Lisa Mariko Ellins

R.O., a 14-year-old at the time of the offence, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder of 14-year-old Devan Selvey.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the senseless nature of the crime and R.O.'s flight, and mitigating factors, such as his guilty plea and significant personal challenges.

Applying the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) principles, particularly diminished moral culpability and rehabilitation, the court accepted a joint submission for the maximum youth sentence: a seven-year Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision (IRCS) order, comprising four years in custody (with 24 months credit for pre-sentence custody) and three years under conditional supervision, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and no-contact order.

The Crown brought an application for an order permitting court security officers to place soft, silent shackles on the young person during his trial for second-degree murder.

The young person opposed the use of shackles, arguing that enhanced procedural protections under the Youth Criminal Justice Act required the least restrictive measures.

The court granted the application, finding that silent shackles balanced the need for courtroom security and the prevention of escape with the young person's dignity and the presumption of innocence, as the shackles would not be visible to the jury.

The young person, charged with second-degree murder, brought a pre-trial application for directions regarding jury selection procedures.

The case had attracted significant pretrial publicity.

The court established a comprehensive jury selection protocol, including liberal pre-screening, specific anti-bias instructions, and a focused challenge for cause process to address potential partiality from media exposure.

The trial judge determined she would ask the challenge questions and adjudicate the challenges individually with other prospective jurors excluded.

The Crown applied to remove defence counsel for a young person charged with second degree murder, alleging a conflict of interest because counsel also represented a Crown witness on unrelated charges.

The witness had given a confusing police statement suggesting the accused might be involved, but later testified at the preliminary hearing that he had no direct communication with the accused.

Both the accused and the witness provided informed waivers consenting to the representation.

The court dismissed the application, finding no realistic risk of adversity in interest and noting that independent counsel could cross-examine the witness if necessary.

The young person, charged with second-degree murder, applied for bail.

The Crown sought detention on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found a substantial likelihood that the young person would commit a serious offence if released, given his prior criminal record and history of violence while in custody.

The court rejected the proposed plan of release, finding the proposed sureties unsuitable and incapable of providing adequate supervision.

Bail was denied and the young person was ordered detained in custody pending trial.

A ruling on the admissibility of a statement made by a young person (YF) charged with first degree murder.

The Crown sought to admit an inculpatory statement made during police interrogation.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether the preconditions for admissibility under section 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act were satisfied.

The court found that the Crown failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the enhanced procedural protections required by the YCJA were complied with, and ruled the statement inadmissible.

The applicant, a mortgage broker charged with multiple counts of sexual assault and fraud, brought a pre-trial motion seeking the production of third-party financial and police records relating to the complainants and other witnesses.

The court applied the framework under sections 278.1 to 278.9 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while some financial records were likely relevant to the fraud allegations and the narrative of the transactions, the applicant failed to establish the likely relevance of personal banking records and police occurrence reports.

The court ordered the production of specific records that met the threshold and denied the remainder.

In this joint trial, the Crown charged two defendants with assault causing bodily harm to a third party.

The victim was assaulted in the foyer of her residence in the early morning hours of August 2, 2017.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility and determine guilt separately for each accused.

The evidence established that one defendant delivered the blows causing bodily harm (two broken front teeth and a laceration), while the other defendant engaged in a single punch exchange with the victim that caused no significant injury.

The court found that the defendant who delivered the serious blows was guilty as a principal to assault causing bodily harm and also guilty of breaching four probation orders.

The other defendant was found guilty of simple assault only, as the Crown failed to prove she was a party to the more serious assault.

The accused was charged with impaired driving after being observed operating a motor vehicle errationally on July 8, 2015.

She provided breath samples showing blood alcohol concentrations of 267 and 288 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The defence raised the issue of automatism arising from parasomnia (sleepwalking), arguing that the accused's actions were involuntary.

The court found that the accused had a documented history of parasomnia episodes triggered by stress and anxiety, had been fatigued from a long drive, had not used her sleep apnea device, and had ingested sleep medication.

Expert evidence and observations by the arresting officer supported the conclusion that the accused was in a dissociative state.

The court found the automatism to be a disease of the mind and rendered a verdict of Not Criminally Responsible.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving while operating an e-bike.

He argued that the trial judge erred in law by concluding that the undisputed facts—including erratic driving, swaying, red eyes, and an odour of alcohol—amounted to impairment.

He also argued the trial judge misapplied the circumstantial evidence test and improperly discounted the lack of impairment indicia at the police station.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the legal test for impairment and reasonably concluded that the totality of the evidence proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.