Madalyn Cristina Bavaro

The court sentenced Samantha Arezo Faryadpoor for her role in a violent home invasion and robbery.

While she did not physically assault the victim, she was an active participant in the planning and execution of the offence.

The court considered both aggravating and mitigating factors, including the seriousness of the offence, the lasting harm to the victim, Faryadpoor’s youth, her guilty plea, and her efforts at rehabilitation.

The court imposed a sentence of three years and ten months in jail, less credit for pre-sentence custody and time on house arrest, followed by two years’ probation with conditions.

This sentencing decision addresses whether strip searches of the accused in pre-sentence custody breached section 8 of the Charter and, if not, whether the frequency and manner of those searches should mitigate sentence.

The court finds no Charter breach but considers the conditions as mitigating.

The court also reviews the appropriate sentencing range for serious gun-related offences, ultimately imposing a nine-year sentence, below the Crown’s request, in light of mitigating factors including the accused’s background, lack of record, and harsh pretrial conditions.

The court sentenced D.A.L. for procuring H.S. to offer or provide sexual services for consideration, contrary to section 286.3(1) of the Criminal Code.

The jury acquitted D.A.L. of all other charges, including human trafficking, receiving a material benefit, advertising, and violence-related offences.

The court reviewed the factual background, pre-sentence report, victim impact statement, and letters of support.

The Crown sought a two-year custodial sentence, while the defence argued for an 18-month conditional sentence.

The court considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including the vulnerability of the complainant, the offender’s lack of criminal record, his rehabilitation, and collateral immigration consequences.

After reviewing relevant case law and the unique circumstances, the court imposed an 18-month conditional sentence (minus 31 days for pretrial custody), to be served under house arrest, followed by 12 months’ probation, with additional conditions and a DNA order.

The Crown applied for orders permitting the complainant in a human trafficking and sexual services case to testify via closed-circuit television (CCTV) and in the presence of a support person, pursuant to sections 486.2(2) and 486.1(2) of the Criminal Code.

The respondent opposed the CCTV request but consented to a support person in the courtroom.

The court granted both applications, finding that the use of CCTV and a support person would facilitate the complainant's ability to provide a full and candid account, considering factors such as the complainant's fear of the respondent, the nature of the offences, and the relationship between the parties.

The court rejected arguments regarding the right to face one's accuser and potential moral prejudice to the jury.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence (two firearms) found during a vehicle stop and search.

They alleged racial profiling, lack of grounds for the Cannabis Control Act (CCA) search, and violations of their s. 10(a) and 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found no racial profiling and determined that the strong smell of fresh marijuana provided valid grounds for the CCA search.

While s. 10(a) rights were not breached, the court found a serious violation of the accused's s. 10(b) rights due to "lackadaisical" police conduct at the station, resulting in significant delays in facilitating access to counsel of choice.

However, applying the Grant factors under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the long-term repute of the justice system would be better served by admitting the evidence, given its reliability, the minimal impact of the breach on the accused (who eventually spoke to counsel), and society's strong interest in adjudicating serious charges on their merits.

The application for exclusion of evidence was dismissed.

Matthew Mailhot was sentenced for possessing fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, along with other drugs, while in custody on a surety revocation.

He had a significant criminal record, including recent firearms convictions for which he was already serving a five-year sentence.

The Crown sought an eight-year consecutive sentence, while the defence sought a four-to-five-year concurrent sentence.

The court emphasized the seriousness of fentanyl trafficking, especially in a custodial setting, but also considered the offender's lamentable background and lifelong addiction as mitigating factors.

The judge rejected the Crown's interpretation of R. v. Ribble regarding the minimal relevance of addiction for commercial traffickers and reaffirmed proportionality as the cardinal principle of sentencing, which includes the offender's moral responsibility.

The court imposed a 3.5-year sentence, consecutive to the existing sentence, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, and victim surcharge.

The judge also recommended transfer to an Alberta institution to support rehabilitation.

Defence counsel for Mr. Fitzpatrick and Mr. Wright brought a motion for a mistrial, alleging that Crown counsel adduced impermissible bad character evidence ("snitches get stitches") during re-examination of a witness, thereby wounding trial fairness.

The Crown argued the re-examination was appropriate given the cross-examination.

The court denied the motion, finding that while the defence was prejudiced by a prior ruling limiting cross-examination on a witness's inconsistent statements, this could be remedied by allowing further cross-examination.

The court concluded that the "snitches get stitches" evidence, while potentially prejudicial, did not rise to the level requiring a mistrial, especially with proper jury instructions, and did not constitute a "catastrophic" defect to trial fairness.

In a first-degree murder trial, the defence brought a motion for a mistrial, alleging numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct during the Crown's closing address to the jury.

The alleged errors included misstating evidence, introducing unelicited evidence, mocking defence counsel and witnesses, and improperly commenting on the burden of proof.

The court reviewed each alleged impropriety, finding some instances of improper conduct but concluding that, individually or cumulatively, they did not fatally wound the trial process or deprive the accused of a fair trial to the extent that a mistrial was warranted.

The motion was dismissed, with the court indicating that corrective instructions would be given to the jury.

In a murder trial, the defendants brought motions regarding the admissibility of evidence.

Philip Fitzpatrick sought to admit antemortem statements by the deceased concerning a dispute over counterfeit money and guns, arguing relevance to witness credibility and narrative.

Evan Wright sought to cross-examine a witness on the deceased's drug trafficking activities, also arguing narrative.

The Crown opposed both.

The court dismissed the application for antemortem statements under the state of mind exception, finding them not relevant and highly prejudicial, though allowing limited questioning on the deceased being ripped off and taking guns.

The court also dismissed the application to admit evidence of the deceased's drug trafficking, finding it irrelevant and highly prejudicial, noting the jury already had sufficient information about the deceased's background.

Philip Fitzpatrick, jointly charged with murder, brought a K.G.B. application to admit two police statements made by his mother, Cheryl Hall, for the truth of their contents regarding the shooter's identity.

The Crown was not opposed if the statements were edited and Ms. Hall could be cross-examined.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding necessity due to Ms. Hall's recantation/unwillingness to adopt her prior statements, and threshold reliability due to procedural safeguards (availability for cross-examination, videotaping) and circumstantial guarantees (statements made hours after shooting, no influence, no leading questions, no motive to lie).

The court ruled the statements admissible for their truth, to be shown to the jury in their entirety with appropriate edits, and permitted the Crown to cross-examine Ms. Hall on the identification and her state of mind.

The accused, Evan Wright, charged with first-degree murder, brought a Corbett application to exclude his criminal record from evidence at trial, arguing its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The court ruled that convictions post-dating the offence are admissible.

It refused to "read down" an aggravated assault conviction but decided to limit cross-examination to only the aggravated assault conviction, excluding two weapon possession convictions.

This decision was based on concerns about propensity reasoning and the potential for imbalance, given the nature of the current charges and the lack of a criminal record for the Crown's main witness.

D.D., a young person, pleaded guilty to robbery and disguise with intent.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the brandishing of an imitation firearm and the planned nature of the robbery, alongside significant mitigating factors such as D.D.'s status as a youthful first offender, early guilty plea, genuine remorse, and a history of profound trauma (father's incarceration, brother's homicide, personal robberies, PTSD diagnosis).

The Crown sought a custodial sentence.

Applying the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) principles of diminished moral blameworthiness and the least restrictive sentence, the court determined that while a gateway to custody existed due to the violent nature of the offence, the aggravating circumstances were not so exceptional as to mandate actual custody.

Instead, the court imposed a four-month deferred custody and supervision order followed by 12 months of probation, emphasizing D.D.'s rehabilitative progress and the need to address underlying issues through continued counselling.

This ruling addresses the scope of preliminary inquiries following the amendments introduced by Bill C-75 to the Criminal Code.

The defendants, jointly charged with numerous counts, including offences punishable by 14 years' imprisonment or more and those punishable by less, sought a preliminary inquiry for all charges.

The Crown argued that preliminary inquiry jurisdiction is now limited to offences carrying a maximum penalty of 14 years or more.

The court, aligning with previous decisions in R. v. Davis and R. v. M.R., held that preliminary inquiries are restricted to charges attracting a potential sentence of 14 years' imprisonment or more, even when grouped with less serious charges arising from the same transaction.

The court clarified that while questions about less serious charges might be permitted if closely linked to the serious ones, the court lacks jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary inquiry or order a discharge for offences punishable by less than 14 years.