His Majesty the King v. Johnathan Alexander Bell, 2026 ONCJ 21

CITATION: R. v. Bell, 2026 ONCJ 21

DATE: 2026 01 12

St. Catharine’s

B E T W E E N :

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— AND —

JOHNATHAN ALEXANDER BELL

Before Justice F.M. Finnestad

Heard on September 18 & 19, 2025

Reasons for Judgment released on January 12, 2026

Ms. Jamaldin………………………………………………………….counsel for the Crown

Mr. Burton……………………………………..counsel for the defendant Johnathan Bell

FINNESTAD, J.:

1Johnathan Bell was charged with dangerous operation and fail to stop when pursued by police. As the accused person advised that the pronouns she/her were appropriate in this case, I will be referring to Ms. Bell accordingly, throughout this judgment.

2At the conclusion of a two-day trial, I found Ms. Bell guilty of dangerous operation and provided reasons. Sentence was imposed. I found her not guilty of failing to stop when pursued and indicated reasons were to follow. There was some time pressure with respect to the verdicts, as Ms. Bell had been in custody for some time and I was not scheduled to return to the St. Catharine’s courthouse on any future date. The verdict on the pursuit charge required more fulsome reasons than time allowed. These are those reasons.

The facts

3The only necessary facts with respect to this one remaining charge are these. Ms. Bell was driving a car very badly and very slowly on a city street in June 2021. D.C. Molnar pulled the car over at the top of a hill, and it came to a full stop. The officer approached the vehicle, seeing the driver’s face in the side mirror. At that point the passenger got out and was stumbling about, in apparent intoxication. D.C. Molnar demanded for safety reasons that he get back in the car. He did so, and the car immediately pulled away. It accelerated and drove down the street. As the car pulled away it contacted D.C. Molnar who was standing at the rear driver’s side quarter panel. He neither fell nor was injured, but the car brushed him. D.C. Molnar testified that in accordance with police policy he did not initiate a chase. A few minutes later he contacted dispatch and was advised that the street was a dead end. He drove to the end and found the Pontiac abandoned. A search of the vehicle produced items connected to Ms. Bell. An extensive search of the surrounding area with a canine unit turned up the uncooperative passenger, but not the driver. Ms. Bell was arrested a couple years later and came to trial in 2025.

The charge

4Section 320.17 provides that everyone commits an offence who operates a motor vehicle while being pursued by a peace officer and who fails, without reasonable excuse, to stop the motor vehicle as soon as is reasonable in the circumstances.

5Despite the Criminal Code heading for this section of “flight from peace officer”, that section setting out the elements of the offence makes no mention of “flight”. I would have no difficulty finding that the driver in this case was “in flight” from police. Instead, the section provides that an offence is committed where a person “operates a motor vehicle while being pursued by a peace officer” and fails without reasonable excuse to stop as soon as is reasonable.

6The essential elements of this offence are that:

A person is operating a motor vehicle
The police are pursuing that driver
the driver knows that they are being pursued
The driver wilfully fails to stop the vehicle as soon as is reasonable
The driver has no reasonable excuse for their failure to stop.

7These essential elements were among those listed in the decision of the Court of Appeal of Alberta in the decision of R v Kulchisky, (2007 ABCA 110) which has been cited in multiple decisions across the country since that time. This decision pre-dated the amendments to then s. 249.1(1), which removed the requirements that the pursuing officers be in a motor vehicle themselves, and that the failure to stop be proved to be for purposes of evading the police. The removal of those two requirements in the current s. 320.17 does not invalidate the list of the remaining essential elements set out by the Court of Appeal for Alberta, nor challenge the findings of subsequent courts which referred to those other elements as essential to be proved.

The issue

8The issue is whether a necessary part of the actus reus, that is, that the vehicle was being pursued, has been proved.

9D.C. Molnar’s evidence was that he did not pursue the departing vehicle. His testified that “not being familiar with the area, and being familiar with pursuit policy, I didn’t pursue him”. He confirmed this in further questioning.

10I should have thought that answer to be determinative of the issue, but there have been cases where officers described their subsequent actions as not being “in pursuit” and courts have found otherwise. (see for example, R v Jensen, 2015 ONSC 1040 at para 28) where what the officers were describing was found to be a “pursuit” in fact, although it may not have constituted such under police policy or regulations, and so not have been described as such in their testimony.) In the case at bar, the officer went back to his car and sat in the driver’s seat, specifically deciding not to pursue. When told by dispatch that the street was a dead end, he followed the road to the end and found the abandoned car.

The meaning of “pursue”

11The ordinary meaning of “pursue” has been considered by many Canadian courts, usually at the trial level. In the oft-cited Ontario Court of Justice decision of R v Kagayalingam, (2006 ONCJ 402), Justice Lipson drew the distinction between pursuit and “active following”. The latter was the officer’s characterization of his own driving, where he remained well back of the driver with no attempt to catch up, and was himself stopping for traffic lights. The trial judge found that pursuit required, in accordance with the Canadian Oxford Dictionary definition, “to follow with intent to overtake”.

12Subsequent cases, before and after the amendments, have relied on this decision. Others have clarified and elaborated on it.

13In R v Briltz, (2016 SKCA 2) it was argued that there was no evidence of a police intention to “overtake” as officers were not trying to pass the fleeing vehicle. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal noted that the trial judge appreciated that “overtake” can take on contextual nuances, and upheld the finding that “overtake” included “to catch up with” and did not require any attempt to actually pass the other vehicle. The trial judge had relied on the decision in R v Zylinski, (2009 ABPC 226) which held that police with emergency lights engaged, “following a vehicle to try to make it stop” were engaged in a pursuit. (see also R v Isaac, (2015 SKQB 46) to similar effect) The Court of Appeal upheld a finding that the officer’s actions in Briltz constituted a pursuit.

14This further definition of pursuit meaning “following a vehicle in order to make it stop” is a welcome and sensible clarification of the definition of pursuit as “following with intention to overtake”. Attempts to overtake or to catch up would be actions in support of the decision to follow a vehicle in order to make it stop.

15In R v Longman, (2017 SKPC 31) the accused had a known history of stopping for police and then taking off when they got out of their vehicles. Mr. Longman did precisely that in this case. The officer got back in the police car and followed the suspect vehicle at a normal speed with the emergency lights on, to the end of the street. When he could no longer see the vehicle, he turned back and reported the event to dispatch. The officer testified that he wanted Mr. Longman’s vehicle to stop, but would not continue to pursue it because of the dangerous way it was being operated.

16Interestingly, defence counsel in that case, in urging an acquittal, referred to an earlier case in which the same accused driver was acquitted upon engaging in exactly the same conduct. In that earlier case the trial judge found that Mr. Longman was not being pursued. The trial judge in the reported decision noted that while Mr. Longman’s behaviour in the first case was identical to the present case, the police behaviour differed. The judge noted at para 29 “in fact, the case law relating to this offence has been focussed primarily on the police behaviour as related to the element of “pursuit”, rather than the accused person’s behaviour.” In the former case, police “stayed where they were, adopting their ‘no pursuit’ policy”. In the case under consideration, the trial judge found that while police were not intending to engage in a high-speed chase, they did follow the driver with the intention of trying to make him stop and therefore were “in pursuit”.

Position of the Crown

17The Crown argued that “pursuit” does not require what is commonly viewed as a “police chase”. She submitted that a driver is being “pursued by police” from the moment police initiate a stop, and continues to be so pursued until told they are free to leave. Thus, if a driver left before the investigation was complete, that “pursuit” would still be in effect. Any conduct of a driver in leaving the scene of a stop would be a refusal to stop when pursued, regardless of whether or not the police followed them.

18In support of this proposition, the Crown relied on the trial decision in R v Dumfeh, (2025 ONCJ 128) which relied on R v Parnell, (2024 ONCJ 310) which relied on R v Athwal, (2019 ONCJ 89). The latter two relied on R v Jensen ( 2015 ONSC 1040). These cases were argued in support of the proposition that a pursuit was commenced with an initial police stop and required nothing further. I disagree with the interpretation of Jensen upon which the other cases have relied without further consideration of the issue.

The Law

19In R v Parnell, a trial decision of this Court, Mr. Parnell was stopped by police. During the interaction, he became nervous and drove away at high speed. The officer was left standing on the sidewalk. He did not give chase because to do so would have compromised public safety. The defence argument at trial was that Mr. Parnell had an excuse for fleeing, as his actions were induced by the officer’s conduct during the stop, which included putting his hand in the area of his firearm.

20In that case, defence conceded that the offence was made out if the trial judge rejected the defence of reasonable excuse for failing to stop. The issue of whether there was a pursuit was not argued. The trial judge held that Mr. Parnell was being pursued when he first stopped. He knew he was not free to leave, and took off for purposes of evading police.

21The trial judge found that though “there was no active pursuit after Mr. Parnell was pulled over, the caselaw makes it clear that a driver who pulls over in response to an officer’s direction and then speeds away before the interaction is complete is rightfully guilty of this offence” (para 29) The trial judge cited Athwal and Jensen in support of this statement of the law.

22With respect, I disagree with this bald statement of what the caselaw establishes. There are cases all over the country which deal with the issue of what in fact constitutes a pursuit. R v Longman (supra), noted that an essential part of the offence of failing to stop while being pursued is actually being pursued, and it is the police response to the flight that may determine whether this offence has been committed.

23The trial judge in Parnell noted at para 29 that in finding that a driver could be guilty of failing to stop while pursued without being actively pursued, “the passages in s. 320.17 of “while being pursued” and “who fails to stop the motor vehicle” are interpreted broadly (my emphasis) to give effect to the legislative purpose while respecting the statutory text.” I would caution that they should not be so broadly interpreted as to violate the actual meaning of the word “pursued”, particularly as such has been defined in the developing caselaw.

24In that context, the trial judge concluded,” the pursuit remains ongoing until the driver is free to leave, and the obligation to stop includes the obligation to stay stopped”. I disagree with the former of the two conclusions, which does not flow necessarily from the latter. The fact that the obligation to stop includes another, to remain stopped until the matter is completed, does not translate into a finding that any breach of that obligation must consequently involve a pursuit. Not every flight results in a pursuit. The breach of that obligation to stay stopped may be, as in the case of Ms. Bell, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle. It may be obstruction of a peace officer in the execution of their duty. But in my view, that flight is not “while pursued” simply by virtue of there having been an initial traffic stop.

25The brief comments in this statement in Parnell, of the “clear caselaw”, reference Athwal (supra) and Jensen (supra) as that caselaw.

26In Athwal, the officer was following two cars in an attempt to stop them, in order to caution the drivers about moose on the roadway. Both were speeding in an area of reduced visibility after midnight. He activated his lights. The first car pulled over and the second, driven by Mr. Athwal, slowed down to the right but then sped off. The officer did not pursue for safety reasons.

27It appears that the trial judge viewed the initial pursuit as interrupted by the vehicle slowing and moving to the right before speeding off (although it appears equally open on those facts to find an actual initial pursuit from which the flight proceeded directly). In convicting of failing to stop while pursued, the trial judge cited R v Jensen as authority for the proposition that a driver who pulls over at police direction and then speeds off before the interaction is complete is guilty of this offence.

28This proposition forms the base upon which rests the inverted pyramid of cases cited by the Crown. In fact, I do not find R v Jensen to stand for that proposition.

29At issue in Jensen was the meaning of “pursuit”. When Mr. Jenson took off after an initial police stop, one officer testified that he followed with lights and sirens engaged, and a second that he was trying to find the vehicle and pull it over. When both officers cornered Mr. Jensen in a parking lot, his vehicle was still in motion.

30Police officers testified that they were not engaged in a “pursuit” which they described by reference to the Ottawa Police Service Suspect Apprehension Pursuits policy. Notwithstanding this testimony, the trial judge found Mr. Jenson guilty of failing to stop when pursued, applying the “common everyday meaning of pursue”.

31An issue on appeal was whether an “intention to overtake” had been established, as described in the definition of “pursue” in R v Kagayalingam (supra). The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found that “assuming without deciding whether intent to overtake is an essential element of the offence, there is ample evidence here to support the view that the police intended to overtake the appellant’s vehicle.” ( para 29) The Court thus found that a pursuit had been established having reference to the definition in the caselaw to that point. It did not set out a new test for what constituted a pursuit, despite being cited to that effect.

32The appellate court in Jensen found that the trial judge had sufficient basis in the evidence to find that the appellant intended to evade the police and knew that the police were pursuing him. “In my view the initial roadside stop fulfils the requirement that the appellant be aware that he is being pursued. He pulled over in response to (the officer’s) direction but then sped away in order to evade him before the interaction was completed.” (para 30)

33In this often-cited paragraph, the Court held that the initial stop was sufficient for Mr. Jensen to know that he was being pursued, when he was in fact, subsequently pursued. This paragraph did not define the actus reus of pursuit, but addressed the mens rea of flight when pursued, by imputing knowledge from the initial stop.

Summary of the Law

34In summary then, Jensen in 2015 was an appellate decision involving a police stop, which was followed by flight and an actual, factual, pursuit involving flashing lights and wailing sirens and which ultimately trapped a moving car. The comments in paragraph 30 did not create a new definition for pursuit. The definition of pursuit in the existing caselaw was referenced and applied. (eg Kagayalingam and R v Quinn (2014 ONCA 650)). The comments in paragraph 30 referenced the mens rea of the offence and not the actus reus.

35In 2015 the trial court in Athwal cited the above-noted paragraph 30 of Jensen as authority that “ a driver who pulls over in response to an officer’s direction, but then speeds away before the interaction is completed can be rightfully convicted of flight from police”. That is not what paragraph 30 says.

36In 2024 the trial court in Parnell relied on Athwal and cited the same paragraph in Jensen to say “the caselaw makes clear” that such a driver could be convicted upon such evidence.

37In 2025 the trial court in Dumfeh, (2025 ONCJ 128) relied on Parnell, the comments in Athwal and para 30 from Jensen to agree with this “clear caselaw”.

38In 2025 the trial court in Hashimi, (2025 ONCJ 673) relied on Dumfeh and Parnell to find guilt in the case of flight without a factual pursuit.

39In my view all of these cases which rely on Jensen, as interpreted, to the point it is described as “clear caselaw”, are in error, It is necessary to return to an interpretation of what is meant by “while pursued” as an essential element of this offence.

Conclusion

40The caselaw is clear that a pursuit requires, by definition, police following a vehicle with the intent to stop it from driving away. This can involve catching up to, or overtaking, a fleeing vehicle. It can be accomplished in many ways and requires neither speed nor distance. It can include various police actions committed with the same intent with respect to the fleeing vehicle. In my view when police do not follow a fleeing vehicle to stop it, there is no pursuit.

41Cases which find that Jensen stands for the proposition that a driver who pulls away from a police stop is guilty of this offence without more, are in error in my respectful opinion. Those comments in Jensen related to knowledge of being pursued, in a case where a de facto pursuit was found to have occurred. Other trial decisions have followed a misinterpretation without question, and the mere fact that there are several of them building on each other does not make them persuasive.

42Parnell interpreted “while being pursued” and “who fails to stop the motor vehicle” “broadly to give effect to the legislative purpose while respecting the statutory text”. (para 29) In my view this interpretation does neither. It does not respect the statutory text in that it violates the common everyday meaning of “pursuit” and the manner in which it has been interpreted in the trial courts over the years. It does not give effect to the legislative purpose unless one determines that the legislative purpose is to stop fleeing drivers whether they are pursued or not. If that were the purpose, the section ought to be worded to that effect, and not require pursuit as an essential element.

43In fact, the legislative purpose of this section is surely to deter and punish those who cause police chases, whether that “chase” is at high or low speed, for a short period of time or a long one, involves moving down the highway with a police cruiser behind, or ramming into police officers who are boxing the driver in with their vehicles in an effort to stop him driving. What is to be deterred is people continuing to drive when it is clear the police are trying to stop them. If the police are not trying to stop them, there is no pursuit. This is so even where police decide not to initiate a pursuit for very sensible public safety reasons.

44This offence is a serious one, with serious penalties, which was surely enacted in recognition of the grave risks to safety inherent in police pursuits. The goals of denunciation and deterrence are behind the sentences imposed for this offence.

45The risks to public safety have led to police forces across the country forming policies to avoid engaging in such activity. It follows from this that there will be fewer of these charges laid, not because drivers have changed their dangerous habits, but because police have changed their response. This does not mean that fleeing drivers have impunity and that the definition of pursuit has to be modified or stretched in order to cover their conduct, regardless of police response. It means that other offences should be laid which reflect the actions of the driver. Sentences imposed could reflect the serious risks to public safety of fleeing from police.

46In all of the circumstances, while I find that Ms. Bell engaged in the dangerous conduct of flight from police, it was her own driving that caused the danger, and not pursuit by police. For that reason she was convicted of, and sentenced for, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle. For that reason she is acquitted of the offence of failing to stop for police when pursued.