Dr. William Komer

The defendant was charged with sexual assault and forcible confinement following an incident in November 2021 where he sexually assaulted his roommate despite her prior and explicit rejection of his advances.

The defendant pleaded not guilty and applied for a verdict of not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCRMD) under section 16 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded that the defendant suffered from a qualifying disease of the mind, but contested whether he was incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his actions or knowing they were wrong.

The court found that while the defendant suffered from a mental disorder, the evidence was insufficient to establish that he lacked the requisite capacity under section 16, and therefore rejected the NCRMD application.

The Court addressed the test for fitness to stand trial under s. 2 of the Criminal Code and held that fitness requires capacity to make and communicate reality-based defence decisions, not capacity to make decisions in one’s best interests.

Applying that standard, the majority found no basis to disturb findings that the accused was fit despite fluctuating psychotic symptoms, because the record showed sustained reality-based participation and intelligible communication.

The majority also dismissed fresh and new evidence motions concerning post-trial psychiatric evidence and later judicial findings about the Crown expert’s practices, concluding the proposed evidence could not reasonably have affected the verdict.

A dissent would have admitted the fresh evidence, found a miscarriage of justice, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The defendant, charged with sexual assault and sexual interference, was found permanently unfit to stand trial.

The defense sought a stay of proceedings under s. 672.851(7) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the defendant permanently unfit and not currently a significant threat to public safety due to high levels of support.

However, the court dismissed the application for a stay, concluding that granting a stay would not be in the interests of the proper administration of justice, considering the serious nature of the alleged offences, the public interest in protecting children, and the potential for future changes in the defendant's supervision.

The appellant, who suffered from schizophrenia and represented himself at trial, appealed his first-degree murder conviction.

He argued he was unfit to stand trial and urged the Court of Appeal to overturn or modify the 'limited cognitive capacity' test from R. v. Taylor to require that an accused be capable of making rational decisions in their best interests.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Taylor test, clarifying that while an accused must have a reality-based understanding of their legal predicament and the ability to make decisions, they need not possess 'analytic capacity' to make decisions in their own best interests.

The Court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the voluntariness of statements made to a Crown psychiatrist and refused to admit fresh psychiatric evidence to substitute a verdict of not criminally responsible.

The appellant, Trae Worrie, appealed his convictions for second-degree murder and attempted murder, arguing he was Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) due to mental disorder.

Two forensic psychiatrists unanimously opined he was NCR, but the trial judge rejected this defense, finding him guilty.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge materially misapprehended expert evidence, particularly concerning a psychologist's testimony, and misused the appellant's after-the-fact conduct.

The court concluded there was no rational basis to reject the unanimous expert opinion that the appellant was NCR.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a verdict of NCR was substituted.

The appellant, Cameron Laming, appealed a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for a weapons dangerous charge.

He argued procedural irregularities during the NCRMD hearing and sought to adduce fresh psychiatric evidence suggesting his mental state was due to drug-induced intoxication rather than a mental disorder qualifying for NCRMD.

The Court of Appeal found significant procedural deficiencies, including the appellant not having read the NCRMD report, equivocal consent, and insufficient reasons from the trial judge.

The fresh evidence, which cast doubt on the NCRMD diagnosis, was admitted.

The appeal was allowed, the NCRMD verdict was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application following the defendant's conviction for two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of weapons dangerous, and one count of breach of recognizance.

The defendant attacked two victims with a knife in an unprovoked manner, causing serious injuries that could have been fatal.

The court found the defendant met the criteria for dangerous offender designation under section 753(1)(a)(ii) based on a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour showing substantial indifference to consequences.

Despite evidence that the defendant's schizoaffective disorder and polysubstance use disorder were theoretically treatable, the court concluded his violent conduct was intractable due to his consistent failure to seek and follow psychiatric treatment, lack of insight into his illness, and resistance to treatment.

The court imposed an indeterminate sentence, finding that neither a determinate sentence nor a determinate sentence with a long-term supervision order would adequately protect the public.

The accused, Trae Worrie, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, sought a ruling to permit the jury to consider his protected out-of-court statements to forensic experts for the truth of their contents, in support of his not criminally responsible (NCR) defence.

The Crown opposed, arguing the statements should only be used to assess the basis of expert opinions, not for their truth.

The court ruled that while the accused consented to the use of the statements for the NCR defence, his exculpatory statements were inadmissible for the truth of their contents unless the Crown sought to admit them.

The statements could be used for the limited purpose of assessing the basis of expert opinions and as original evidence of mental state (e.g., preposterous statements indicating delusions).

The accused was charged with attempted murder for stabbing his co-worker repeatedly in the back and neck at their workplace.

The Crown alleged the accused knew his actions were wrong.

The accused raised a defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder under section 16 of the Criminal Code, arguing he was suffering from a mental illness that rendered him incapable of knowing his actions were wrong.

The court found the accused probably suffered from a delusional disorder involving beliefs of persistent harassment and depression, but was not convinced the mental disorder rendered him incapable of knowing the act was morally wrong or making rational choices about it.

The accused was found guilty as charged.

The Crown applied pursuant to section 672.12(3)(b) of the Criminal Code for an order to assess whether the accused was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD).

The accused had been ordered to undergo a fitness assessment, which found him fit to stand trial but raised concerns about potential NCRMD.

The court dismissed the Crown's application as premature, holding that the Crown may only raise the NCRMD issue at two specific junctures: when the accused puts mental capacity into issue, or after a finding of guilt but before conviction.

The application was brought before trial, violating the principles established in R. v. Swain.

The appellants, who were each found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) on consent, appealed their verdicts.

They argued that the Criminal Code violates sections 7 and 15 of the Charter by failing to mandate an inquiry into whether an accused's consent to an NCRMD finding is voluntary and informed, similar to the inquiry required for guilty pleas under section 606(1.1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Charter challenges, finding no violation of fundamental justice or equality rights.

The Court also dismissed the appellants' individual arguments regarding the reasonableness of their verdicts, fitness to stand trial, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder, was transferred from a medium security facility to a maximum security facility by order of the Ontario Review Board.

The Review Board concluded that the 'least onerous and least restrictive' test under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code did not apply to the specific conditions of the disposition.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the 'least onerous and least restrictive' requirement applies to the disposition order as a whole, including its conditions.

The Court found that the Review Board committed an error of law and that the Crown failed to demonstrate that no substantial wrong occurred, entitling the appellant to a re-hearing.