Brandon Crawford

The applicants, an anti-abortion organization and its youth coordinator, sought to display graphic images of fetuses during a protest on Parliament Hill.

Officers from the Parliamentary Protective Service (PPS) prohibited the display, citing rules against obscene or hateful messages.

The applicants brought an application arguing this violated their freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the PPS's operational decision breached the applicants' Charter rights and was not justified under s. 1, as the specific prohibition on graphic images was not yet published at the time.

The court granted a declaration that the rights were infringed but declined to strike down the rules governing Parliament Hill, as the rule-making committee was not a party to the proceeding.

The appellant was convicted of impaired operation of a motor vehicle, having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit within two hours of operating a motor vehicle contrary to the Criminal Code, and operating a motor vehicle while licensed as a young driver with a blood alcohol concentration over zero contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in law and misapprehended material evidence regarding: (1) his reasonable expectation of privacy in the ambulance; (2) when the officer detected an odor of alcohol; and (3) when the officer's grounds to issue a breath demand crystallized.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellate court found no material misapprehension of evidence, no legal error, and that the trial judge's findings were reasonably available on the record.

The court dismissed a motion to certify a class action brought by Rodney Wilson against the Ontario Provincial Police for alleged privacy breaches arising from video recording detainees using the toilet in OPP cells.

The court found that the proposed common issues, including alleged Charter breaches and damages, required individualized adjudication and were not suitable for certification.

The court also addressed the evolution of OPP privacy policies and the balance between detainee privacy and institutional security.

Costs were awarded to the defendant.

The accused brought a s. 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 677 days (22.5 months), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for summary conviction cases.

The Crown argued for defence-caused delay and exceptional circumstances (JPT judge not authorizing sufficient trial time).

The court found no defence-caused delay and determined that while the JPT judge's decision was unforeseen, the Crown failed to take reasonable steps to remedy the delay by not seeking a pre-trial motion before the trial judge.

Consequently, the Crown could not rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay, and a stay of proceedings was granted.

The defendants, Philip Dass and Oren Lazore, brought s. 11(b) Charter applications for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial completion was 29.46 months.

After deducting 57 days of defence delay for Mr. Dass, the net delay was 27.5 months, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters.

The court found that Mr. Dass did not demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, nor did the case take "markedly longer" than it reasonably should have.

Mr. Lazore's application also failed, partly due to his counsel's unavailability causing further delay.

Both applications for a stay of proceedings were dismissed.

The appellant, Ali Mankal, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while impaired by drug.

The appeal centered on whether the trial judge materially misapprehended the Drug Recognition Expert's (DRE) opinion evidence regarding the cause of pinpoint pupils.

The defence argued that the impairment, including pinpoint pupils, could be attributed to a concussion, while the trial judge concluded it was solely due to drug impairment, relying on a misinterpretation of the DRE's testimony.

The appellate court found that the trial judge's misapprehension of this critical evidence played an essential part in the conviction, leading to a miscarriage of justice.

The Ontario Court of Justice ruled on the admissibility of Drug Recognition Evaluator (DRE) evidence in a criminal trial where the evaluating officer's certification had lapsed due to COVID-19 by the time of giving evidence.

The court determined that while the statutory shortcut for DRE evidence admissibility under s. 320.31(5) of the Criminal Code did not apply, the evidence was admissible under the common law Mohan framework.

The judge found that the Crown met the criteria for expert evidence admission, considering the officer's training, prior certification at the time of the evaluation, and the specific reason for the lapse.

Danielle Leblanc, initially charged with first-degree murder, pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice after providing a statement that led to her common-law spouse's second-degree murder plea.

The court considered the unique circumstances of Leblanc being a victim of severe and prolonged domestic violence by the murderer, which significantly reduced her moral blameworthiness.

Despite the seriousness of obstructing justice in a murder investigation, the court granted a conditional discharge with 12 months probation, emphasizing proportionality and the limited application of general deterrence in cases involving battered women.

The appellant, Hussein Kelkas, appealed his conviction for three counts of sexual assault involving two complainants.

The central issue at trial was consent.

The trial judge found the complainants credible and the appellant's evidence incredible.

The appeal grounds included misapprehension of evidence, impermissible judicial notice, improper bolstering of credibility, and a finding of fact without evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of evidence or credibility, and no impermissible use of judicial notice.

This consolidated appeal addressed the admissibility of evidence obtained through a wiretap authorization granted in 2016 for a 2009 murder investigation.

The Court of Appeal found that the authorization was improperly granted due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds, as the affidavit failed to establish a credible-based probability that interceptions would yield evidence of the long-dormant homicide or that other investigative procedures were unlikely to succeed.

The court emphasized that a generic investigative plan and unsupported inferences of continued association among targets after several years were insufficient.

Consequently, the interceptions constituted a serious breach of Charter s. 8 rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court upheld the exclusion of the evidence under Charter s. 24(2) due to the seriousness of the state conduct and the significant impact on privacy interests.

The appeals from conviction were allowed, and acquittals were entered, while the appeals from acquittal were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assault, incest, sexual assault with a weapon, and mischief against his sibling.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of a defence witness, failed to provide meaningful reasons, and applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were sound, the reasons were sufficient for appellate review, and there was no uneven scrutiny of the evidence.

The Court allowed the appeals and held that the mandatory victim surcharge in section 737 of the Criminal Code violates section 12 of the Charter for impecunious offenders.

The provision was declared of no force and effect immediately.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge imposed under section 737 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violates sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellants were impoverished offenders with mental and physical disabilities, unemployment, and substance abuse issues.

The trial judges had refused to impose the surcharge, finding it unconstitutional.

The Crown appealed and the Superior Court judges overturned these decisions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge, finding that while it engages the appellants' liberty interests, it does not violate section 7 because impoverished offenders cannot be imprisoned for non-payment (inability to pay is a reasonable excuse), extensions of time to pay are available, and the deprivation is not grossly disproportionate to the important objectives of the surcharge regime.

The court also found the surcharge does not violate section 12 of the Charter as it is not cruel and unusual treatment, being disproportionate but not grossly disproportionate.