Patricia Sophia Brown

The accused was charged with flight from a peace officer under s. 320.17 of the Criminal Code after he pulled over for a traffic stop but subsequently drove away.

The police did not attempt to follow or intercept him.

The court considered conflicting jurisprudence on the meaning of 'pursued' and adopted the appellate definition requiring police to actually follow a vehicle with the intent to overtake or capture.

Because the police did not follow the accused after he departed, the actus reus of the offence was not made out.

The accused was found not guilty.

The appellant appealed from a conviction for sexual assault on multiple grounds, including alleged errors in the trial judge's application of the burden and standard of proof, an adverse inference from silence, the admission of testimony regarding the complainant's demeanour, and improper reliance on the complainant's testimonial demeanour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of law or consideration of evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the sentence imposed.

The conviction appeal raised two grounds: first, that the trial judge failed to address frailties in the complainant's evidence and material inconsistencies, and second, that the trial judge erred in her section 11(b) Charter analysis regarding defence delay.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or her apportionment of delay.

The appellant received a two-year custodial sentence for a serious sexual assault of a 13-year-old child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding the sentence fit and appropriate.

The Ontario Court of Justice sentenced the offender, Lawrence Davis, to a global term of seven years' imprisonment following his guilty pleas to several firearms offences, including transferring a firearm and possessing a loaded prohibited firearm.

The charges arose from an attempted illegal gun sale in a residential neighbourhood that escalated into a shootout, resulting in the death of the buyer and injuries to the offender.

In determining the sentence, the court balanced the severe danger of public gun trafficking against mitigating factors, including the offender's guilty pleas, family support, and the impact of systemic anti-Black racism.

After deducting enhanced credit for 1,065 days of pre-sentence custody, the offender was left with two years, seven months, and fifteen days remaining to serve.

On a defence motion in a murder prosecution, the court considered whether a court-ordered mental disorder assessment report had to be disclosed immediately to the Crown under s. 672.2(4) of the Criminal Code.

Relying on the fair trial rationale recognized in prior Ontario authority, the court held that strict compliance with the provision should yield where immediate disclosure would impair the accused's ability to decide whether to advance an NCR defence.

The report was ordered to be delivered only to defence counsel and not filed with the court or disclosed to the Crown at that stage.

If the accused later intends to rely on the report or raise capacity or NCR, disclosure and filing must occur at least 60 days before trial.

The accused, Frank Duquette, was charged with two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking methamphetamine and fentanyl following a traffic stop where a backpack containing illicit substances was found at his feet.

The co-accused, Amy Pineo-Fisher, had already been acquitted.

The central issue was whether the Crown could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Duquette had knowledge and control of the drugs.

The court found the police constable's testimony unreliable due to poor recollection of key details and determined there was insufficient evidence to establish that Duquette was in a position to observe the drugs in the backpack.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove the knowledge element of possession, and Duquette was acquitted on all charges.

The offender, Audley Crooks, was convicted by a jury of multiple Criminal Code offences including two counts of sexual assault, human trafficking, receiving a material benefit from human trafficking, and advertising sexual services.

The offences occurred over a two-week period in August 2020, involving a vulnerable complainant who was already engaged in sex work.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the serious nature of the offences, the victim's vulnerability, the offender's prior conviction for a similar offence, and his lack of insight.

Mitigating factors included the offender's efforts to change his lifestyle while on bail, family support, and the fact that the complainant was already in the sex trade.

The court applied "Duncan credit" for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions and "Downes credit" for strict bail conditions.

The Crown sought a 14-year global sentence, while the defence sought 3-5 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of eight years imprisonment before credit, which was reduced to six years after accounting for 24 months of pre-sentence and bail credit.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, a 20-year SOIRA order, and a non-communication order.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging an infringement of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the information being sworn to the anticipated end of trial was 804 days (26 months, 13 days), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court matters.

The court found that the Crown abdicated its responsibility to efficiently manage the prosecution, particularly regarding a co-accused whose charges were eventually stayed, and failed to diligently respond to disclosure requests.

Despite some defence delay (122 days), the net delay remained above the presumptive ceiling, and no exceptional circumstances were established by the Crown.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

Kelly Jacobs was convicted by a jury of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing the death of Beulah Peters.

The court considered sentencing objectives, aggravating factors (high intoxication, prolonged drinking, dangerous driving, unlicensed driving, frequency of impaired driving in the community, impact on victims), and mitigating factors (no prior criminal record, positive Gladue report, strong community support, employment, education, remorse, compliance with release conditions except alcohol abstinence).

The court applied Gladue principles, noting that the offender's circumstances did not diminish moral culpability to warrant a further reduction in sentence.

A conditional sentence was deemed unfit.

Following a consent order appointing the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) as guardian of the respondent's property, the PGT sought its costs of the application.

The respondent opposed, arguing that Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure should apply to deny costs.

The court held that section 8 of the Public Guardian and Trustee Act provides statutory authority for the PGT to deduct its reasonable fees and expenses from the respondent's property, and this provision prevails over Rule 57.

The court found the PGT's requested costs of $21,173.38 to be reasonable and ordered them payable from the respondent's funds.

The offender pleaded guilty to arson with disregard for human life after setting fire to a neighbour's house with his brother.

The fire caused $150,000 in property damage and destroyed the home.

The court found the offender's moral blameworthiness was significantly reduced due to his severe cognitive limitations, functioning at the 1st percentile.

Balancing the gravity of the offence with the offender's reduced culpability, the court imposed a two-year conditional sentence followed by three years of probation.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder following a brutal, unprovoked attack on a 75-year-old woman walking on a trail.

The offender, who had consumed marijuana and psilocybin, inflicted severe head injuries that ultimately caused the victim's death 14 months later.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 14-17 years, while the defence sought the minimum 10 years.

The court weighed the severe aggravating factors of the savage attack on a vulnerable victim against the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, and prospects for rehabilitation, ultimately setting parole ineligibility at 13 years.

The accused was charged with second degree murder after brutally beating a 75-year-old woman on a walking trail.

The accused admitted to causing the victim's death but argued he lacked the requisite intent due to extreme intoxication from consuming magic mushrooms and marijuana.

The court rejected the defence of non-mental disorder automatism, finding no psychiatric evidence to support it.

The court concluded that the accused's coordinated actions before, during, and after the attack, along with the targeted and severe nature of the blows, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to cause bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause death and was reckless as to whether death ensued.

The accused was found guilty of second degree murder.

The offender, Mitchell O’Hanley, was convicted of dangerous driving and arson.

This decision outlines the sentencing, considering mitigating factors such as his youth, lack of prior record, employment, and efforts towards rehabilitation, against aggravating factors including the seriousness of arson, complete destruction of property, risk to neighbours and firefighters, and the dangerous driving incident.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for arson, imposing a 15-month imprisonment for arson and a $1,750 fine with a 30-day license suspension for dangerous driving, followed by 24 months probation.

The accused was found in possession of a loaded handgun, ammunition and cocaine when stopped by police while walking along a street late at night.

The trial judge found that several of the accused's constitutional rights were infringed by police but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, convicting the accused of various firearms offences and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

A majority of the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge committed reversible error in assessing the seriousness of the Charter-infringing police conduct, excluded the evidence and entered acquittals.

The Supreme Court of Canada, by majority, allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, substantially for the reasons of the dissenting judge at the Court of Appeal, while leaving open the question of whether remedies other than exclusion of evidence may be available under s. 24(1) of the Charter when dealing with s. 24(2).

The accused was arrested following a nightclub shooting and placed in a dry cell for approximately two hours before police collected gunshot residue samples from his hands.

He was not provided an opportunity to contact legal counsel until after the samples were taken.

The accused brought a Charter application arguing his s. 10(b) rights were violated.

The court found that the police failed to facilitate the accused's right to counsel at the earliest practicable opportunity and that the delay was unreasonable.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the gunshot residue evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The offender, an 18-year-old international university student, was convicted of sexually assaulting a 17-year-old highly intoxicated female student in a university residence.

The court considered the significant physical and psychological impact on the victim, the offender's lack of a prior criminal record, and the collateral immigration consequences of a custodial sentence.

The court determined that a sentence of 26 months' imprisonment was appropriate, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for a serious crime of violence against a vulnerable victim.

The accused brought a Charter application at the commencement of his trial seeking to exclude a firearm, ammunition, and cocaine seized by police during a street stop.

The court found that the police arbitrarily detained the accused without reasonable suspicion, violating his s. 9 Charter rights.

This unlawful detention also resulted in breaches of his s. 8 right against unreasonable search and s. 10(b) right to counsel.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the police acted in good faith and the evidence was highly reliable and essential to the prosecution.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision refusing to appoint him as the substitute decision-maker for his mother regarding her admission to a care facility.

The Board had found the appellant did not meet the criteria under s. 33(6) of the Health Care Consent Act, relying on the 'best interests' factors in s. 42(2).

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the Board erred in law by misapplying the statutory test, improperly discounting the mother's previously expressed wishes to be cared for by family, and misinterpreting the definition of 'available'.

The Court quashed the Board's decision and appointed the appellant as his mother's representative.