Elizabeth Maguire

During a jury trial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to introduce cell tower evidence showing the accused's phone was turned off or disconnected on several dates prior to the shooting, matching the pattern on the day of the murder.

The defence objected, arguing the evidence was speculative.

The court held that the evidence was not admissible to prove the identity of the shooter, as its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value for that purpose.

However, the court ruled the evidence was admissible as circumstantial evidence of planning and deliberation, provided the jury first found the accused was the shooter.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of photographic and video evidence against the accused, Raja Dosanjh, in a first-degree murder trial.

The defence objected to four photographs and one video.

The court applied the probative value versus prejudicial effect test, excluding one photograph (Exhibit 'A') due to its high prejudicial value outweighing its low probative value.

Three other photographs (Exhibit 'B') and one video (Exhibit 'C') were deemed admissible as circumstantial evidence related to identification, height, and mannerisms, with appropriate jury cautions to mitigate prejudice.

In a first-degree murder trial, the defence objected to the admissibility of various Crown documents (hotel records, telephone records, BC police surveillance) and sought a ruling to prevent the Crown from presenting its proposed theory of liability to the jury.

The court applied the probative value versus prejudicial effect balancing test and found most of the disputed evidence admissible, as it collectively supported the Crown's theory connecting the accused to the vehicle used in the killing and to co-conspirators.

However, Air Canada records related to the victim's travel were deemed inadmissible due to speculative relevance.

The defence's broader objection to the Crown's theory of liability was adjourned as premature, and the court affirmed that the jury could compare handwriting samples without expert testimony, provided proper instructions are given.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of various PowerPoint slides the Crown sought to use during a criminal trial.

The defence objected to specific elements, including a label on a DNA evidence slide implying a warrant was necessary, the relevance of an arrest photo taken a year after the alleged offence, and the potential for opinion evidence from an officer using video stills.

The court ruled that the DNA slide must be edited to remove the warrant reference, the arrest photo was admissible given the significance of identification, and the video stills were admissible provided prejudicial labels were removed and witness testimony avoided improper opinion.

The Crown sought to use the phrase "professional killing" in its opening and closing addresses to the jury in a first-degree murder trial, arguing it was an "umbrella term" supported by circumstantial evidence of planning and coordination.

The defence objected, arguing the phrase was prejudicial, irrelevant, and would lead to improper propensity reasoning, especially as the accused had no prior record and was not charged with criminal organization involvement.

The court found the phrase irrelevant and potentially irreparably prejudicial without an evidentiary basis at the opening stage, prohibiting its use in the Crown's opening address but allowing for reconsideration before closing arguments.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a motion seeking standing to challenge the search and seizure of electronic data (GPS tracklogs and a phone contact list) extracted from a rental vehicle's infotainment system.

The Crown argued the accused lacked standing because the vehicle was obtained under false pretenses and the phone belonged to a third party.

The court applied the Marakah framework and found that the accused had a direct interest and an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the electronic data, as it had the potential to reveal intimate biographical details.

The accused was granted standing to argue the Section 8 Charter breach.

The defendants pleaded guilty to multiple serious offences involving child pornography, sexual abuse of a two-year-old child, and related crimes.

The Crown sought 12 years imprisonment, while defence counsel argued for 4-5 years.

The court imposed a total sentence of 7 years, with credit for 14 months of pre-trial custody at time and a half (21 months), resulting in a net sentence of 5 years and 3 months.

The judgment emphasizes the principles of denunciation and deterrence in child sexual abuse cases while maintaining proportionality to the offenders' degree of responsibility.

The accused stood trial on nine counts arising from a head-on collision causing serious injuries to three persons, including impaired driving causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, and driving over 80 causing bodily harm.

The central contested issue was causation, particularly which vehicle crossed the centre line on a rural stretch of Highway 2.

Applying the dangerous driving authorities and the Smithers/Nette causation standard, the court accepted the Crown's lay and reconstruction evidence, found that the accused was speeding, disregarding lane markings, driving on the wrong side of the road, and highly impaired, and held that his conduct was a significant contributing cause of both collisions and the bodily harm suffered.

Findings of guilt were entered on all counts, with formal convictions deferred for further submissions concerning Kienapple.

The accused was charged with multiple offences including sexual assault causing bodily harm, choking during sexual assault, and break and enter arising from violent attacks against two elderly neighbours.

The defence argued that the accused’s actions were the result of non‑insane automatism caused by a neurological event, relying on expert evidence that a temporal lobe seizure likely triggered the behaviour.

The Crown challenged the reliability of that opinion and argued the conduct was voluntary or alternatively that any automatistic state resulted from a disease of the mind.

The court accepted the neurologist’s evidence and found the accused was most likely in an automatistic state caused by a transient medical condition and not a disease of the mind.

As voluntariness was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused was acquitted.