Philippe Georges Cowle

The appellant appealed his convictions for two sexual assaults against two sex workers, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury to disregard certain Crown cross-examination, admitting a photograph of the appellant, and allowing speculation about the cleaning of blood at the scene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the cross-examination, the admission of the photograph, or the Crown's suggestions regarding the blood evidence.

The Court noted the overwhelming evidence against the appellant, including similar fact evidence, medical evidence, and corroboration by other witnesses.

The accused and a co-accused were jointly charged with firearms offences.

The trial was delayed beyond the 18-month Jordan ceiling, partly due to the unavailability of the co-accused's counsel.

The case management judge granted a stay of proceedings, finding the delay presumptively unreasonable and refusing to attribute the co-accused's delay to the accused.

The Court of Appeal affirmed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that delay caused by a co-accused in a joint trial can amount to a discrete exceptional circumstance.

Applying the four criteria from R. v. Tran, the Court found the joint trial was in the interests of justice, the delay arose from the joint trial, the delay was reasonably unavoidable, and the Crown could not have reasonably ameliorated it.

The delay was deducted, bringing the net delay under the ceiling, and the stay was set aside.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a faint hope application seeking a jury review of a 25-year parole ineligibility period for first degree murder.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge applied the correct pre-2011 reasonable prospect screening standard under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code, did not misapprehend the evidence, and was entitled to consider institutional misconduct, psychological risk assessments, limited acceptance of responsibility, and the likely loss of community support upon deportation.

The court rejected the submission that reliance on static factors foreclosed any future application, noting that the judge expressly left open a renewed application in two years.

The appeal was dismissed as the screening decision fell within the broad range of reasonableness.

The appellants challenged a criminal appeal judgment from the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard the appeal and delivered an oral ruling the same day.

The Court held that the appeal should be dismissed, substantially for the reasons of the majority below.

The intervener participated, but the dispositive issue was resolved by adopting the appellate majority's reasoning.

The applicant, convicted of sexual interference against a child aged 12 to 14 and sentenced to 4.5 years' imprisonment, sought bail pending appeal.

The applicant advanced three grounds of appeal: an allegedly improper corrective jury instruction regarding the defence theory, inconsistent verdicts on two counts, and error in dismissing a s. 11(b) Charter application for a stay based on delay.

The motion judge found all three grounds to be weak or without merit.

Applying the Oland framework, the court held that the seriousness of the offence and the weakness of the grounds of appeal elevated the enforceability concern over the reviewability concern.

Bail was denied.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and assault, challenging the trial judge's credibility assessments on multiple grounds: failure to consider the complainant's motive to fabricate, failure to address inconsistencies in testimony, failure to consider evidence of collusion and tainting between the complainant and her daughter, and erroneous assessment of the appellant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's comprehensive credibility analysis and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals of R.V.A., who was found guilty of repeatedly sexually abusing his daughter between the ages of 12 and 16.

The court addressed the trial judge’s reliance on an adoptive admission, the treatment of the stepmother’s evidence, and the rejection of the appellant’s testimony.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the nine-year sentence fit despite a possible error regarding aggravating factors.

The appellant, Ahmed Ali Debouk, appealed his convictions for extortion, uttering death threats, criminal harassment, and breaching a non-communication condition, arguing his guilty pleas were involuntary due to pre-trial detention pressures and that his Charter rights were violated by non-disclosure of a voice mail recording.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in either ground, holding that the pleas were voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, and that there was no evidence of non-disclosure or prejudice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, B.B., was convicted of sexual assault and two counts of common assault against his stepdaughter, N.S., following a trial in the Superior Court of Justice.

He appealed only the sexual assault conviction, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the timing of the most serious sexual assaults and erred in rejecting the testimony of S.B., the complainants’ mother.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of the evidence.

However, Dawe J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial judge’s error regarding the timing of the assaults played an essential part in the reasoning process leading to conviction.

The appellant, A.N., appealed convictions for three counts of sexual interference and three counts of sexual assault, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The appeal focused on whether a 60-day period of delay, attributed by the trial judge to COVID-19 as an exceptional circumstance, was properly deducted from the total delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s reliance on local knowledge and internal court statistics to find the delay was justified, and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed D.C.'s appeal from convictions for sexual assault and assault causing bodily harm.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in failing to declare a mistrial and in assessing the evidence.

The court found no error in the trial judge’s approach, including his assessment of the complainant’s credibility and the pattern of verdicts.

The court also rejected arguments regarding consent and the sufficiency of the evidence, upholding the convictions.

The appellants, David Case and Celine Loyer, appealed their convictions for sexual assault, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable due to the complainant's "flashback" memory being unreliable.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's memory and the confirmatory evidence to be reasonable and not fundamentally flawed.

The dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial judge's reasoning regarding the reliability of the "sleeping flashback" was circular and illogical, and that the confirmatory evidence was overstated.

Both sentence appeals regarding a no-contact condition were also dismissed.

The applicant, convicted of sexual offences against two young girls and sentenced to seven years, sought bail pending appeal of his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario denied the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish that his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The court determined that the grounds of appeal regarding inadvertent collusion, similar fact evidence admissibility, and the sentencing judge's analysis of health circumstances were very weak, not clearly surpassing the 'not frivolous' criterion.

The balance of the competing interests of enforceability (seriousness of the crime) and reviewability (weakness of appeal grounds) favoured enforceability, concluding that a reasonable member of the public would lose confidence in the administration of justice if the applicant were released.

The appellant, E.M., sought leave to appeal a 30-month imprisonment sentence for sexually assaulting his intimate partner, requesting a conditional sentence or a shorter term of incarceration.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable error in the sentencing judge's discretion.

The court reiterated the high deference owed to sentencing decisions and found the sentence proportionate and not demonstrably unfit, despite the appellant's guilty plea and remorse.

The appellant, Hopeton Wright, appealed his convictions for three counts of sexual interference and three counts of sexual assault (stayed) in relation to two of his common-law partner’s children.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's admission of similar fact evidence from another child of his common-law partner, and the trial judge's instructions to the jury on prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to admit the similar fact evidence, which was highly probative of a specific propensity, and no consequential error in the jury instructions regarding prior inconsistent statements.

The applicant was convicted of operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit and received a 15-month driving prohibition and a $3,000 fine.

After his conviction was restored by the Court of Appeal, he sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada and moved for a stay of his driving prohibition and fine pending the leave application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that under s. 320.25 of the Criminal Code, it lacks jurisdiction to stay a driving prohibition unless leave to appeal has already been granted.

Furthermore, the court found that even if it had jurisdiction, the applicant failed to meet the test for a stay on the merits.

This is an appeal from a conviction for second-degree murder and aggravated assault.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's jury charge regarding the sufficiency of cautions on eyewitness identification evidence and an ante-mortem statement, and sought to admit fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence motion, finding it did not meet the Palmer threshold.

It also dismissed the conviction appeal, concluding that the trial judge's jury instructions on eyewitness identification (including photo/in-dock identification and collusion) and the ante-mortem statement were sufficient and did not constitute an error, particularly given that the accused was known to the eyewitness.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court's decision to stay proceedings against the respondent for "over 80" due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The delay was caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The summary conviction appeal judge (SCAJ) found the Crown had not taken reasonable steps to mitigate delay by accepting consecutive trial dates instead of exploring earlier non-consecutive ones.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the SCAJ erred by failing to defer to the trial judge's assessment of local circumstances and the reasonableness of the Crown's actions in managing the pandemic-induced backlog.

The Court clarified that the heightened urgency for scheduling retrials (as per MacIsaac) does not apply to initial trials delayed by exceptional circumstances like COVID-19.

The stay of proceedings was set aside, and the conviction restored.

The appellant, convicted of two counts of sexual assault, one count of sexual touching, and one count of showing pornographic materials to a minor, appealed on the ground that the trial judge erred in finding him guilty of an incident that allegedly occurred at the complainant's grandmother's house, claiming it was outside the scope of the charges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the incident fell within the broad scope of the indictment, which specified a time period and town rather than precise locations.

The court reiterated that the Crown is not bound to prove its specific theory of the case if the conviction falls within the indictment's scope and the defence had a full and fair opportunity to defend, which was found to be the case here given the extensive cross-examination and closing submissions by trial counsel regarding the incident.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and aggravated assault.

The central issue on appeal concerned the proper use of an accused's mixed statement (containing both inculpatory and exculpatory elements) when introduced by the Crown, and when the accused subsequently testifies consistently with the exculpatory part.

The trial judge erred by instructing the jury that the exculpatory aspect of the out-of-court statements could not be used for their truth.

The Court of Appeal clarified that such mixed statements, when led by the Crown, are admissible for the truth of their contents, regardless of whether the accused later testifies consistently.

However, the jury must be cautioned against impermissible lines of reasoning, such as inferring truth from mere repetition or using the prior statement as independent corroboration.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered due to the trial judge's erroneous instruction and the resulting confusion and prejudice to the accused.