This decision addresses a Charter application concerning a 95-minute delay in implementing Mr. Mohamed’s s. 10(b) right to counsel following his arrest for impaired driving and related firearms offences.

The court found a breach of the right to counsel due to the delay, primarily caused by the arresting officer’s failure to arrange alternative transport to the station.

However, the evidence of the firearm, ammunition, and breath samples was admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter after a balancing of factors, given the minor impact on the accused’s rights and the strong public interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The court acquitted Mr. Mohamed on the firearms-related charges due to insufficient evidence linking him to the firearm but convicted him on impaired driving and over-80 charges based on reliable breathalyzer evidence.

Jian Chen was charged with trafficking one kilogram of ketamine.

The case involved a complex police investigation where Chen was not the initial target but was observed transferring ketamine to the target of the investigation.

Chen challenged the admissibility of evidence on the basis of breaches of his Charter rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b), specifically delays and failures in providing timely and effective rights to counsel due to language barriers and police procedural shortcomings.

The court found breaches of these rights but declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, considering the police acted in good faith and the breaches were contextually minor.

The court convicted Chen of trafficking, emphasizing the importance of reasonable police diligence in facilitating access to counsel of choice, especially in multilingual contexts.

This decision addresses Charter applications by Tutshuma (Paul) Munda and Ade Munda, who were charged with firearms offences following a police search.

The court found that police used excessive force against Paul Munda when he was kicked in the face while handcuffed, breaching his s. 7 Charter rights, and that there was a 22-minute unreasonable delay in facilitating his right to counsel, breaching s. 10(b).

However, the evidence was not excluded, though a sentencing reduction was ordered if convicted.

The court dismissed all Charter claims by Ade Munda, finding the police use of force and delay in providing rights to counsel reasonable, and that inaccuracies in a police synopsis did not materially affect his bail hearing.

The defendant, Anushan Uthayakumar, faced charges including careless storage of a firearm and possession of a loaded restricted firearm after a traffic stop and subsequent discovery of a weapon.

The defence sought to exclude the firearm, alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, specifically arguing racial profiling in the selection of the surveillance location, a pretextual traffic stop, and an unlawful search of the vehicle.

The court dismissed all Charter applications, finding no evidence of racial profiling, that the traffic stop was a legitimate sobriety check, and that the cannabis discovery leading to the search was lawful.

Consequently, the defendant was found guilty on all counts.

The defendants, Andre Pyne and Sadri Zorjani, brought applications under sections 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b), and 24(2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude evidence, with Mr. Zorjani also seeking a stay of proceedings under section 24(1).

The court dismissed all applications, finding that police had reasonable grounds for arrest, there was no section 10(a) breach, and while a serious section 10(b) breach occurred due to delayed access to counsel, the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) as it was independently discovered and the breach was not deliberate or systemic.

The court also found that the high public interest in prosecuting gun crimes weighed against exclusion.

The defendant, Adrian Thomas, was charged with multiple offences, including assault with intent to resist arrest and various firearm-related charges, following a traffic stop and struggle with police.

The court found the initial traffic stop lawful and the prolonged detention not arbitrary.

However, it found that the police used excessive force during the arrest, constituting a breach of the defendant's section 7 Charter rights, and that there were unjustified delays in providing and facilitating access to counsel, breaching section 10(b) Charter rights.

While the search of the vehicle was deemed a lawful inventory search, the court applied the Grant analysis and determined that the serious section 7 violation necessitated the exclusion of the handgun evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

Consequently, the defendant was found not guilty of all gun-related charges but guilty of resisting arrest.

The defendants applied to exclude evidence (a gun and their clothing) obtained following their detention and arrest, alleging breaches of their Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found the initial investigative detention lawful, but identified breaches of s. 10(b) due to the police's failure to promptly advise of the right to counsel upon detention and for subsequent delays in facilitating access to counsel at the police station.

However, the court found no s. 8 breach regarding the gun seizure, concluding the accused had no privacy expectation, had abandoned the gun, and the search was conducted with valid consent.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant test, the court weighed the moderate seriousness of the Charter breaches against their minimal impact on the accused's rights and society's strong interest in adjudicating serious armed robbery cases on their merits.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed, and all evidence was found admissible.

The defendants, Jason Mercuri and Justin Silva, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence (drugs and a loaded handgun) found in a vehicle following a traffic stop and subsequent searches.

They alleged violations of sections 8 (unreasonable search), 9 (arbitrary detention), and 10 (right to counsel) of the Charter.

The court found the initial traffic stop was lawful, being for a legitimate dual purpose (regulatory and criminal suspicion), and the subsequent searches were justified under the Liquor Licence Act due to the observation of open alcohol.

While an admitted breach of section 10 (delayed right to counsel) occurred, the court determined it was not causally linked to the discovery of the evidence and, applying the Grant analysis under section 24(2), found that the seriousness of the breach and its impact on the defendants' rights did not outweigh society's interest in the adjudication of serious offences on their merits.

The application to exclude the evidence was denied.

The applicant defendant challenged a search of his person and vehicle under the Cannabis Control Act, 2017, arguing violations of Charter sections 8 and 9.

The court found that the police officer lacked objective and subjective reasonable grounds for the search, as the smell of marijuana and a marijuana stem were insufficient to establish current possession of unpackaged cannabis.

The officer's testimony regarding the stem and residue was found to lack veracity due to circumstantial evidence.

Applying the Grant factors, the court determined that the serious state misconduct (bad faith, deliberate disregard for rights, misleading testimony) and significant impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

Consequently, the seized handgun, cannabis, and hashish were excluded from evidence, leading to an acquittal on the firearm charge.

A young person was charged with 16 firearms and drug-related offences.

Following a trial in February and March 2019, the court found the accused guilty of four charges, including possession of a loaded firearm.

The accused launched a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown conceded the Charter violations, but the court did not exclude the evidence under section 24(2).

At sentencing, the Crown sought 9-12 months custody followed by probation, while the defence sought an absolute discharge or, alternatively, a conditional discharge.

The court found the case to be exceptional under section 39(1)(d) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, warranting a custodial sentence.

However, considering the accused's circumstances, rehabilitation progress, and mitigating factors, the court imposed a deferred custody and supervision order rather than secure or open custody.