Iain Ericson Skelton

The accused brought two applications under sections 276 and 278.92 of the Criminal Code seeking to admit evidence of the prior sexual activity of two young complainants (sisters).

Under section 278.92, the accused sought to admit text messages exchanged between the accused and one complainant, and text messages between that complainant and her friend.

Under section 276, the accused sought to admit evidence that the younger complainant had viewed pornography and attempted to observe the accused and her mother engaging in sexual activity.

The court found that the text messages constituted records under section 278.1 and were capable of being admitted.

At stage two, both the complainant's counsel and the Crown conceded that the text messages had significant probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice, and the court admitted them.

For the section 276 application, the court found that viewing pornography and observing sexual activity constitute sexual activity within the meaning of section 276, and that the evidence was sufficiently specific.

At stage two, the court balanced the factors under section 276(3) and found that the evidence had significant probative value relevant to the accused's ability to make full answer and defence, and admitted the evidence subject to parameters to be determined by the trial judge.

The defendant, charged with sexual assault and sexual interference, was found permanently unfit to stand trial.

The defense sought a stay of proceedings under s. 672.851(7) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the defendant permanently unfit and not currently a significant threat to public safety due to high levels of support.

However, the court dismissed the application for a stay, concluding that granting a stay would not be in the interests of the proper administration of justice, considering the serious nature of the alleged offences, the public interest in protecting children, and the potential for future changes in the defendant's supervision.

The defendant, a young person, was charged with attempted murder.

The court first addressed a Charter application for a stay of proceedings, brought by the defence, alleging lost evidence due to the Crown's failure to call the complainant and another witness.

The court dismissed the application, ruling that an absent witness's potential testimony does not constitute "lost evidence" in the same manner as tangible items, and the state has no obligation to preserve witness availability.

Proceeding to the trial on the merits, the court relied on extensive video evidence and witness testimony to establish the defendant's identity as one of the assailants.

While the Crown proved the defendant stabbed the complainant, the court found that the specific intent to kill, required for attempted murder, was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, the defendant was acquitted of attempted murder but found guilty of the lesser included offence of assault causing bodily harm.

The accused, Frederick Leon, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings for second-degree murder due to unreasonable delay.

The court applied the Jordan framework, calculating total delay, defence delay, and considering exceptional circumstances, specifically the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on trial scheduling.

The court found that after deducting defence delay and pandemic-related delay, the net delay fell below the presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The offender, Enoch Villanueva, was found guilty of aggravated assault for biting off the tip of the victim's finger during an altercation.

The court considered sentencing principles, aggravating factors (violence, permanent disfigurement, ongoing victim impact, offender reigniting the fight, and returning to the scene), and mitigating factors (family support, expressed remorse, no prior criminal record).

The court rejected the defence's request for a 90-day intermittent sentence, finding it insufficient for denunciation and deterrence given the severity and lasting impact of the injury.

The Crown sought 8-9 months.

The court imposed a sentence of 6 months jail, followed by 2 years probation with conditions including anger management, a DNA order, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a no-contact order with the victim during custody.

The defendant was charged with aggravated assault for biting off the complainant's fingertip during an altercation, claiming self-defence.

The court found that the defendant's act of biting was not for the purpose of self-defence, as the complainant had ceased fighting and was attempting to disengage.

The defendant's testimony was rejected due to inconsistencies and lack of candour, while the corroborating evidence of a third-party witness was accepted.

The Crown successfully disproved the self-defence claim beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in a conviction for aggravated assault.

The Crown sought to admit utterances from a 911 call made by the deceased complainant, Pierre Lefebvre, under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule in a criminal trial for unlawfully being in a dwelling with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine admissibility.

The application was dismissed because the utterances did not meet the criteria for the res gestae exception nor the threshold reliability under the principled approach.

The court found that the declarant did not personally observe the events and his high anxiety and confusion raised concerns about the possibility of concoction or distortion, making the evidence an inadequate substitute for sworn testimony.

D.D., a young person, pleaded guilty to robbery and disguise with intent.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the brandishing of an imitation firearm and the planned nature of the robbery, alongside significant mitigating factors such as D.D.'s status as a youthful first offender, early guilty plea, genuine remorse, and a history of profound trauma (father's incarceration, brother's homicide, personal robberies, PTSD diagnosis).

The Crown sought a custodial sentence.

Applying the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) principles of diminished moral blameworthiness and the least restrictive sentence, the court determined that while a gateway to custody existed due to the violent nature of the offence, the aggravating circumstances were not so exceptional as to mandate actual custody.

Instead, the court imposed a four-month deferred custody and supervision order followed by 12 months of probation, emphasizing D.D.'s rehabilitative progress and the need to address underlying issues through continued counselling.

Rodney John Love pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence and probation, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of excessive force with a golf club causing injury, and mitigating factors, such as the offender being a first-time offender, his remorse, acceptance of responsibility, a positive pre-sentence report, and proactive steps in anger management and sobriety.

The court also considered the collateral consequence of a conviction preventing the offender from coaching hockey.

Applying sentencing principles, including proportionality, denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and restraint, the court determined that a conditional discharge with 2 years probation was in the offender's best interest and not contrary to the public interest, given the totality of circumstances.

The accused was charged with operating a vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit (over 80 mgs) and distracted driving contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The central issue was whether the police violated the accused's Charter section 10(b) rights regarding the right to counsel.

The court found that the police failed to comply with their informational and implementational obligations under section 10(b) by misleading the accused about his right to choose counsel and failing to provide access to a telephone and telephone book.

The court excluded the breath test evidence as a remedy under section 24(2), finding the violation was serious and had significant impact on the accused's Charter rights.

The over 80 charge was dismissed.

The accused was found guilty of the distracted driving charge.

The accused, a truck driver with a clean driving record and no prior criminal history, was convicted of an offense related to impaired or dangerous driving.

The court rejected a conditional discharge despite acknowledging the significant collateral consequences to the accused's employment and financial situation.

The court imposed a conviction, finding that denunciation and general deterrence principles were paramount given the accused's specialized commercial driving license.

A fine of $2,000 plus a victim surcharge of $600 was imposed, with 28 days imprisonment as the default term if unpaid.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

He challenged the admissibility of breath test results, claiming violations of his Charter rights under sections 8 and 10(b).

The defendant argued that he was not adequately informed of his right to free legal advice at the roadside before providing samples to the approved screening device.

The court found that the police fully complied with the informational requirements of section 10(b) and that any confusion on the defendant's part was not apparent to the officers.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was tried on multiple counts relating to two separate incidents: alleged failure to comply with a recognizance by communicating with a complainant, theft of her telephone, and assault between August 17-23, 2016, and similar charges on September 2, 2016, including forcible confinement.

The court found the defendant guilty of both counts of failure to comply with the recognizance but acquitted him of the assault, theft, and forcible confinement charges.

The court determined that while the complainant's evidence established the defendant's breach of bail conditions, it did not constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt for the remaining charges.

The defendant was charged with over 80, having care or control of a motor vehicle contrary to s. 253(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence brought a Charter application challenging whether the investigating officer had reasonable suspicion to make an approved screening device (ASD) demand and whether there was an unreasonable delay in obtaining breath samples.

The defence conceded reasonable suspicion existed based on the odour of alcohol.

The primary issue was whether a 13-minute delay while the officer waited for a tow truck to impound the vehicle violated the "as soon as practicable" requirement under s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the delay was reasonable under the circumstances and dismissed the Charter application.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle "Over 80" following a police investigation on December 10, 2015.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the investigation by bringing a blended Charter application and trial, alleging breaches of Sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defendant argued that the officer improperly delayed providing rights to counsel regarding a marijuana possession charge in order to prioritize the drinking and driving investigation.

The court dismissed the Charter application and found the defendant guilty, holding that the officer lawfully conducted the sobriety investigation within the parameters of Highway Traffic Act authority and that the officer was not obligated to immediately provide rights to counsel regarding the possession charge.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The defendant brought a Charter motion arguing that police violated his rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown called evidence from the responding officer and the complainant.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the defendant, that the detention was lawful under the Highway Traffic Act, and that the defendant understood the reasons for his detention.

All Charter arguments were rejected and the evidence was admitted as admissible.

The defendant was found guilty as charged.