Patricia Sophia Brown

The appellant appealed from a conviction for sexual assault on multiple grounds, including alleged errors in the trial judge's application of the burden and standard of proof, an adverse inference from silence, the admission of testimony regarding the complainant's demeanour, and improper reliance on the complainant's testimonial demeanour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of law or consideration of evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the sentence imposed.

The conviction appeal raised two grounds: first, that the trial judge failed to address frailties in the complainant's evidence and material inconsistencies, and second, that the trial judge erred in her section 11(b) Charter analysis regarding defence delay.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or her apportionment of delay.

The appellant received a two-year custodial sentence for a serious sexual assault of a 13-year-old child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding the sentence fit and appropriate.

The accused, Frank Duquette, was charged with two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking methamphetamine and fentanyl following a traffic stop where a backpack containing illicit substances was found at his feet.

The co-accused, Amy Pineo-Fisher, had already been acquitted.

The central issue was whether the Crown could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Duquette had knowledge and control of the drugs.

The court found the police constable's testimony unreliable due to poor recollection of key details and determined there was insufficient evidence to establish that Duquette was in a position to observe the drugs in the backpack.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove the knowledge element of possession, and Duquette was acquitted on all charges.

The offender, Audley Crooks, was convicted by a jury of multiple Criminal Code offences including two counts of sexual assault, human trafficking, receiving a material benefit from human trafficking, and advertising sexual services.

The offences occurred over a two-week period in August 2020, involving a vulnerable complainant who was already engaged in sex work.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the serious nature of the offences, the victim's vulnerability, the offender's prior conviction for a similar offence, and his lack of insight.

Mitigating factors included the offender's efforts to change his lifestyle while on bail, family support, and the fact that the complainant was already in the sex trade.

The court applied "Duncan credit" for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions and "Downes credit" for strict bail conditions.

The Crown sought a 14-year global sentence, while the defence sought 3-5 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of eight years imprisonment before credit, which was reduced to six years after accounting for 24 months of pre-sentence and bail credit.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, a 20-year SOIRA order, and a non-communication order.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging an infringement of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the information being sworn to the anticipated end of trial was 804 days (26 months, 13 days), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court matters.

The court found that the Crown abdicated its responsibility to efficiently manage the prosecution, particularly regarding a co-accused whose charges were eventually stayed, and failed to diligently respond to disclosure requests.

Despite some defence delay (122 days), the net delay remained above the presumptive ceiling, and no exceptional circumstances were established by the Crown.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

Kelly Jacobs was convicted by a jury of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing the death of Beulah Peters.

The court considered sentencing objectives, aggravating factors (high intoxication, prolonged drinking, dangerous driving, unlicensed driving, frequency of impaired driving in the community, impact on victims), and mitigating factors (no prior criminal record, positive Gladue report, strong community support, employment, education, remorse, compliance with release conditions except alcohol abstinence).

The court applied Gladue principles, noting that the offender's circumstances did not diminish moral culpability to warrant a further reduction in sentence.

A conditional sentence was deemed unfit.

The offender, Mitchell O’Hanley, was convicted of dangerous driving and arson.

This decision outlines the sentencing, considering mitigating factors such as his youth, lack of prior record, employment, and efforts towards rehabilitation, against aggravating factors including the seriousness of arson, complete destruction of property, risk to neighbours and firefighters, and the dangerous driving incident.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for arson, imposing a 15-month imprisonment for arson and a $1,750 fine with a 30-day license suspension for dangerous driving, followed by 24 months probation.

The accused was found in possession of a loaded handgun, ammunition and cocaine when stopped by police while walking along a street late at night.

The trial judge found that several of the accused's constitutional rights were infringed by police but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, convicting the accused of various firearms offences and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

A majority of the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge committed reversible error in assessing the seriousness of the Charter-infringing police conduct, excluded the evidence and entered acquittals.

The Supreme Court of Canada, by majority, allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, substantially for the reasons of the dissenting judge at the Court of Appeal, while leaving open the question of whether remedies other than exclusion of evidence may be available under s. 24(1) of the Charter when dealing with s. 24(2).