Shane Wright

The accused was convicted by jury of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, administering a stupefying drug to facilitate sexual interference, sexual assault, attempt voyeurism, and possession of stolen medication from two hospitals.

The offences involved two stepdaughters over a four-year period.

The court imposed a total sentence of 7 years 2 months, with ancillary orders including prohibition from contacting victims, section 161 restrictions for 20 years, lifetime SOIRA registration, DNA order, and 10-year firearms prohibition.

This decision addresses the application of section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms concerning the right to counsel upon detention.

Dylan Smith was charged with two Highway Traffic Act offences related to a fatal accident.

The key issue was whether Smith was detained when he gave a statement in the back of a police cruiser without being informed of his right to counsel, thus triggering Charter protections.

The court applied the purposive approach to detention from R. v. Grant and R. v. Suberu, considering physical and psychological restraint.

It found that although Smith was not physically restrained or formally arrested, the circumstances—being isolated in the cruiser, cautioned about charges, and the power imbalance—amounted to detention.

Consequently, his right to counsel was engaged and denied, leading to exclusion of the statement under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused, M.T, was charged with sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault involving his step-daughter, H.H. The Crown dismissed the sexual exploitation charge.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant and the accused, applying the principles from R. v. W.(D.) and considering the evidence of children and delayed reporting.

The court found the complainant credible and the accused not credible due to inconsistencies and strategic answers.

M.T was found guilty of sexual interference and sexual assault.

The accused was charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking after police executed search warrants at a residence and on her vehicle, finding significant quantities of fentanyl, cocaine, and cash.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence to prove constructive possession.

The court found that while there was a high suspicion of the accused's involvement in the trafficking operation, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she had knowledge and control of the drugs, as other individuals had access to the residence and vehicle.

The accused was found not guilty.

The applicant, charged with fraud over $5000, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of her right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was 38.4 months.

The court deducted 8.25 months as defence delay due to implicit waiver during protracted resolution discussions, and a further 1.15 months for discrete exceptional circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The remaining delay fell below the 30-month ceiling and was found to be reasonable, as the applicant took no meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings.

The application was dismissed.