Charldera Sheriniqua Murphy

The defendants brought an ex parte request under Rule 2.1.01(1) to dismiss the plaintiff's action, arguing it was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process because it was statute-barred.

The plaintiff failed to respond to two notices from the Registrar regarding the court's consideration of dismissal.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim, issued April 26, 2024, arose on March 15, 2020, when the defendants defaulted on lease payments.

As such, the claim was commenced beyond the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002, and was therefore dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The defendants requested the court to dismiss the action brought by the plaintiff under Rule 2.1.01(1), arguing it was frivolous, vexatious, statute-barred, and improperly commenced in the Superior Court.

The court, acting on this ex parte request, issued a notice to the plaintiff.

As the plaintiff failed to file submissions, the court directed a fresh notice be issued and stayed the action pursuant to s.106 of the Courts of Justice Act, pending the outcome of the Rule 2.1 hearing.

The applicants, Joel Gomes and Stacey Downey, sought a stay of charges for multiple masked robberies due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from information sworn to anticipated trial end was 23 months and 16 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the significant delay was attributable to the Crown's failure to provide essential disclosure, including police notes of alleged confessions and timely DNA analysis results, which were crucial for the defence to make an informed election of trial mode.

The Crown's arguments of defence delay and case complexity were rejected, as the Crown failed to act diligently or proactively to minimize the delay.

The application was granted, and the charges against both accused were stayed.

This ruling addresses the scope of preliminary inquiries following the amendments introduced by Bill C-75 to the Criminal Code.

The defendants, jointly charged with numerous counts, including offences punishable by 14 years' imprisonment or more and those punishable by less, sought a preliminary inquiry for all charges.

The Crown argued that preliminary inquiry jurisdiction is now limited to offences carrying a maximum penalty of 14 years or more.

The court, aligning with previous decisions in R. v. Davis and R. v. M.R., held that preliminary inquiries are restricted to charges attracting a potential sentence of 14 years' imprisonment or more, even when grouped with less serious charges arising from the same transaction.

The court clarified that while questions about less serious charges might be permitted if closely linked to the serious ones, the court lacks jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary inquiry or order a discharge for offences punishable by less than 14 years.

The accused brought several pre-trial motions in a sexual assault and sexual interference case.

The motions challenged the admissibility of the accused's statement to police under Section 10(a) and (b) of the Charter and on voluntariness grounds, sought directions regarding a Section 278.93 application concerning a video, and requested editing of the complainant's Section 715.1 statement.

The court dismissed the Charter and voluntariness applications, finding the accused was sufficiently informed of the charges and jeopardy.

For the video, the court declined a definitive pre-trial ruling on admissibility, deeming it contingent on the complainant's testimony, but clarified that the video was part of the subject matter of the charge and thus not subject to Section 276.

Regarding the Section 715.1 statement, the court ordered two passages containing leading and rhetorical questions from the interviewer to be edited out, while allowing another.

Following a family law motion concerning child support, the court determined costs.

The moving party sought retroactive child support and income imputation against the responding party.

The court found mixed factual success but held that the moving party was ultimately substantially successful in securing ongoing child support without reduction for disability benefits paid for the child.

Applying the success principle and noting neither party acted unreasonably and the issues were not complex, the court awarded partial costs to the moving party.