ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
MERAJ HASHIMI
Before Justice Mara Greene
Reasons for Judgment released December 16, 2025
M. Sotirakos……………………………………….……………………..….… for the Crown
B. Galle .............………………………................................................ for Meraj Hashimi
Greene, J:
1Mr. Hashimi is charged with failing to stop for police, dangerous driving, driving while prohibited and obstruct peace officer.
2It is alleged that on January 25, 2025, Mr. Hashimi fled from police after having been pulled over for a minor traffic violation. It is further alleged that he gave a false name to police and that he was suspended from driving at the time.
Summary of the Evidence
3On January 25, 2025, Officer Johnson saw a vehicle fail to yield to a pedestrian at an intersection. Officer Johnson put on his lights to alert the driver that he had to pull over. The driver pulled over moments later near 10 Tuxedo court.
4Officer Johnson approached the vehicle and spoke to the driver who identified himself as Syad Mohdmahd Hashimi. The driver advised that he did not have his driver’s license, or any other identification with him and that he presently resides in Ottawa. Officer Johnson then went to his cruiser to look into the driver’s identity.
5Officer Johnson suspected that the identity provided was false, so he returned to the vehicle to question the driver further. Officer Johnson asked the driver about his height and his phone number. Officer Johnson then advised the driver that he is going to run some additional checks and that if it turns out that he is not who he claims to be, he will be arrested. Officer Johnson returned to his vehicle to look up the MTO photograph of Syad Mohdmahd Hashimi.
6Once this was completed, Officer Johnson returned to the vehicle and asked the driver to exit the vehicle. Instead of exiting, the driver started his vehicle and drove off.
7The driver, who was later identified as Mr. Meraj Hashimi, drove a very short distance, stopped the vehicle and ran from the car. Back up officers were called to help in the pursuit of Mr. Hashimi.
8Officer Samsom arrived on scene at 1:27 pm and located Mr. Hashimi in the plaza at 1260 Markham Road approximately ten minutes later. Officer Samson then placed him under arrest and cuffed him.
9During the search incident to arrest, Officer Samson located a driver’s license with the name Meraj Hashimi on it. He held the license up to Mr. Hashimi and confirmed that the person in the photograph was the person he had in custody. Officer Samson then discovered that Mr. Hashimi’s license was suspended, and he arrested Mr. Hashimi for driving while suspended.
10Mr. Hashimi was advised of his right to consult with counsel. Mr. Hashimi stated that he wanted to speak to a free lawyer.
11Officer Samson drove Mr. Hashimi back to where Officer Johnson was to confirm that this was the same man that officer Johnson had pulled over. After Officer Johnson confirmed that the man in custody was the man he pulled over, Officer Samson arrested Mr. Hashimi for failing to stop for police. Mr. Hashimi replied that he fled because he was scared as his license was suspended. Mr. Hashimi was then advised of his rights to counsel. He was not advised of his right to remain silent. Mr. Hashimi was told that he could talk to counsel at the police station.
12A short time later, Officer Samson advised Mr. Hashimi that he was also being arrested for the offence of dangerous driving. Officer Samson did not re-read to Mr. Hashimi his rights to counsel.
13After Officer Samson arrested Mr. Hashimi on the failure to stop charge, Officer Johnson walked over to the cruiser and asked Mr. Hashimi why he lied to him. Officer Johnson asked this question without even knowing if Mr. Hashimi had been advised of his right to consult with counsel. Officer Johnson testified that he asked this because he was frustrated. He further testified that Mr. Hashimi did not have to answer him.
Issues
14The following issues were raised at trial:
A) Did Officer Johnson violate Mr. Hashimi’s rights as guaranteed by section 10(b) of the Charter by not advising him of his right to counsel while investigating Mr. Hashimi for providing a false name?
B) Did Officer Johnson violate Mr. Hashimi’s section 10(b) Charter rights by asking Mr. Hashimi questions after he was arrested but before he had an opportunity to consult with counsel?
C) Did Officer Samson violate Mr. Hashimi’s rights under section 7 and 10(b) Charter rights by posing questions to Mr. Hashimi while transporting him to the station?
D) If there is a Charter violation, what remedy should be granted?
E) Has the Crown proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hashimi committed the offence of obstruct police?
F) Has the Crown proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hashimi committed the offence of failing to stop for police?
G) Has the Crown proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hashimi committed the offence of dangerous driving?
15Counsel for Mr. Hashimi conceded that Mr. Hashimi was operating a motor vehicle while disqualified from doing so. As such, I need not address this issue in detail. I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hashimi was operating a motor vehicle on the day in question. Officer Johnson testified that he saw Mr. Hashimi driving and that he pulled Mr. Hashimi over. Moreover, the Crown filed the relevant documents confirming that Mr. Hashimi was disqualified from driving. Mr. Hashimi is therefore found guilty of this offence.
A) Section 10(b) and Officer Johnson at time of initial stop
16Mr Hashimi was pulled over for committing a Highway Traffic Act offence. Officer Johnson advised Mr. Hashimi of the reason for the stop and asked for his driver’s license, insurance and registration. Mr. Hashimi told officer Johnson that he did not have any of these documents with him. Officer Johnson then asked Mr. Hashimi to identify himself. At that point Mr. Hashimi gave a false name. Officer Johnson testified that he immediately suspected it was a false a name because Mr. Hashimi looked at his phone prior to identifying himself and because often times when driver’s deny having identification with them, they are not being truthful.
17Officer Johnson testified that given his suspicion, he went to his vehicle to do some searches on his computer in order to verify Mr. Hashimi’s identity. Officer Johnson returned to the vehicle and asked Mr. Hashimi a series of questions to help confirm if Mr. Hashimi was lying to him. On the body worn camera, Officer Johnson can be seen advising Mr. Hashimi that he was going to look up his photograph on MTO and that if the photograph did not match Mr. Hashimi’s face, he would arrest Mr. Hashimi.
18Counsel for Mr. Hashimi argued that as soon as Officer Johnson suspected that Mr. Hashimi gave a false name, he ought to have advised Mr. Hashimi of his right to consult with counsel. Mr. Hashimi was detained as he had just been pulled over and the officer was no longer just investigating the Highway Traffic Act offence, he was also investigating the offence of obstruct police officer.
19Pursuant so section 10(b) of the Charter, police are required to advise detained persons of their right to consult with counsel immediately upon their detention. While police are not required to advise detainees of their right to consult with counsel if detained under the Highway Traffic Act, once, however, the investigation shifts to a criminal matter, rights to counsel are required (R. v. Prosper, 1994 CanLII 65 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236 and R. v. Subaru, [2009] S.C.R. 460).
20In the case at bar, it is my view that during the first few minutes of the detention Officer Johnson was only investigating the identity of Mr. Hashimi in furtherance of the Highway Traffic Act offence. In my view, he had not yet turned his mind to investigating Mr. Hashimi for any criminal offence. I am mindful that he had a suspicion that Mr. Hashimi had provided a false name, but he was not in the process of investigating an obstruct police charge. He was still focused on confirming the identity of the driver so that he could issue a ticket under the Highway Traffic Act.
21It is my view, that the investigation shifted to a criminal investigation the moment that Officer Johnson stated to Mr. Hashimi that he was going to check MTO data base to view a photograph of the person Mr. Hashimi claimed to be. At this point, Officer Johnson’s tone changed, and he was clearly contemplating arresting Mr. Hashimi for the criminal offence of obstruct police. It as this point in time that section 10(b) was triggered, and Officer Johnson was required to advise Mr. Hashimi of his right to consult with counsel. Since he failed to do so, Mr. Hashimi’s 10(b) rights were violated.
B) S.10(b) violation by Office Johnson post arrest
22After Mr. Hashimi was arrested and placed in the back of Officer Samson’s vehicle, he was advised of his right to counsel. Mr. Hashimi stated that he wanted to speak to counsel. His access to counsel was delayed until arriving at the station. Prior to going to the station, however, Officer Samson drove Mr. Hashimi to Officer Johnson and asked Officer Johnson to confirm that the person in custody was in fact the person who had fled. Officer Johnson confirmed that Mr. Hashimi was the person he stopped. Officer Johnson then approached Mr. Hashimi and asked Mr. Hashimi why he lied.
23In my view, this is a violation of section 10(b) of the Charter. Mr. Hashimi had already indicated an interest in exercising his right to speak to counsel. If an arrested person expresses a desire to exercise his right to consult with counsel, the police are required to refrain from eliciting information from the arrestee until he or she has a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel (see R. v. Prosper, supra at paras 35-36). While police are permitted to ask questions necessary for procedural reasons, the question posed by Officer Johnson does not fall into this exception. This question went to the heart of the obstruct charge.
24I am mindful that Officer Johnson testified that he was frustrated and did not expect a response from Mr. Hashimi. In my view, this does not alter the fact that Officer Johnson posed a question directly about the offence under investigation prior to Mr. Hashimi having an opportunity to consult with counsel. I appreciate that Officer Johnson testified that Mr. Hashimi did not haver to answer him, but how was Mr. Hashimi to know this if he had not yet been afforded his right to counsel, nor had he been advised of his right to remain silent.
25In my view, in asking this question of Mr. Hashimi, Officer Johnson violated Mr. Hashimi’s rights as guaranteed under section 10(b) of the Charter.
C) Officer Samson and Sections 7 and 10(b) of the Charter
26All parties agree that Officer Samson advised Mr. Hashimi of his right to consult with counsel at the roadside. He failed, however, to advise Mr. Hashimi of his right to remain silent and that if he said anything it could be used in evidence. All parties also agree that Mr. Hashimi was not afforded an opportunity to speak to counsel until after he arrived at the station. It was also conceded by the Crown that on route to the station, Officer Samson engaged Mr. Hashimi in conversation. Counsel for Mr. Hashimi argued that Mr. Hashimi’s section 7 and 10(b) rights were violated because Officer Samson, by chatting with Mr. Hashimi, attempted to actively elicit information from him. Crown counsel argued that the conversion was only small talk. Any questions posed by the officer were conversational and not about the charges. To the extent the case was discussed, the officer was only responding to questions posed by Mr. Hashimi. As such, it was the Crown’s position that there was no Charter breach.
27The Crown’s argument is based on Officer Samson’s evidence at trial that his intention when speaking to Mr. Hashimi was to be nice and include him in on the conversation. They talked about an accident they saw on the road, and then Officer Samson merely responded to Mr. Hashimi’s questions about the arrival of the canine unit.
28I accept Officer Samson’s evidence that it was not his intention to illicit evidence. The difficulty is that the questions he posed ended up being relevant to the charges before the court. As they passed a car accident on the side of the road and started to discuss it, Officer Samson specifically asked Mr. Hashimi if he still drives and discussed his license suspension. These questions and answers given were directly relevant to his reason for arrest. In my view, despite Officer Samson’s intention of making small talk, the effect of his conduct is that he elicited evidence from Mr. Hashimi after Mr. Hashimi indicated he wanted to speak to counsel but before he was afforded an opportunity to consult with counsel. In my view, this amounts to a violation of section 10(b) of the Charter.
29The section 7 argument, in my view is slightly more complex. Counsel for Mr. Hashimi argued that his client’s section 7 Charter rights were violated because the officer failed to advise Mr. Hashimi that he had the right to remain silent. Crown counsel argued that no violation took place since his section 7 rights were not triggered. The vast majority of cases addressing the failure to give the primary caution are resolved through assessing the voluntariness of the statement. In such cases, section 7 is not really addressed because as the Supreme Court of Canda held in R. v. Singh 2007 SCC 48, 2007 S.C.C. 48, that “…in the context of a police interrogation of a person in detention, where the detainee knows he or she is speaking to a person in authority, the two tests are functionally equivalent” (R. v. Singh, supra, at paragraph 8). In the case at bar, however, there was no voluntariness voir dire because the Crown did not lead at trial any of the utterances made by Mr. Hashimi during the transport to the police station. I therefore must address the absence of the caution in the context of the right to silence.
30The right to silence can be conveyed in two different ways. First through access to counsel and second through the primary caution. In the case at bar, Mr. Hashimi was not afforded an opportunity to speak to counsel prior to the discussion with officer Samson in the cruiser nor was he advised of his right to remain silent. In other words, the two main ways in which the right to silence is normally conveyed to a detainee were not provided in this case.
31Crown counsel argued that despite this fact there was no violation of section 7 because the right to silence was not triggered in this case. Respectfully, I disagree. In R. v Tessier 2022 SCC 35, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the right to silence arises upon detention (R. v. Tessier, supra, at paragraph 39). Since Mr. Hashimi was detained, section 7 was triggered.
32It is my view, that since the right to silence and voluntariness are functionally equivalent, the section 7 analysis does not differ dramatically from the voluntariness analysis. The key difference is that instead of the Crown having to prove that the Mr. Hashimi voluntarily chose to speak to the police, Mr. Hashimi has the burden to establish on a balance of probabilities that he did not know of his right to remain silent and as such did not waive his right to silence and did not freely choose to converse with Officer Samson.
33The link between voluntariness and the caution has been subject to some judicial comment. For example, in R. v. Singh, supra, Charron J. held that “even if the suspect has not formally been arrested and is not obviously under detention, police officers are well advised to give the police caution . . .” (R. v. Singh, supra, at paragraph 33). The Court in R. v. Tessier expanded on this sentiment. The court stated,
One understands Charron J.’s sensible intuition. While a proper caution will not guarantee that statements given thereafter are voluntary, it stands to reason that proving the accused made a free choice to speak to the authorities will be easier for the Crown if a caution is given. Because a suspect is more vulnerable to making involuntary statements than a mere witness or a person not involved in the crime, the presence or absence of a police caution is an “important” factor in answering the question of voluntariness upon which the admissibility of statements will turn (Boudreau v. The King, 1949 CanLII 26 (SCC), [1949] S.C.R. 262, at p. 267) (R. v. Tessier, supra at paragraph 8).
34The Supreme Court of Canada went on to state in R. v. Tessier, “I would recognize that the absence of a caution for a suspect constitutes prima facie evidence that they were unfairly denied their choice to speak to the police (see S. N. Lederman, M. K. Fuerst and H. C. Stewart, Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant: The Law of Evidence in Canada (6th ed. 2022), at ¶8.119)”. The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Tessier, further stated that once it is established that the caution was not given, “it then falls to the Crown to discharge its persuasive burden by proving either that the accused was not in legal jeopardy, in that they were a mere witness and not a suspect, or that the absence of the caution was without consequence and that the statements were beyond a reasonable doubt and in view of the context as a whole, voluntary”(R. v. Tessier, supra at para 9).
35One way in which the Crown can discharge its burden is to show that despite the absence of a caution, the accused knew he had the right to remain silent (R. v. Tessier, supra, at para 12).
36In a recent trial decision, R. v. Singh 2024 ONSC 5561, Harris J. held that the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Tessier, supra, revitalized the importance of the primary caution and put it at the centre of the procedural protections due an individual in the investigatory stage of the criminal process. Harris J. stated at paragraph 17 “the salutary purpose of the caution is to convey the suspect’s right to silence directly and plainly”. The trial judge further noted that the right to silence is a key facet of the right against self-incrimination (R. v. Singh, supra, at para 34).
37In the case at bar, Mr. Hashimi, did not testify. I have no direct evidence of what he knew or did not know about his right to remain silent. Having said that, there is other evidence that strongly supports the finding that Mr. Hashimi did not know of his right to remain silent and did not make an informed choice when he waived that right and spoke to Officer Samson in the cruiser while being driven to the police station. First of all, Mr. Hashimi had not yet had an opportunity to consult with counsel. Secondly, I have no evidence that Mr. Hashimi would know about his right to remain silent. Thirdly, the utterances made by Mr. Hashimi were not conducted in an interview type fashion but were more part of a casual dialogue in the police cruiser. It is inconceivable that a lay person would automatically understand the implication of talking to police in these circumstances. Fourthly, as noted in R. v. Tessier, supra, the fact of detention may cause a person to feel compelled to make statement (R. v. Tessier, supra, at para 75).
38In my view, in light of all these factors, there is a strong inference that Mr. Hashimi did not know of his right to remain silent or the potential risks of speaking to police. As such, Mr. Hashimi could not have made an informed waiver of his right to remain silent when he spoke to Officer Samson. I am therefore satisfied that Mr. Hashimi’s right to remain silent was violated.
D) Remedy
39In the case at bar counsel for Mr. Hashimi does not seek a 24(2) remedy. Instead, he seeks a stay of proceedings. In my view all utterances made by Mr. Hashimi after Officer Johnson advised Mr. Hashimi that if he gave a false name he would be arrested should be excluded under 24(2) of the Charter due to the breaches of sections 10(b) and 7. While this remedy is not sought, it is my view that it would have been the appropriate remedy. In light of this, fairness dictates that I not consider any utterance made by Mr. Hashimi after Officer Johnson began the investigation into the offence of obstruct police. I am mindful that the Crown does not seek to rely on the vast majority of these statements as such, I will not engage in a detailed 24(2) analysis. Suffice it to say that there were a series of breaches relating to section 10(b) and section 7 of the Charter. While not the most serious of conduct, the number of the breaches leads me to conclude that the first prong of the Grant analysis favours exclusion. The impact on the Charter protected right was significant as it went to the heart of what sections 10(b) and 7 were meant to protect. While the offences are serious and the third prong may favour admission of the evidence when I balance all the factors, it is my view that admission of the statements would put the administration of justice into disrepute.
40In relation to Mr. Hahimi’s argument that a stay of proceedings should be granted, pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter, I am permitted to impose any remedy that the court deems appropriate and just in the circumstances. In assessing whether a stay of proceedings should be granted in this case, I note that the Supreme Court of Canada has consistently stated that a stay of proceedings is a remedy that should only be resorted to in the clearest of cases given society’s interest in having matters tried on their merits. In R. v. Babos, [2014] S.C.C. 16, the Supreme Court of Canada summarized the relevant legal principles as they relate to a stay of proceedings:
(1) There must be prejudice to the accused’s right to a fair trial or the integrity of the justice system that “will be manifested, perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by its outcome” (Regan, at para 54).
(2) There must be no alternative remedy capable of redressing the prejudice; and
(3) Where there is still uncertainty over whether a stay is warranted after steps 1 and 2, the court is required to balance the interests in favour of granting a stay, such as denouncing misconduct and preserving the integrity of the justice system, against “the interest that society has in having a final decision on the merits”.
41In my view, since none of the utterances made as a result of the violations are being used at trial, trial fairness is not affected by the breach. Where there is no issue about trial fairness, the question the court must consider is whether the state has engaged in conduct that is “offensive to societal notions of fair play and decency and whether proceeding with a trial in the face of that conduct would be harmful to the integrity of the justice system (R. v. Babos, supra, at para 35, R. v. Somerville, [2017] ONSC 3311 at para 115).
42As noted in R. v. Somerville, supra, at the second stage the question is whether a remedy short of a stay of proceedings is capable of redressing the prejudice. At the third stage, the court must assess whether “the integrity of the administration of justice is better protected by a stay or by a trial, despite the impugned conduct”. (R. v. Somerville, supra, at paragraph 118).
43In assessing whether the breach negatively affects the integrity of justice system, I need to consider Officer Samson’s evidence about why this happened. I accept Officer Samson’s evidence that he just forgot to give the caution. He was consistent in his answers on this point and there was nothing in the evidence to lead me to doubt this aspect of his testimony. At the moment of the arrest, a lot was going on. The canine unit had arrived to help look for a bag the police were concerned about, and a number of different charges were being considered. I am satisfied that Officer Samson just made a mistake and that he did not intentionally fail to advise Mr. Hashimi of his right to remain silent.
44As for the failing to hold off questioning Mr. Hashimi, as I previously stated I accept Officer Samson’s evidence that he was just making small talk. The conversation started when they passed a serious car accident on the side of the road and was really focused on the issue of accidents. The second part of the conversation was largely Officer Samson answering questions about the canine unit. In relation to Officer Johnson, I accept it was a momentary lapse in judgment.
45In my view, both Officer Johnson and Officer Samson displayed bad judgment in having these conversations with Mr. Hashimi, but they were not intentionally trying to gather evidence. As such, a stay of proceedings is not necessary to protect the integrity of the administration of justice.
(E) Obstruct Justice
46In the case at bar, it was effectively conceded that Mr. Hashimi gave a false name to Officer Johnson. Counsel for Mr. Hashimi argued that this evidence was insufficient to make out the offence of obstruct police.
47The offence of obstruct police requires the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
a) There was an obstruction
b) That the obstruction affected the police officer in the execution of his/her duty, and
c) That the person did so willfully.
48In R. v. Kiradziev, 2010 ONCJ 162, Zuker J. stated,
173It is not, in my view, sufficient for the Crown to meet its onus by simply demonstrating that the police officer had been inconvenienced to some degree. (R. v. Hardgrove, (1985) 35 MVR 217). The police are inconvenienced daily in their duties, but that is not enough to criminalize the actions of the person that has caused the inconvenience. When an inconvenience amounts to an obstruction, is of course, dependent upon the individual circumstances of each case. Suffice it to say that the inconvenience or the extra work generated by the accused’s conduct must be more than trifling or de minimis in nature”
49In the case at bar, I am satisfied that the Crown has met her burden. Officer Johnson was obstructed in his investigation into Mr. Hashimi’s Highway Traffic Act offence by being provided a false name. Officer Johnson was unable to complete the ticket in a timely fashion and instead, had to look up information on his computer to confirm Mr. Hashimi’s identity. I appreciate that the delay was not that long, but it was long enough that in my view it amounts to an obstruction that is more than merely trifling or de minimis in nature.
50In relation to whether the Crown has proven that Mr. Hashimi had the requisite mens rea for the offence, it is my view that the only inference available from the evidence is that Mr. Hashimi intentionally provided a false name to Officer Johnson to avoid being identified as a person with a suspended license. I reach this conclusion for a number of reasons. Firstly, Mr. Hashimi is presumed to know his own name, therefore the only inference is that he knew he gave a false name. Secondly, Officer Samson found a driver’s license in the name of Meraj Hashimi on Mr. Hashimi during the search incident to arrest. The only inference is that Mr. Hashimi lied to Officer Johnson about not having his license with him. Thirdly, Crown counsel provided evidence at trial that Mr. Hashimi’s license was suspended at the time. It is reasonable to conclude that Mr. Hashimi knew his license was suspended. Fourthly, Mr. Hashimi fled the scene as soon as it became clear that he was caught in the lie. In my view all these circumstances combined support only one inference which is that Mr. Hashimi intended to obstruct Officer Johnson when he provided a false name in order to avoid prosecution. I am therefore satisfied that the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hashimi committed the offence of obstruct police.
(F) Flight from police
51Pursuant to section 320.17 of the Criminal Code, “Everyone commits an offence who operates a motor vehicle or vessel while being pursued by a peace officer and who fails, without reasonable excuse, to stop the motor vehicle or vessel as soon as is reasonable in the circumstances”.
52Counsel for Mr. Hashimi argued that on a plain reading of the section, Mr. Hashimi has not committed the offence. At no point did he fail to stop for police. Mr. Hashimi was pulled over by Officer Johnson. He complied with the demand to pull over. He just failed to remain stopped and chose to leave before officer Johnson could complete his investigation.
53Crown counsel argued that the offence is broad enough to include the acts committed by Mr. Hashimi. I agree. A similar scenario happened in both R. v. Dumfeh, 2025 ONCJ 125 and in R. v. Parnell 2024 ONCJ 310. Justice Garg in R. v. Parnell, supra, identified the issue as follows:
The only question is whether the offence remains available in circumstances where the accused had initially stopped as directed. In a sense there was no active pursuit after Mr. Parnell had pulled over.
54In R. v. Dumfeh, Justice Prutschi held that the legislative purpose of s.320.17 is “designed to criminalize the extraordinarily dangerous act of fleeing police while in a car”. Justice Prutschi went on to state that had the arresting officer taken steps to follow the vehicle after it peeled away, the offence of flight from police would be made out. Justice Prutschi noted “I cannot endorse the absurdity that would short-circuit a charge of flight from police simply because police made a strategic decision, informed by public safety concerns, not to engage in a highly dangerous chase”.
55I completely agree with this sentiment. I further agree with Justice Prutschi that “pursuit is a continuous act which, as Justice Garg put it in R. v. Parnell, “remains ongoing until the driver is free to leave, and that the obligation to stop includes the obligation to stay stopped”.
56Using this definition of “pursuit”, when Mr. Hashimi was pulled over by Officer Johnson he was required to remain stopped until advised that he was free to leave. By leaving before the close of the investigation, Mr. Hashimi violated his obligation to remain stopped and in doing so committed the offence captured in section 320.17 of the Criminal Code.
57Counsel for Mr. Hashimi further argued that I cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hashimi was intending to flee from police because there is insufficient evidence that Mr. Hashimi would have known that he was going to be arrested. Respectfully, I disagree. Officer Johnson was very clear with Mr. Hashimi that he was going to look up the photograph of Syad Mohdmahd Hashimi and that if it did not look like Mr. Hashimi he would be arrested. Officer Johnson then went to his vehicle, was in his vehicle for a period of time. He then walked towards Mr. Hashimi and ordered him to step out of his car at which point Mr. Hashimi fled. In my view, the only inference available on this evidence is that Mr. Hashimi knew that his lie was discovered and chose to flee.
(G) Dangerous Driving
58The final offence before the court is that of dangerous driving. The driving that the Crown alleges was dangerous relates to Mr. Hashimi’s flight form Officer Johnson after Office Johnson told him to step out of the car.
59Pursuant to section 320.13(1) of the Criminal Code, ”Everyone commits an offence who operates a convenience in a manner that, having regard to all of the circumstances, is dangerous to the public”.
60The Crown need not prove that anyone was actually harmed as a result of the driving. The Crown need only prove that Mr. Hashimi drove in manner that was a marked departure from the standard or care of a reasonable person.
61In my view, the Crown has not met their burden. I am mindful that an average person would not drive away after being pulled over by police. It is my view, that the mere act of driving away alone is insufficient to make out this offence. The manner of driving, as opposed to the act of pulling away, is the conduct captured by this provision.
62In the case at bar, Mr. Hashmi did drive away when Officer Johnson told him to step out of the vehicle. He then drove only a very short distance, parked the car and fled on foot. There is no suggestion that Mr. Hashimi almost hit Officer Johnson. There is no evidence that Mr. Hashimi drove in excess of the speed limit or that he broke any rules of the road as he drove away from Officer Johnson. Moreover, the distance he drove was very short. When I consider all this evidence, while it was wrong to flee from police, I cannot find that the driving itself presented a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person. Mr. Hashimi is therefor found not guilty of this offence
Conclusion
63In light of my findings, Mr. Hashimi is found guilty of the offences of driving while prohibited, flight from police and obstruct police. He is not guilty of the offence of dangerous driving.
Released December 16, 2025 ____________________
Justice Mara Greene