address and the reasonableness of the incest conviction.

He also appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions, sufficient evidence to support the incest conviction, and that the sentence was fit and warranted given the appellant's prior conviction for similar offences against a young child.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the Crown's appeal from a directed verdict of acquittal for Abdullahi Osman, who was charged as an accessory after the fact to murder.

The court held that, although attempted murder can in rare cases be an included offence to murder, there was no air of reality to the included offence of being an accessory after the fact to attempted murder in this case, as the evidence was clear that the principal's acts caused the victim's death.

The decision clarifies the law on included offences, the requirements for accessory after the fact liability, and the rare circumstances in which attempted murder may be left to a jury as an included offence where the victim dies.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the Crown's appeal from a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of accessory after the fact to murder.

The court found that the evidence did not support leaving the charge to the jury on the basis of wilful blindness, as there was no basis for a reasonable jury to find that the respondent knew or was wilfully blind to the fact that the victim had died.

The court also held there was no air of reality to the included offence of being an accessory after the fact to attempted murder, as the evidence established the victim died and there was no live issue as to causation.

The appellant, Justin Aghayere Omoragbon, sought leave to appeal his 26-month sentence for breaking and entering a dwelling-house.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred by not accepting the 18-month sentence proposed by the Crown and later adopted by the defence.

The Court of Appeal found that there was no joint submission on sentence, no violation of the principles in R. v. Nahanee or R. v. Anthony-Cook, and that the sentencing judge properly considered the mitigating factors and the appellant’s circumstances.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Emmanuel Pinard, appealed his conviction for possession of a firearm knowing it to be unauthorized.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered arguments regarding the trial judge’s instructions to the jury, the adequacy of assistance to the self-represented appellant, and the admission of evidence of prior discreditable conduct.

The court found no error in the trial judge’s instructions or approach, and dismissed the conviction appeal, also denying leave to appeal the sentence.

The applicant sought a review under s. 680 of the Criminal Code of a decision denying her bail pending appeal.

Fresh evidence admitted at the hearing confirmed that the applicant's sentence on the matters under appeal would expire in three days.

The court dismissed the application as moot, noting that even if successful, a bail order could not realistically be implemented before the sentence expired.

The court rejected the applicant's argument that the underlying bail decision would prejudice future bail applications, clarifying that bail pending appeal decisions apply a different standard and do not bind future original bail hearings.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, sought leave to appeal his three-year custodial sentence.

The appeal raised two grounds: that the trial judge erred in relying on R. v. A.J.K. as mandating a minimum three-year sentence for penetration, and that she failed to consider relevant R. v. Friesen factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not apply a minimum sentence but rather a fit range, and appropriately considered all relevant sentencing factors, including the seriousness of digital penetration.

T.J.W. appealed his sentence of five years for two counts of sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to identify his advanced age (76 at sentencing) as a mitigating factor and by giving insufficient weight to other mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was aware of the appellant's age and considered it, and that defence counsel did not present evidence of health conditions or specific impacts of incarceration due to age.

The court concluded that the trial judge gave due weight to all relevant factors, including family support and community contributions, and that the sentence was within the appropriate range, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant was convicted of kidnapping, assault, assault with a weapon, uttering death threats, and a human trafficking offence.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge improperly used s. 276 of the Criminal Code to disregard all of the complainant’s evidence regarding her work as a sex worker and made errors in assessing her credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by effectively excluding a broad area of evidence related to the complainant's sex trade involvement without providing notice or an opportunity for submissions, which constituted a significant breach of procedural fairness and amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

Althea Reyes sought bail pending her appeal of convictions for fraud and impersonation, and the subsequent order collapsing her conditional sentence.

The court applied the three-part test under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

The conviction appeal was deemed to have little merit as she had pled guilty.

While the appeal of the conditional sentence collapse was not frivolous, the applicant failed to persuade the court she would surrender if released, given her history of non-compliance and untruthfulness.

The proposed bail plan, particularly the post-treatment phase with a surety with her own criminal record and inadequate supervision plan, was deemed insufficient.

The court found her detention necessary in the public interest due to her extensive history of fraudulent activities and risk to public safety.

The application for bail pending appeal was denied.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and robbery and appealed his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in her R. v. Grant analysis by characterizing the impact of a s. 10(b) Charter breach (unreasonable delay in access to counsel of choice) as "neutral," when it should have weighed in favour of exclusion.

However, the Court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that even if the impugned evidence (satchel and knife) had been excluded, the remaining overwhelming identification evidence would have inevitably led to the same convictions.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned due to lack of submissions.

This appeal concerns a partial stay of proceedings granted by a trial judge due to Charter violations arising from an unauthorized "no-knock" police entry into the accused's residence to effect an arrest.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in granting a partial stay based on a factual misapprehension and in rejecting alternative remedies.

The Court concluded that while the police misconduct was serious, a stay was not warranted given the lack of evidence of a systemic problem and the availability of alternative remedies like a strong judicial reprimand and potential sentence reduction.

The Crown's appeal was allowed, vacating the stay, and the accused's cross-appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, B.W., appealed his conviction for multiple sexual offences and his six-year global custodial sentence, which included a lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order and a ten-year internet ban.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility assessment of the complainants, alleging collusion, unaddressed inconsistencies, and misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's credibility findings or assessment of collusion risk.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence, substituting the lifetime SOIRA order with a twenty-year order based on the unconstitutionality of the previous SOIRA provisions (R. v. Ndhlovu) and removing the ten-year internet ban, which was erroneously included in the prohibition order.

The appellant, Jorge Berganza-Zaldana, appealed his conviction for possession of child pornography.

Police found child pornography on a digital backup of his phone on a desktop computer.

The appellant argued the Crown failed to prove knowledge and intent, suggesting the backup was created automatically and without his knowledge.

The trial judge, relying on circumstantial evidence and *R. v. Villaroman*, found the only reasonable inference was that the appellant intentionally created the backup with knowledge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences were reasonable and supported the conviction, upholding the application of the circumstantial evidence standard.

The Crown applied to revoke the appellant's bail release order under s. 679(6) of the Criminal Code due to new charges.

The appellant cross-applied for a fresh bail release pending appeal.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the appellant committed an indictable offence while on release, leading to the revocation of the existing bail.

The court then denied the appellant's application for fresh bail, concluding that while the appeal was not frivolous, the appellant's detention was necessary in the public interest due to public safety concerns (risk of further fraud) and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, especially given the new charges and the weak nature of the appeal grounds.

The appellant was convicted of multiple firearm and driving offences, including possession of a loaded restricted firearm, dangerous driving, and assaulting a peace officer.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the reasonable doubt standard regarding mens rea for dangerous driving and assaulting a police officer, and that the firearm verdicts were unreasonable due to a lack of knowledge regarding the weapon's characteristics.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of mens rea or credibility of witnesses.

The court concluded there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish the appellant's possession and knowledge of the firearm's loaded and restricted nature, noting that modifications to the weapon suggested intent for it to be operable.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.