ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
MICHAEL AKUFFO-DUNCAN
Before Justice A. Neil Singh
Heard on January 28, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on February 26, 2026
Eugene Wong counsel for the Crown
Patricia Brown counsel for the defendant Michael Akuffo-Duncan
SINGH J.:
INTRODUCTION
1On July 3, 2024, Mr. Akuffo-Duncan was the subject of a traffic stop after he completed a U-turn. His interaction with the police that day brought Mr. Akuffo-Duncan before me for a trial that asks an important legal question, one on which Courts have diverged.
2The facts are not in dispute. The evidentiary portion of this trial proceeded on the basis of an Agreed Statement of Fact, filed jointly by the Crown and the defence.
3After completing the U‑turn, the police activated their lights and sirens to initiate a traffic stop. Mr. Akuffo‑Duncan pulled over. A brief investigation followed, and then he drove away. The police did not try to stop him. There was no attempt to intercept or follow him. Later that night, after an earlier, unsuccessful attempt to surrender while the investigating officer was at a hospital on another call, Mr. Akuffo‑Duncan turned himself in.
4The Crown asserts that it has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the offence of flight from a peace officer while being pursued. It argues that the pursuit did not end when Mr. Akuffo‑Duncan initially stopped his vehicle but was ongoing throughout the traffic stop. In their submission, the offence was complete once he drove away, and no further action by police was required.
5The defence contends that a pursuit requires something more: an actual attempt by police to follow with the intent to overtake or capture.
6The Court is therefore asked to determine which of the two competing interpretations of “pursued” is correct, where each interpretation is supported by a line of authority that has taken the law in different directions.
THE LEGISLATIVE PROVISION AND THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENCE
7Section 320.17 of the Criminal Code states:
Everyone commits an offence who operates a motor vehicle or vessel while being pursued by a peace officer and who fails, without reasonable excuse, to stop the motor vehicle or vessel as soon as is reasonable in the circumstances.
8To rebut the presumption of innocence, the Crown must prove beyond all reasonable doubt that:
(1) Mr. Akuffo-Duncan operated a motor vehicle;
(2) The police were pursuing him;
(3) He knew the police were pursuing him;
(4) He failed to stop his vehicle as soon as reasonably possible in the circumstances; and
(5) He had no reasonable excuse for failing to stop
9At issue here are elements #2 and #3. Mr. Akuffo‑Duncan was clearly driving. If I find that the police were pursuing him, and that he knew as much, then elements #4 and #5 will follow based on the evidence. He did not stop his vehicle, and there is no evidence capable of raising a reasonable excuse.
THE DIVERGING JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MEANING OF “PURSUED”
10The meaning of “pursued” in s. 320.17, and previously in s. 249.1(1), has been the subject of significant judicial debate.
11In R v. Kagayalingam1, Justice Lipson held that the meaning of “pursue” is “to follow with intent to overtake.” This definition was adopted and expanded by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Quinn to include following with “intent to overtake or capture.”2
12In R v. Jensen3, the Summary Conviction Appeal Court held that Crown must prove the accused knew the police were pursuing him4.
13The interpretation of Jensen has since diverged.
14In R v. Athwal5, Justice Bishop found that Jensen stood for the proposition that a driver who stops when directed by police, but then drives away before the interaction is complete, can be convicted of flight; such a driver cannot reasonably believe that leaving would not prompt pursuit.
15This proposition was subsequently relied upon in R. v. Parnell6 and R v. Dumfeh7.
16Athwal has been subsequently relied upon to find that a driver who stops for police but then departs mid‑interaction is guilty of the offence and cannot reasonably think that leaving would not prompt a pursuit8. This line of authority asserts that phrases “while being pursued” and “who fails…to stop the motor vehicle” in s.320.17 of the Criminal Code are interpreted broadly to give effect to the legislative purpose while respecting the statutory text. These courts have found that a pursuit remains ongoing until a driver is free to leave, and the obligation on a driver to stop includes the obligation to remain stopped9.
17More recently, however, Justice Finnestad in R. v. Bell reached a different conclusion10. Her Honour determined that Parnell and Dumfeh misstated Jensen. They conflated the knowledge element (mens rea) with the pursuit element (actus reus). Justice Finnestad held that Jensen did not define “pursuit”; rather, it addressed how the initial stop could establish knowledge in a case where the police in fact engaged in an actual pursuit.
18The Court in Bell found that a pursuit requires the police to follow a vehicle with the intent to stop it from driving away. Where the police do not follow with an intent to stop, there is no pursuit11.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
19Having reviewed the cases, I agree with and adopt the reasoning of Justice Finnestad. I do so because Bell is firmly grounded in the binding appellate jurisprudence. The definition of “pursued” employed in Bell reflects its ordinary meaning endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Quinn and applied by the Summary Conviction Appeal Court in Jensen.
20Quinn remains the most recent pronouncement of the Court of Appeal on the meaning of “pursue,” and its definition, “to follow with intent to overtake or capture.” This must govern my analysis.
21The competing line of cases rely upon an expanded interpretation of paragraph 30 of Jensen that is inconsistent with these appellate authorities. My adoption of the reasoning in Bell therefore rests not on personal preference of reasoning, but on fidelity to binding appellate authority.
22With respect, the alternative line of authority arises from treating paragraph 30 of Jensen as defining the actus reus of pursuit. It does not. Paragraph 30 speaks to knowledge in a case where an actual pursuit followed. It cannot be used to dispense with the requirement that police must, in fact, follow the fleeing vehicle.
23A review of the caselaw establishes the following principles:
(1) A pursuit requires the police to follow a vehicle with the intent to stop it from driving away. This can include catching up, overtaking, or any movement aimed at stopping the fleeing vehicle. Specific speeds or distances are not required, but some form of following must exist.
(2) If the police do not follow, there is no pursuit. Where the police take no steps after the accused departs, the actus reus is not made out.
(3) A traffic stop does not constitute an ongoing pursuit. A breach of the obligation to remain stopped does not transform into “flight while pursued.”
(4) The mental element of the offence requires knowledge that one is being pursued.
(5) Knowledge that one is stopped is not the same as knowing one is being pursued. If police do not follow, the accused cannot know they are being pursued, because they are not.
(6) Knowledge must exist at the time the driver fails to stop. Knowledge cannot be retroactively supplied by what might occur later. Thus, where no pursuit follows the driver’s departure, knowledge of being pursued cannot be established.
(7) Knowledge of being pursued can be imputed from the context surrounding the traffic stop, but only if an actual pursuit follows.
(8) The meaning of “pursued” is “to follow with intent to stop or overtake.” This may be slow or cautious, but it must be aimed at stopping the vehicle.
(9) The meaning of pursuit must respect the statutory text and maintain its everyday and ordinary meaning. The definition of pursuit cannot be expanded so broadly as to violate the actual meaning of the word.
24The misapplication of Jensen has transformed knowledge of a pursuit into a rule that any driver who departs from a traffic stop is automatically pursued within the meaning of s.320.17 of the Criminal Code. This is not supported by the Court in Jensen and it contradicts the findings in Quinn and Kagayalingam, respectively.
25The effect of this misapplication is that the Court has inadvertently rewritten the statutory requirement of “being pursued” and expanded its meaning so broadly as to violate the ordinary meaning of the term.
26I appreciate the Crown’s concern that a narrower definition of pursuit may reduce the availability of this offence in situations where police elect, for public-safety reasons, not to engage in a chase. However, the statutory requirement of “being pursued” must still be respected in accordance with the principles of statutory interpretation.
Application of the Principles to the Facts
27As in Bell, the officer here made a deliberate decision not to follow the departing vehicle, and no action, however minor, was taken to overtake, catch up, or stop the accused. These factual similarities support applying the same analysis.
28It is clear that Mr. Akuffo-Duncan was stopped by the police. He pulled over as directed. As the investigation unfolded, he fled from the traffic stop. There is no evidence the police undertook any action that could be constituted as following with an intention to overtake or stop.
29Consequently, there was no pursuit.
30The Crown has failed to prove the both the actus reus and mens rea of the offence. Mr. Akuffo-Duncan will be found not guilty.
CONCLUSION
31I understand that s.320.17 aims to hold accountable those who cause police chases. It seeks to criminalize and deter people from continuing to drive when it is clear the police are trying to stop them. In that vein, and at first glance, this result may seem absurd.
32However, this is not indicative of any gap in the legislative scheme. Parliament has enacted other Criminal Code offences capable of addressing the conduct exhibited by Mr. Akuffo‑Duncan. What it does mean, is that his flight from the traffic stop does not automatically result in a finding he was “being pursued” by the police.
33It may very well be the case that Mr. Akuffo-Duncan’s actions amounted to obstructing a peace officer under s.129(a) the Criminal Code. Were he charged with this offence, we may very well be having a different discussion. He was not, however, and I must deal with the allegation against him as particularized.
34Parliament has chosen its wording of the section. They must have done so with purpose. If Parliament wishes to specifically criminalize drivers from fleeing traffic stops irrespective of any pursuit, the section ought to be amended, or a new offence created to reflect this will. That is neither the role nor responsibility of the Court.
35Relying upon and adopting Justice Finnestad’s analysis in Bell, I find the Crown has failed to prove that Mr. Akuffo-Duncan was “being pursued” by the police after he fled.
36Mr. Akuffo-Duncan, you will be found not guilty. The charge is dismissed. You are free to go.
Released: February 26, 2026
Signed: Justice A. Neil Singh
Footnotes
- 2006 ONCJ 402 at para 38.
- R v. Quinn, 2014 ONCA 650 at para 10 (leave to appeal dismissed 2015 25419 (SCC)).
- 2015 ONSC 1040 at para 30.
- The Court also stated that the accused must also intend to evade the police, however, that element has been removed from the current iteration of the offence in s.320.17 of the Criminal Code.
- 2016 ONCJ 89 at para 111.
- R v. Parnell, 2024 ONCJ 310
- R v. Dumfeh, 2025 ONCJ 310
- R v. Parnell, supra at para 29; R v. Dumfeh, supra at pp 4-5.
- Ibid.
- 2026 ONCJ 21.
- Ibid at para 40.