M. Dykstra

The applicant, Ahman Ottley, sought to exclude evidence (drugs and a gun) obtained from searches of his car and residences, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under sections 8 (unreasonable search or seizure) and 9 (arbitrary detention).

The court addressed a preliminary issue regarding the disclosure of confidential informant (CI) information, finding that the judicial summary provided was sufficient for the defence to make full answer and defence.

The court then found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds for Mr. Ottley's arrest, based on CI information, police surveillance, and a prior "found in" incident.

Consequently, his section 9 rights were not violated.

The search of his car incident to arrest was deemed lawful and reasonable, as it was connected to the investigation, thus not violating his section 8 rights.

Finally, the searches of his residences, authorized by a warrant, were also found to be reasonable, as the issuing justice had sufficient grounds to believe evidence of drug trafficking would be found at those locations.

As no Charter breaches were found, the application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The accused was charged with theft from Walmart and possession of heroin and methamphetamine.

A loss prevention officer lawfully arrested the accused under s. 494 of the Criminal Code after observing him leave the store with unpaid merchandise.

Police arrived approximately five hours later.

The court found that the loss prevention officer was not acting as a state agent and therefore the Charter did not apply to his conduct.

However, the court found that the arresting police officer breached the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights by: (1) unreasonably delaying informing the accused of his right to counsel by approximately 15-33 minutes; and (2) failing to take adequate steps to ensure the accused understood his rights despite an apparent language barrier.

The court excluded the drug evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the seriousness of the state misconduct and impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in an adjudication on the merits.

The accused was convicted of theft but acquitted of both drug possession charges.

The defendant was charged with possession of fentanyl, a Schedule I drug, contrary to section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging that his detention and arrest were unconstitutional and the search was unreasonable, contrary to sections 9 and 8 of the Charter respectively.

The trial proceeded as a blended voir dire with all evidence taken together on both the trial and Charter application.

The central factual issue was whether the defendant threw down a baggie of fentanyl when exiting his vehicle.

The court found the defendant not guilty, acquitting him due to reasonable doubt regarding whether the officer observed what he claimed to have observed, despite finding the officer's evidence generally credible.

The applicant sought a declaration that a deceased father's statement, implicating himself in drug importation and exculpating his daughter, was admissible at her trial either as a declaration against penal interest or under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court denied the application, finding that the statement did not meet the criteria for a declaration against penal interest due to lack of apprehended penal vulnerability and remoteness of consequences.

Furthermore, it lacked sufficient indicia of reliability for the principled exception, given the circumstances of its making, the declarant's criminal record for dishonesty, and absence of corroborating evidence.

The accused was convicted by a jury of importing between 6.5 and 8.5 kilograms of cocaine into Canada.

The Crown sought a sentence of 7 years' incarceration, while the defence argued for 6.5 years, citing time spent on bail as a mitigating factor.

The court found that the accused's bail conditions were not sufficiently stringent to warrant a reduction in sentence.

Applying the established sentencing range for first-time offenders importing large quantities of cocaine, the court sentenced the accused to 7 years' incarceration, along with a 10-year weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at his residence and conducted a warrantless search of his vehicle, finding cocaine in both locations.

The accused challenged the searches under s. 8 of the Charter.

The court upheld both searches, finding the warrant was supported by sufficient corroborated information from a confidential informant, and the vehicle search was validly incidental to arrest.

However, at trial, the accused raised an alternate suspect defence, pointing to his brother who lived with him and had access to the vehicle and residence.

The court found the brother lacked credibility but concluded the evidence raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused or his brother possessed the cocaine.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant, Carol Andrea Gilmore, was found guilty by a jury of importing 217 grams of cocaine into Canada.

This was her third conviction for drug importation, in addition to other drug-related offenses and breaches of court orders.

The court considered the serious impact of drug importation on society, the principles of sentencing, and relevant case law on sentencing ranges for cocaine importation.

Despite the relatively small quantity of cocaine, the defendant's extensive criminal record, lack of genuine remorse, and history as a repeat drug courier were significant aggravating factors.

The court imposed a sentence of 4 years imprisonment, which, after credit for pre-sentence custody, resulted in 31.5 months in custody, along with a DNA order and a 10-year weapons prohibition order.

The offender pleaded guilty to importing 758 grams of cocaine into Canada after being caught at Pearson International Airport.

The Crown sought a sentence of 2.5 years, while the defence sought 2 years.

The court considered the offender's remorse, guilty plea, and lack of a related criminal record as mitigating factors.

The court sentenced the offender to two years in jail, along with a DNA order and a weapons prohibition.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine after returning from Jamaica.

During a customs inspection, a positive ion scan led to further questioning and a personal search.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit the accused's statements as voluntary, while the defence sought to exclude the statements and drugs due to alleged breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found the statements were voluntary and not the result of oppression.

However, the court held that the accused was detained when the CBSA officer began focused questioning after a second positive ion scan without providing Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court excluded the accused's statements regarding a side trip to Panama made during this period of detention, but admitted subsequent statements made after rights were provided.

Two accused pleaded guilty to importing cathinone (the active ingredient in khat) contrary to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown initially sought imprisonment but later revised its position to seek fines.

Both accused sought absolute discharges.

The court established that absent significant aggravating factors, custodial sentences are rarely appropriate for khat importation given the substance's limited harmfulness.

Both accused received absolute discharges, with mandatory firearm prohibition orders imposed.

The applicant was arrested at Pearson Airport after a border services officer suspected him of ingesting cocaine.

A subsequent hospital visit confirmed he had swallowed 52 pellets of cocaine.

The applicant brought a pre-trial Charter application arguing his ss. 8 and 9 rights were violated and seeking exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Crown conceded the officer lacked reasonable grounds for the arrest.

Applying the Grant framework, the court found the officer's conduct was egregious, including misleading testimony and arresting the applicant as punishment for requesting counsel.

The court concluded the serious Charter-infringing conduct and its significant impact on the applicant outweighed society's interest in a trial on the merits, and excluded the evidence.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter alleging breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

They were charged with cocaine trafficking offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and faced a projected delay of over 50 months from charge to the anticipated completion of trial.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Morin, assessing the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the accused.

Significant portions of the delay were attributed to the Crown’s failure to provide timely disclosure and inadequate case management.

The court concluded that the applicants’ s. 11(b) rights were breached and that a stay of proceedings was the appropriate remedy.

The accused brought an application to exclude statements made to police following arrest for possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused argued that police violated his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel by questioning him after he had requested to speak with a lawyer and before he had a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel.

The court found that although the police were justified in delaying access to a telephone until arrival at the station due to safety and logistical concerns, officers nonetheless elicited information from the accused during the hold‑off period.

Applying the framework in R. v. Grant, the court held the Charter breaches were serious and significantly impacted the accused’s right against self‑incrimination.

The accused’s statements made between arrest and arrival at the police station were excluded under s. 24(2).