Marcia Hilliard

The applicant, charged with firearms offences, sought to exclude firearm evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his s. 8 rights due to an unlawful search.

The court found that while the general warrant for a cellphone was valid, the police search of the vehicle exceeded its scope, constituting a Charter breach.

Applying the Grant test, the court determined the breach was serious, the impact on the accused's Charter interests was significant (especially given his status as a victim in the underlying murder investigation), and despite society's interest in adjudication on the merits of serious firearm charges, the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The application to exclude the evidence was granted.

The applicant, Ali Bhatti, charged with firearms offences, sought to exclude firearm evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging a s. 8 Charter breach due to an unreasonable search.

The court found that while the general warrant used to seize his cellphone was properly issued and based on reasonable grounds, the police exceeded its scope by searching a hidden compartment in his vehicle's door frame.

This search was deemed unreasonable, infringing the applicant's s. 8 Charter rights.

The determination on the s. 24(2) remedy (exclusion of evidence) was deferred for further written submissions.

Kelly Jacobs was convicted by a jury of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing the death of Beulah Peters.

The court considered sentencing objectives, aggravating factors (high intoxication, prolonged drinking, dangerous driving, unlicensed driving, frequency of impaired driving in the community, impact on victims), and mitigating factors (no prior criminal record, positive Gladue report, strong community support, employment, education, remorse, compliance with release conditions except alcohol abstinence).

The court applied Gladue principles, noting that the offender's circumstances did not diminish moral culpability to warrant a further reduction in sentence.

A conditional sentence was deemed unfit.

The applicant, who was shot during a home invasion, brought a Charter application to exclude drug evidence seized during a warrantless search of his girlfriend's apartment.

The police obtained a signed consent to search from the girlfriend, but the applicant argued her consent was neither informed nor voluntary.

The court found the consent was validly obtained and that the applicant had only a limited privacy interest in the apartment.

The court concluded there was no breach of section 8 of the Charter, and alternatively, the evidence would not be excluded under section 24(2).

The application was dismissed.

The Crown brought a motion to admit the content of prior consistent statements made by a child complainant with special needs, T.S., to her mother and aunt in a sexual assault case.

The respondent, M.S., opposed, arguing that only the fact, timing, and location of the disclosures should be admissible, not their content, due to the prejudicial effect outweighing probative value.

The court reviewed Supreme Court precedents, including R. v. Stirling and R. v. Dinardo, which address the admissibility of prior consistent statements as narrative evidence to provide context and assist in assessing credibility, but not for the truth of their content.

The court distinguished the present case from Dinardo and G.C. by noting the absence of significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony or spontaneous disclosures immediately after the alleged events.

Consequently, the court found that the proposed evidence, beyond the fact and timing of disclosure, was not necessary to create a logical framework for the central allegation and that the risk of misuse by the jury outweighed any potential benefit.

The Crown's motion was dismissed, limiting the witnesses to testifying only about the fact, date, time, and place of disclosure, and actions taken as a result.

The accused brought a Charter motion arguing that his arrest for murder was unlawful because police lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

He sought exclusion of evidence obtained incident to arrest under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court reviewed the information available to police at the time, including reports from family members, alarming text messages, and investigative steps linking the accused to the missing person.

Applying the principles governing lawful arrest and the threshold of reasonable and probable grounds, the court held that the officers acted reasonably and in good faith in rapidly evolving circumstances.

The court concluded that the grounds for arrest met the legal standard and that the evidence obtained incident to arrest was admissible.