J. Greenspan

During a criminal proceeding, the defendants applied to exclude recordings of intercepted conversations.

The Crown sought to admit sessions 381 and 842.

The court found that portions of session 381 were sufficiently audible and contextualized to be admitted, while prejudicial portions regarding personal drug use were excluded.

The court ruled that session 842 was inadmissible hearsay, as the statements had no evidentiary value unless admitted for the truth of their contents.

In a voir dire during a criminal proceeding, the Crown sought to admit evidence of web-browsing intercepts and MMS messages allegedly captured from the accused's cell phone using novel police interception software.

The court reviewed the requirements for authenticating electronic documents under sections 31.1 to 31.3 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court found that the police witness lacked the necessary expertise and actual knowledge to confirm that the intercepted data accurately reflected what was accessed or displayed on the accused's device.

As the technology was novel and untested by the police, and no expert evidence or corroborating data was provided, the Crown failed to authenticate the electronic documents.

The evidence was ruled inadmissible.

During a jury trial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to introduce cell tower evidence showing the accused's phone was turned off or disconnected on several dates prior to the shooting, matching the pattern on the day of the murder.

The defence objected, arguing the evidence was speculative.

The court held that the evidence was not admissible to prove the identity of the shooter, as its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value for that purpose.

However, the court ruled the evidence was admissible as circumstantial evidence of planning and deliberation, provided the jury first found the accused was the shooter.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a motion seeking standing to challenge the search and seizure of electronic data (GPS tracklogs and a phone contact list) extracted from a rental vehicle's infotainment system.

The Crown argued the accused lacked standing because the vehicle was obtained under false pretenses and the phone belonged to a third party.

The court applied the Marakah framework and found that the accused had a direct interest and an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the electronic data, as it had the potential to reveal intimate biographical details.

The accused was granted standing to argue the Section 8 Charter breach.

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion to exclude Crown evidence due to alleged s. 8 Charter breaches.

In response to an affidavit filed by the investigating officer, the applicant sought disclosure of all recorded communications between the officer and the Crown Attorney regarding a warrant.

The Crown did not object to providing the materials to the judge for review.

The court ordered the Crown to provide the requested information for the judge's review pursuant to R. v. Dixon and R. v. Chu.

The applicants, charged with sexual assault and administering a stupefying drug, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to a 39-month delay between the charges and the trial date.

The court analyzed the delay using the Morin framework, attributing portions to inherent time requirements, defence actions, Crown actions, and institutional delay.

Although the court found actual and inferred prejudice, the unreasonable delay was calculated to be only one month beyond the Morin guidelines.

The court concluded that this short period of unreasonable delay was outweighed by the societal interest in having the serious charges determined on their merits, and dismissed the application.