Samantha Robinson

The accused, O.W., was charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder in connection with a fatal shooting.

The Crown’s case was entirely circumstantial, relying on evidence of means, opportunity, motive, and post-offence celebratory conduct.

The central issue was the identity of the second shooter.

The court found significant gaps and inconsistencies in the evidence, particularly regarding motive and animus, and concluded that the Crown had not proven O.W.’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

O.W. was acquitted on both counts.

The court considered a Crown application to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased to a friend, Rebecca Guindon, identifying O.W. as the perpetrator of a prior shooting, in a trial for first-degree murder and attempted murder.

The application was dismissed.

The court found that the statements lacked sufficient procedural and substantive reliability to be admitted for their truth under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court also rejected their admissibility under the "state of mind" exception, finding the statements incapable of supporting the inferences the Crown sought regarding motive or animosity between the deceased and O.W.

The court considered the admissibility of discreditable conduct evidence in a judge-alone trial for first-degree murder and attempted murder.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence that the accused, O.W., threatened the deceased with a firearm on Instagram Live hours before the homicide, and a video showing O.W. associating with J.A. (the co-accused) who brandished a handgun.

The court found both pieces of evidence highly probative to issues of motive, animus, intent, and identification, and held that their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect, especially given the reduced risk of prejudice in a judge-alone trial.

The application to admit the evidence was granted.

An offender was found guilty of second-degree murder of an Indigenous victim.

The Crown sought a 13-year parole ineligibility period, citing the offender's extensive criminal record, history of violence, and non-compliance with court orders.

The defence requested the minimum 10-year parole ineligibility, emphasizing the impact of colonialism and intergenerational trauma on the offender, as detailed in a Gladue report, and his struggles with substance abuse and mental health.

The court considered the sentencing principles, including denunciation and deterrence, balanced against the Gladue factors, and the jury's recommendation.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility for 10 years, along with a lifetime firearms prohibition, DNA order, and a communication prohibition.

The accused was tried on historical sexual offence allegations involving repeated touching of a grandchild over many years, spanning both pre- and post-age-14 conduct.

The court found the complainant credible and largely reliable, rejected the defence theory that the allegations were fabricated over inheritance-related resentment, and held that the Crown's midtrial witness preparation of family witnesses did not amount to an abuse of process.

Applying the recent fabrication exception and the established framework for sexual assault, the court concluded that some alleged incidents left a reasonable doubt but that two incidents of sexual interference and multiple incidents of sexual assault were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Convictions were entered on both counts.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to adduce the video recorded police statement of a deceased witness in a second-degree murder trial.

The defence opposed the application, arguing the statement lacked threshold reliability and could not be cross-examined.

The court found the statement met the test for procedural reliability under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, noting adequate substitutes for cross-examination such as hallway video footage and the solemnity of the interview.

The application was granted and the statement was ruled admissible.

The appellant was convicted in a judge-alone trial of two counts of sexual assault and one count of choking, receiving a three-year sentence.

He appealed his convictions, arguing errors in the assessment of corroborative evidence, conflation of credibility and reliability, and reliance on stereotypes regarding witness reticence.

He also sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, finding the trial judge's assessment of evidence, including an audio recording, was sound and that any comment on witness reticence was not material to the decision.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was deemed entirely fit given the serious nature of the assaults, breach of trust, and attempts to subvert justice.

The accused was tried on one count of sexual assault arising from a late-night sexual encounter between two college students.

The central issue was consent to vaginal intercourse and subsequent sexual activity, with the case turning on credibility and reliability.

Applying the W(D.) framework, the court found material inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence, accepted the accused’s account that consent was communicated by words and gestures, and found the alleged anal penetration was not proven.

The Crown failed to prove absence of consent or the requisite mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by using s. 633 of the Criminal Code to stand aside two male jurors for gender diversity, which was done in the presence of the jury.

The Court of Appeal found this was a legal error, as the judicial stand-aside power cannot be used to actively promote diversity on the petit jury, citing R. v. Chouhan.

The court further held that this error was not curable by the proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code because it prejudiced the appellant's right to a fair trial and undermined public confidence in the administration of justice, particularly given the jury witnessed the defence's objection.

A new trial was ordered.

The accused was tried for murder arising from a point-blank shooting in a housing project parking area.

The central issue was identification, with the Crown relying on a purported recognition witness, cell phone location evidence, text messages, and alleged consciousness of guilt.

The court found the eyewitness evidence unreliable given the darkness, extremely brief and stressful observation, generic description, cross-racial identification concerns, and the witness's admitted difficulty distinguishing the accused from his brothers.

Applying the circumstantial evidence standard, the court held the after-the-fact conduct and utterances did not make guilt the only rational inference and also rejected party liability on the evidence.

The accused was acquitted.

This decision concerns a new trial to determine if the accused, René Goudreau, was not criminally responsible (NCR) by reason of mental disorder for the first-degree murder of his mother.

The accused had previously been convicted by a jury, but the Ontario Court of Appeal ordered a new trial solely on the NCR issue.

The court considered expert psychiatric evidence, the accused's behaviour before and after the offence, and evidence of extensive planning related to life insurance policies on the victim.

Despite evidence of mental disorder, the court found that the accused failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that he was incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his acts or knowing they were wrong.

The court concluded that the accused engaged in detailed planning for financial gain and acted rationally in many aspects, tipping the scales against an NCR finding.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to admit the videotaped police statement of a witness who died shortly after the incident.

The witness did not see the stabbing but spoke to both the deceased and the accused on the day of the incident.

The court found the statement lacked threshold reliability due to the witness's severe liver disease, cognitive decline, and apparent bias.

The motion was largely dismissed, with the statement ruled inadmissible hearsay, save for a brief observation regarding the deceased's demeanor prior to the incident.

Idres Ismail, charged with murder, sought permission to adduce evidence at trial regarding an alternate suspect.

The evidence included a threatening video found on the deceased's phone, viewed shortly before his death, featuring an unknown male who resembled the accused.

The court applied the "air of reality" test, finding that the temporal connection between the video and the death, coupled with the threatening nature, provided a sufficient evidentiary foundation to cast doubt on the accused's guilt.

The application to admit the alternate suspect evidence was granted.

Colleen Cahill, charged with multiple provincial and federal offences including theft, break and enter, and administration of justice offences, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on primary and secondary grounds.

The Superior Court of Justice granted judicial interim release, finding that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances, particularly given Cahill's HIV-positive status and chronic lung disease, which placed her at significant risk in detention.

The court determined that her proposed release plan, involving supervision by the John Howard Society and continuation of a methadone program, sufficiently mitigated the risks of non-attendance and reoffending, and that her release would not undermine confidence in the administration of justice.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the death of his mother in a fire.

Following conviction, he raised a defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR).

The jury rejected the NCR defence.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's answer to a jury question regarding whether the appellant would be eligible for insurance proceeds if found NCR.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that it could not consider the financial consequences of an NCR verdict.

The court held that the error was not harmless and that the curative proviso was unavailable.

The conviction was set aside and a new second-stage trial on the NCR issue was ordered.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault and sexual assault against his former partner, as well as assault against their infant son.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the complainant.

The trial judge found numerous significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, particularly regarding her motivations for wanting the accused out of the house, the timing of her seeking legal advice for custody, and her explanation for the lack of visible facial injuries.

Due to these credibility and reliability concerns, the court found a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused of all charges.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm offences arising from a shooting incident on January 31, 2015.

The primary issue at trial was identity.

The Crown alleged the appellant discharged a firearm in a residential street and fled to his girlfriend's apartment.

The defence contended the appellant was asleep in the apartment and that two other men were the ones who fled and entered the building.

The trial judge rejected the defence theory as implausible and accepted identification evidence placing the appellant as the shooter.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the reliability of a key identification witness, citing concerns about cross-racial identification, limited description, initial misidentification in a photo line-up, and the witness's impaired state at the time of the incident.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's careful treatment of the identification evidence and dismissed the appeal.

Grace Gaurino was convicted of fraud over $5,000 and theft over $5,000, with the theft count stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The fraud involved $16,629.96 from her 98-year-old vulnerable employer, Eileen Rennie, through altered cheques.

The Crown sought 18-21 months custody, while the defence requested 90 days or less intermittent.

A key consideration was the collateral immigration consequence under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, where a custodial sentence of six months or more would remove the right to appeal a deportation order on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.

The court balanced denunciation, general deterrence (paramount in breach of trust fraud), and rehabilitation, alongside mitigating factors (first offence, admissions, personal difficulties, late remorse) and aggravating factors (breach of trust, vulnerable victim, some planning).

Finding the appropriate sentence range to be between 90 days and 12 months, the court imposed a 90-day intermittent sentence to preserve Gaurino's right to appeal deportation, considering her three Canadian citizen children and strong rehabilitation prospects.

A restitution order of $16,629.96 and a 2-year prohibition from positions of financial authority were also imposed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal for operating a motor vehicle while disqualified.

The trial judge had ruled a certified copy of the prohibition order inadmissible due to a missing signature on the copy attached to the Notice of Intent, deeming it prejudicial and not "reasonable notice" under the Canada Evidence Act.

The Superior Court found the trial judge erred in law by misapplying the standard of reasonable notice, failing to weigh all relevant facts, and effectively requiring an exact copy.

The court held that reasonable notice is a concept, not a document, and the omission of a signature did not cause confusion or prejudice given the other correct information provided.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, a guilty verdict entered, and the matter remitted for sentencing.

After a jury returned a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, the accused applied under ss. 672.11(b) and 672.12(1) of the Criminal Code for a psychiatric assessment to determine whether he was not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder at the time of the offence.

The defence relied on the accused’s extensive psychiatric history, prior NCR finding, prior unfitness to stand trial, and evidence during trial suggesting untreated mental illness.

The Crown argued the application failed to establish reasonable grounds because there was no supporting expert medical opinion linking the illness to criminal responsibility at the time of the offence.

The court held that the threshold for ordering an assessment is low and requires only reasonable grounds based on a credibly based probability that the assessment is necessary.

Given the accused’s documented mental health history and the evidentiary record, the court found the threshold met and ordered the assessment.