Ron Ellis

The accused was convicted by jury of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, administering a stupefying drug to facilitate sexual interference, sexual assault, attempt voyeurism, and possession of stolen medication from two hospitals.

The offences involved two stepdaughters over a four-year period.

The court imposed a total sentence of 7 years 2 months, with ancillary orders including prohibition from contacting victims, section 161 restrictions for 20 years, lifetime SOIRA registration, DNA order, and 10-year firearms prohibition.

This criminal trial concerned a charge of sexual assault against J.M. involving fellatio and vaginal intercourse with the complainant, A.M. The central issue was consent, with conflicting accounts from both parties.

The complainant alleged non-consensual acts, supported by secretly recorded phone calls where she confronted the accused about violating boundaries.

The accused maintained consent, interpreting his responses in the calls as attempts to de-escalate conflict.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of both witnesses, noting inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony regarding the details of the assault and her initial reports to police, particularly concerning the vaginal intercourse and her use of the term "gave" for oral sex.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal.

Michael Smith pleaded guilty to causing damage by fire and possession of incendiary materials.

The Crown sought a six-month jail sentence, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence.

The court, applying the principle of proportionality and considering the offender's moral responsibility, mental health, and substance abuse issues, determined that a conditional sentence was appropriate.

The judge emphasized that a conditional sentence can have significant deterrent and denunciatory effects, and that incarceration is not always rehabilitative.

A 15-month conditional sentence with house arrest and probation was imposed.

A youth pleaded guilty to armed robbery with an imitation firearm and using an imitation firearm while committing an indictable offence, as well as two counts of breaching a recognizance by violating curfew conditions.

The central legal issue was whether custody was available as a sentencing option.

The court determined that while robbery does not include bodily harm as a statutory element, the offence constituted a violent offence under section 39(1)(c) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act because the youth endangered the safety of victims by creating a substantial likelihood of causing psychological bodily harm.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 34 days in open custody followed by 17 days of community supervision and 18 months of probation with strict conditions.

The applicant, Stephen Jurkus, jointly charged with Leslie Lonsbary for failing to provide the necessaries of life, sought severance from Lonsbary for their joint jury trial.

Jurkus argued that a joint trial would be unjust due to differing allegations, roles, and evidence, and that severance would allow for an earlier judge-alone trial.

The Crown opposed, citing judicial economy, avoiding inconsistent verdicts, and the Court of Appeal's prior comments on complexity.

The court dismissed the application, finding that Jurkus failed to establish that severance was in the interests of justice, emphasizing the legal and factual nexus between the charges and the jury's capacity to compartmentalize evidence.

The applicant, Rueben Russell Garcia, sought a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing his criminal matter to trial.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial end was 1,017 days (33 months and 16 days), exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases under R. v. Jordan.

The court attributed 149 days of delay to the defense prior to the preliminary hearing and an additional 3 months for failing to consent to committal earlier, reducing the net delay to 25 months, which is below the presumptive ceiling.

The court also found exceptional circumstances due to the complexity of the joint marijuana extraction operation and the joinder of charges with a co-accused.

As a transitional case under the Jordan framework, the applicant failed to demonstrate sustained efforts to expedite proceedings or that the delay markedly exceeded what was reasonably required.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

John Kavinsky was found guilty of aggravated assault.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the serious and life-threatening injuries inflicted with a knife, the deliberate act of carrying a weapon to a social event, the motive of resisting efforts to prevent drunk driving, and attempts to conceal evidence.

Mitigating factors included his youth, lack of prior criminal record, genuine remorse, and positive prospects for rehabilitation.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence, rejecting a suspended sentence or intermittent custody.

A custodial sentence of 21 months was imposed, with credit for pre-sentence custody, followed by two years of probation, a lifetime weapons prohibition, a DNA order, forfeiture of the knife, and a victim surcharge.

The Crown applied to have Justin Primmer declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of detention.

Primmer sought dismissal or a determinate sentence with long-term supervision.

The court found Primmer met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation under two pathways, based on a pattern of repetitive violent behaviour, failure to restrain behaviour, likelihood of future violence, and persistent aggressive behaviour showing substantial indifference to consequences.

The court rejected arguments for a lesser sentence, including religious conversion, pro-social behaviour in custody, treatability, and the "burnout theory," citing his history of manipulation, lack of genuine remorse, and chronic dishonesty.

An indeterminate sentence was imposed to protect the public.

This corrigendum amends a prior ruling dated February 13, 2017, in a criminal proceeding.

It specifically corrects paragraph 23, which detailed trial scheduling and counsel availability for a s. 11(b) Charter application, and paragraph 71 ix., which addressed the calculation of institutional delay attributable to the preliminary hearing judge's reserved decision.

The applicants, Stephen Jurkus and Leslie Lonsbary, sought a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay in bringing their criminal matter to trial.

Applying the framework from R. v. Jordan, the court calculated the total delay at 1,178 days (39.3 months), exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

After subtracting defence-caused delay, the net delay remained above the ceiling.

The Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness by establishing exceptional circumstances or case complexity.

The court also found the delay unreasonable under the pre-Jordan Morin framework, considering factors such as prolonged disclosure, institutional delays, the Crown's joint prosecution decision, and significant prejudice to the accused.

The applications for a stay of proceedings were granted.

The accused attended a birthday party where the hosts enforced a strict rule against drinking and driving.

When the intoxicated accused attempted to leave in his vehicle, the host confronted him and a physical altercation ensued.

During the struggle, the accused repeatedly stabbed the host with a pocket knife, causing severe injuries.

The accused fled the scene and participated in hiding the weapon and his bloody clothes.

At trial, the accused claimed self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court rejected the defence, finding that while the accused had a reasonable belief that force was being used against him to prevent him from driving, his response of repeatedly stabbing the host was unreasonable and excessive.

The accused was found guilty of aggravated assault.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence, alleging that his right to counsel in private was breached when he spoke to duty counsel from a holding cell at the police detachment.

The accused claimed he could hear voices outside the cell and was concerned his conversation could be overheard.

The court found that the accused was in fact afforded privacy, was the only person in the cell block and booking area, and was monitored only by video with no audio recording.

The court rejected the accused's after-the-fact assertion that he reasonably believed his conversation could be overheard, finding his testimony lacked reliability and he took no steps at the time to indicate concern.

The Charter application was dismissed and the accused was found guilty.

The accused pleaded guilty to fraud contrary to section 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

While employed as a Service Canada Benefits Officer with access to the Service Canada computer system, the accused fraudulently created employment insurance claims for himself and 13 other individuals over a 20-month period, resulting in total losses of $306,221 to the Government of Canada and $7,903.33 to CIBC.

The court imposed a sentence of 30 months in federal penitentiary, along with restitution orders and fines in lieu of forfeiture for the full amount of losses, with default imprisonment terms specified.

The defendants pleaded guilty to multiple serious offences involving child pornography, sexual abuse of a two-year-old child, and related crimes.

The Crown sought 12 years imprisonment, while defence counsel argued for 4-5 years.

The court imposed a total sentence of 7 years, with credit for 14 months of pre-trial custody at time and a half (21 months), resulting in a net sentence of 5 years and 3 months.

The judgment emphasizes the principles of denunciation and deterrence in child sexual abuse cases while maintaining proportionality to the offenders' degree of responsibility.

The accused was charged with two counts of criminal negligence causing death and two counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm arising from a motor vehicle collision at a Costco store parking lot in London, Ontario.

The vehicle, operated in reverse, travelled approximately 59 meters across the parking lot and crashed through the front entrance of the store, resulting in the deaths of two individuals (including a newborn) and injuries to two others.

The accused claimed her foot became caught under the brake pedal while she was unable to apply the brakes.

The court rejected this explanation as physically impossible based on the vehicle's pedal configuration and the accused's shoe dimensions.

The court found the accused guilty of the lesser included offence of dangerous driving rather than criminal negligence, distinguishing the case based on the absence of wanton or reckless disregard required for the more serious charge.

The applicant was charged with luring a person under the age of 16 by means of telecommunication contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant pleaded guilty but sought a stay of proceedings, alleging a breach of his Charter rights under section 7 and claiming entrapment.

The police had posted an advertisement on Kijiji posing as a 14-year-old female and engaged in email communications with the applicant over several months.

The court rejected the entrapment defence, finding that the police conducted a valid bona fide investigation using a legitimate investigative technique at a location where the crime is committed at a high rate, and that there was no inducement that would offend basic community values.

Media organizations sought certiorari to quash a provincial court judge’s order imposing a partial publication ban and denying access to a video exhibit tendered during a guilty plea for obstruction of justice arising from a detention-centre death.

The applicants argued that the provincial court judge lacked jurisdiction and that the order failed the Dagenais/Mentuck test.

The Superior Court held that the judge presiding over the guilty plea had jurisdiction to consider and grant a publication ban related to the proceeding before him.

The court found that the partial ban appropriately balanced open court principles with the fair trial rights of co‑accused facing related charges.

The court concluded that the order was necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk to the proper administration of justice and that no error of law appeared on the face of the record.

The accused applied for a Fisher (Peterman) order seeking increased public funding to retain specific out‑of‑town counsel at rates substantially higher than the Legal Aid tariff.

Both accused already held Legal Aid certificates with travel authorization for counsel.

The court held that the right to counsel of choice does not impose a positive obligation on the state to fund that counsel at enhanced rates.

The applicants had not exhausted available competent counsel in nearby jurisdictions and the circumstances did not meet the extraordinary threshold required for such relief.

The application was dismissed.