Cecilia Dolorosa Georgette Kathleen Marie Bouzane

The accused, a single mother, was charged with three counts of attempted murder and one count of uttering a threat to cause death after choking and smothering her three children.

The accused admitted to the acts and to endangering their lives, but argued she lacked the specific intent to kill due to advanced intoxication and a blackout.

The court found that while the accused was not in a state of advanced intoxication, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she intended to kill her children, as she stopped the assault herself, instructed her child to call 911, and expressed a desire to protect them from herself.

The accused was found not guilty of attempted murder but guilty of the lesser included offences of aggravated assault and uttering threats.

The self-represented applicant sought procedural orders, including the issuance of subpoenas against four police officers and the production of internal investigation records, in advance of his mandamus application.

The mandamus application sought to overturn a Justice of the Peace's refusal to allow a private prosecution against two officers for alleged misconduct during an arrest.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the procedural requests, finding that the application was a collateral attack on a previous ruling, that fresh evidence is generally inadmissible on judicial review, and that compelling the officers to testify would violate their Charter rights against self-incrimination.

The court sentenced J.P. Dominic Mignac for aggravated assault and resisting arrest following a stabbing incident at a Burger King.

The court found the case fell within the mid-range of sentencing for aggravated assault, considering factors such as provocation, lack of criminal record, remorse, and rehabilitation prospects.

The sentence imposed was two years less a day to be served as a conditional sentence with house arrest, followed by three years' probation, and included ancillary orders such as a DNA order and weapons prohibition.

The decision reviews the applicable sentencing principles and case law, emphasizing the balance between denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, B.S.L., on charges including sexual assault and uttering threats.

The appeal raised two grounds: first, that the trial judge erred by failing to act as a gatekeeper against inadmissible evidence of other sexual activity under s. 276 of the Criminal Code; and second, that the trial judge relied on speculation and conjecture to make adverse credibility findings about the complainant, particularly regarding an audio recording.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or credibility findings, and that the defence's questioning about the recording's date did not constitute s. 276 evidence.

The accused brought a s. 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 677 days (22.5 months), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for summary conviction cases.

The Crown argued for defence-caused delay and exceptional circumstances (JPT judge not authorizing sufficient trial time).

The court found no defence-caused delay and determined that while the JPT judge's decision was unforeseen, the Crown failed to take reasonable steps to remedy the delay by not seeking a pre-trial motion before the trial judge.

Consequently, the Crown could not rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay, and a stay of proceedings was granted.

The accused, Dominic Mignac, was charged with seven counts, including aggravated assault, assault causing bodily harm, attempted murder, and resisting arrest, following a stabbing incident at a Burger King.

The court found the accused guilty of assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, and resisting arrest.

However, the charges of attempted murder, uttering a death threat, and carrying a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace were dismissed due to reasonable doubt regarding the specific intent to kill and the purpose of carrying the knife.

The defence of self-defence was rejected as the accused's actions were not deemed a reasonable or proportional response to any perceived threat, particularly after the victim had disengaged.

The accused was tried on historical sexual offence allegations involving repeated touching of a grandchild over many years, spanning both pre- and post-age-14 conduct.

The court found the complainant credible and largely reliable, rejected the defence theory that the allegations were fabricated over inheritance-related resentment, and held that the Crown's midtrial witness preparation of family witnesses did not amount to an abuse of process.

Applying the recent fabrication exception and the established framework for sexual assault, the court concluded that some alleged incidents left a reasonable doubt but that two incidents of sexual interference and multiple incidents of sexual assault were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Convictions were entered on both counts.

The appellant, Hany Komy, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his credibility.

The Superior Court of Justice found that while the trial judge did misapprehend some evidence concerning the appellant's testimony about a complainant's hiring and training, this misapprehension was not material to the overall credibility assessment.

The trial judge had numerous other valid reasons for her negative credibility finding, including the appellant's combative demeanor, evasiveness, self-serving answers, and failure to comply with the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of assault and unlawful presence in a dwelling, appealed his conviction, seeking to introduce new evidence as an alibi.

The court applied the Palmer and Snyder tests for admitting new evidence on appeal.

The proposed new evidence, a witness statement, was deemed not to constitute a true alibi and was found to be neither credible nor reliable.

The court concluded that the new evidence was not sufficiently cogent to have influenced the trial judge's decision.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the new evidence was not admitted.

The defendant was charged with having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg within two hours of operating a conveyance.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, seeking exclusion of breath samples and statements.

The court found no violation of the "immediately" requirement for the ASD demand and no residual mouth alcohol issue.

However, a s. 10(b) Charter violation was found due to a 7-minute delay in providing rights to counsel after arrest.

Applying the Grant factors, the court determined that the breath sample evidence and statements should not be excluded.

The Crown proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, finding the defendant's BAC was at least 160 mg.