Charldera Sheriniqua Murphy

The defendants brought an ex parte request under Rule 2.1.01(1) to dismiss the plaintiff's action, arguing it was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process because it was statute-barred.

The plaintiff failed to respond to two notices from the Registrar regarding the court's consideration of dismissal.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim, issued April 26, 2024, arose on March 15, 2020, when the defendants defaulted on lease payments.

As such, the claim was commenced beyond the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002, and was therefore dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The defendants requested the court to dismiss the action brought by the plaintiff under Rule 2.1.01(1), arguing it was frivolous, vexatious, statute-barred, and improperly commenced in the Superior Court.

The court, acting on this ex parte request, issued a notice to the plaintiff.

As the plaintiff failed to file submissions, the court directed a fresh notice be issued and stayed the action pursuant to s.106 of the Courts of Justice Act, pending the outcome of the Rule 2.1 hearing.

The applicants, Joel Gomes and Stacey Downey, sought a stay of charges for multiple masked robberies due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from information sworn to anticipated trial end was 23 months and 16 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the significant delay was attributable to the Crown's failure to provide essential disclosure, including police notes of alleged confessions and timely DNA analysis results, which were crucial for the defence to make an informed election of trial mode.

The Crown's arguments of defence delay and case complexity were rejected, as the Crown failed to act diligently or proactively to minimize the delay.

The application was granted, and the charges against both accused were stayed.

This ruling addresses the scope of preliminary inquiries following the amendments introduced by Bill C-75 to the Criminal Code.

The defendants, jointly charged with numerous counts, including offences punishable by 14 years' imprisonment or more and those punishable by less, sought a preliminary inquiry for all charges.

The Crown argued that preliminary inquiry jurisdiction is now limited to offences carrying a maximum penalty of 14 years or more.

The court, aligning with previous decisions in R. v. Davis and R. v. M.R., held that preliminary inquiries are restricted to charges attracting a potential sentence of 14 years' imprisonment or more, even when grouped with less serious charges arising from the same transaction.

The court clarified that while questions about less serious charges might be permitted if closely linked to the serious ones, the court lacks jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary inquiry or order a discharge for offences punishable by less than 14 years.

The Children and Family Services for York Region brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order finding two children in need of protection and placing them in extended society care with no access to the parents.

The parents opposed the motion, seeking the return of the children or, alternatively, access.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, noting the parents' history of unaddressed mental health issues, lack of parenting skills, and failure to work with the Society.

The court granted the summary judgment, finding the children in need of protection and ordering extended society care with no access to the parents, but allowing sibling access.

The accused brought several pre-trial motions in a sexual assault and sexual interference case.

The motions challenged the admissibility of the accused's statement to police under Section 10(a) and (b) of the Charter and on voluntariness grounds, sought directions regarding a Section 278.93 application concerning a video, and requested editing of the complainant's Section 715.1 statement.

The court dismissed the Charter and voluntariness applications, finding the accused was sufficiently informed of the charges and jeopardy.

For the video, the court declined a definitive pre-trial ruling on admissibility, deeming it contingent on the complainant's testimony, but clarified that the video was part of the subject matter of the charge and thus not subject to Section 276.

Regarding the Section 715.1 statement, the court ordered two passages containing leading and rhetorical questions from the interviewer to be edited out, while allowing another.

The applicant was arrested at Pearson Airport after a border services officer suspected him of ingesting cocaine.

A subsequent hospital visit confirmed he had swallowed 52 pellets of cocaine.

The applicant brought a pre-trial Charter application arguing his ss. 8 and 9 rights were violated and seeking exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Crown conceded the officer lacked reasonable grounds for the arrest.

Applying the Grant framework, the court found the officer's conduct was egregious, including misleading testimony and arresting the applicant as punishment for requesting counsel.

The court concluded the serious Charter-infringing conduct and its significant impact on the applicant outweighed society's interest in a trial on the merits, and excluded the evidence.

In a criminal fraud prosecution, the accused brought Charter applications challenging the seizure of documents from a correctional facility and seeking exclusion of evidence and a stay for abuse of process.

The court held that the alleged statement by conduct arising from the accused packing his belongings was not proven voluntary and was inadmissible.

However, the court found no s. 8 breach because the correctional officer acted under delegated institutional authority when moving and taking custody of the inmate's belongings, and the documents would in any event have been admitted under s. 24(2).

The court also dismissed the s. 7 abuse of process application, finding no basis to review prosecutorial discretion despite contradictory testimony from the correctional officer.

In this criminal proceeding, the accused brought Charter applications alleging excessive police force during an undercover drug arrest and an unreasonable search incident to arrest.

The court reviewed the evidence of the accused and multiple police officers concerning the takedown, facial injuries, the seizure of buy money, and the recovery of drugs and a cell phone.

Applying the governing principles on justified force and reasonable search incident to lawful arrest, the court found the force used was legally justified and reasonable in the circumstances and that the search was conducted lawfully.

The court rejected the accused's evidence on a central credibility issue, found no breaches of ss. 7 or 8, and dismissed the applications for exclusion under s. 24(2).

The accused applied for a Rowbotham order seeking state-funded counsel under s. 7 of the Charter after Legal Aid Ontario denied funding.

The court considered whether the accused met the three-part Rowbotham test: ineligibility for Legal Aid after exhausting appeals, indigence preventing retention of counsel, and risk that the absence of counsel would compromise the right to a fair trial.

Although the court accepted that Legal Aid appeals had been exhausted and that the complexity and seriousness of the case could compromise trial fairness without counsel, it found that the accused failed to establish indigence.

The court concluded that the accused had divested himself of assets through questionable non-arm’s-length property transfers and failed to provide corroborating financial documentation.

As a result, the application for state-funded counsel was dismissed.

Following a family law motion concerning child support, the court determined costs.

The moving party sought retroactive child support and income imputation against the responding party.

The court found mixed factual success but held that the moving party was ultimately substantially successful in securing ongoing child support without reduction for disability benefits paid for the child.

Applying the success principle and noting neither party acted unreasonably and the issues were not complex, the court awarded partial costs to the moving party.