Christopher Heron

This ruling addresses the admissibility of Crown expert evidence in a criminal trial concerning firearm offences.

The Crown sought to introduce opinion evidence from Sgt. Peter Reinjtes regarding firearm classification, functioning, and comparison, specifically to link a seized firearm to one seen in a social media video, and to comment on the firearm's prevalence.

The defence conceded classification and functioning but contested the comparison and prevalence evidence.

Applying the Mohan framework, the court found the comparison evidence logically relevant and necessary to assist the trier of fact, particularly regarding unique markings and their significance.

However, the court excluded the expert's opinion on the firearm's prevalence, deeming it unreliable due to a lack of normative data and reliance on anecdotal experience.

The assessment of the expert's duty to the court was reserved for further inquiry during the trial.

The accused was arrested on an outstanding warrant for failing to attend court.

Following the arrest, police searched his vehicle and found a loaded handgun.

The accused brought a Charter application arguing the search violated his s. 8 rights.

The court found that the search was not truly incidental to the arrest, as there was no reasonable prospect of securing evidence related to the failure to attend court offence.

The court concluded that the warrantless search violated s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court excluded the handgun from evidence, finding that the police conduct was serious and lacked good faith, and that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault, sought an "order in aid" to compel the complainant's parents to disclose the names and contact information of her therapists.

This information was required to facilitate an application under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code for the production of therapy records.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the statutory regime for third-party record production requires the applicant to identify the specific record and the person in possession or control of it.

The court found that the Criminal Code does not contemplate a discovery process or an "order in aid" to obtain the identity of record holders, and that the complainant's parents were not "record holders" as defined by the Code.

The applicant, G.G., facing sexual assault charges, brought a motion seeking direction on whether sections 276 and 278.93 of the Criminal Code applied to the proposed impeachment of the complainant, E.B., based on her inconsistent police statement.

The Crown argued that a s. 276 application was required.

The court ruled that s. 276 did not apply, allowing the defence to cross-examine the complainant on her January 23, 2020 statement without a s. 276 application, emphasizing that the evidence related to the very sexual activity alleged, not prior sexual history.

The appellant appealed his conviction and 18-month conditional sentence for sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 10(b) Charter application regarding his right to counsel and misapprehended evidence in finding the complainant was unconscious and incapable of consenting.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant waived his right to counsel was supported by the evidence.

The court also held that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence, including the appellant's statement to police and witness testimony, to reasonably conclude the complainant was unconscious.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant, H.A.E., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the corresponding sentence, which included a six-month conditional sentence, one year of probation, and a 10-year Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility assessment, alleging different scrutiny levels for the complainant and appellant, undue reliance on demeanour, and an error in rejecting the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The sentencing appeal argued inadequate consideration of collateral impacts, failure to apply the principle of restraint, and an unreasonable sentence compared to similar cases.

The Superior Court dismissed both the conviction and sentencing appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's credibility findings or application of the law regarding consent, particularly s. 273.2 of the Criminal Code.

The court also determined that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, distinguishing the aggravating factors present in this case from those in cited precedents.

The Crown brought a motion to admit the content of prior consistent statements made by a child complainant with special needs, T.S., to her mother and aunt in a sexual assault case.

The respondent, M.S., opposed, arguing that only the fact, timing, and location of the disclosures should be admissible, not their content, due to the prejudicial effect outweighing probative value.

The court reviewed Supreme Court precedents, including R. v. Stirling and R. v. Dinardo, which address the admissibility of prior consistent statements as narrative evidence to provide context and assist in assessing credibility, but not for the truth of their content.

The court distinguished the present case from Dinardo and G.C. by noting the absence of significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony or spontaneous disclosures immediately after the alleged events.

Consequently, the court found that the proposed evidence, beyond the fact and timing of disclosure, was not necessary to create a logical framework for the central allegation and that the risk of misuse by the jury outweighed any potential benefit.

The Crown's motion was dismissed, limiting the witnesses to testifying only about the fact, date, time, and place of disclosure, and actions taken as a result.