J. Greenspan

The accused was driving a pickup truck at excessive speeds when he rear-ended a motorcycle, causing grievous bodily harm to the rider.

The accused did not stop, claiming he thought he hit an animal, and took secondary roads home.

The court rejected his explanation, finding his driving was a marked departure from the standard of care and that he was wilfully blind to the collision.

The accused was found guilty of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failing to stop.

The accused, charged with historical sexual assault of his 12-year-old cousin in 1991, brought a lost evidence application seeking a stay of proceedings.

The defence argued that the failure of the police to preserve a tape recording of the complainant's 1991 interview, tissue samples from her abortion, and other records constituted unacceptable negligence and breached his s. 7 Charter rights.

The court dismissed the application, finding no unacceptable negligence because the police had closed the file in 1991 at the urging of the accused's family and had no reason to believe the evidence would be needed.

The court also found no actual prejudice to the accused's fair trial rights, as the missing evidence would not have assisted his defence given the admissions made at the time and the availability of detailed contemporaneous notes.

The defendant applied for a mistrial in his sexual assault trial, arguing that the complainant gave materially different evidence in a subsequent trial involving his brothers.

The defence alleged that the complainant's testimony regarding her 1991 statements to the Children's Aid Society and police was inconsistent.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the essence of the complainant's evidence was the same in both trials.

Any minor differences were insignificant, would not have impacted the court's assessment of her credibility, and did not render the trial unfair.

The defendant brought a motion seeking the trial judge's recusal based on a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The motion arose after the trial judge had completed her reasons for judgment convicting the defendant of historical sexual assault, but before those reasons were released, when the defence sought to bring a lost evidence application.

The defence alleged that six events, including the trial judge's refusal to release her preliminary reasons and her questioning of defence counsel during an adjournment request, demonstrated bias.

The trial judge dismissed the motion, finding that her conduct was consistent with her gatekeeping function and that a reasonable, informed observer would not conclude she was biased or incapable of deciding the remaining applications impartially.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference relating to an incident in 1991 when the complainant was 12 years old and the accused was 21.

The assault resulted in the complainant becoming pregnant and subsequently having an abortion.

The matter was investigated by police and CAS at the time, but no charges were laid.

The complainant came forward again in 2022.

The trial judge applied the W.(D.) framework, rejecting the accused's blanket denials as not credible.

Despite the passage of 33 years, missing police and CAS records, the destruction of hospital tissue samples, and the complainant's conflated memory regarding the location of the abortion, the court found the complainant's core testimony identifying the accused as the perpetrator to be credible and reliable.

The accused was found guilty of sexual interference, with the sexual assault count stayed under the Kienapple principle.

During a criminal proceeding, the defendants applied to exclude recordings of intercepted conversations.

The Crown sought to admit sessions 381 and 842.

The court found that portions of session 381 were sufficiently audible and contextualized to be admitted, while prejudicial portions regarding personal drug use were excluded.

The court ruled that session 842 was inadmissible hearsay, as the statements had no evidentiary value unless admitted for the truth of their contents.

In a voir dire during a criminal proceeding, the Crown sought to admit evidence of web-browsing intercepts and MMS messages allegedly captured from the accused's cell phone using novel police interception software.

The court reviewed the requirements for authenticating electronic documents under sections 31.1 to 31.3 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court found that the police witness lacked the necessary expertise and actual knowledge to confirm that the intercepted data accurately reflected what was accessed or displayed on the accused's device.

As the technology was novel and untested by the police, and no expert evidence or corroborating data was provided, the Crown failed to authenticate the electronic documents.

The evidence was ruled inadmissible.

During a jury trial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to introduce cell tower evidence showing the accused's phone was turned off or disconnected on several dates prior to the shooting, matching the pattern on the day of the murder.

The defence objected, arguing the evidence was speculative.

The court held that the evidence was not admissible to prove the identity of the shooter, as its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value for that purpose.

However, the court ruled the evidence was admissible as circumstantial evidence of planning and deliberation, provided the jury first found the accused was the shooter.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a motion seeking standing to challenge the search and seizure of electronic data (GPS tracklogs and a phone contact list) extracted from a rental vehicle's infotainment system.

The Crown argued the accused lacked standing because the vehicle was obtained under false pretenses and the phone belonged to a third party.

The court applied the Marakah framework and found that the accused had a direct interest and an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the electronic data, as it had the potential to reveal intimate biographical details.

The accused was granted standing to argue the Section 8 Charter breach.

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion to exclude Crown evidence due to alleged s. 8 Charter breaches.

In response to an affidavit filed by the investigating officer, the applicant sought disclosure of all recorded communications between the officer and the Crown Attorney regarding a warrant.

The Crown did not object to providing the materials to the judge for review.

The court ordered the Crown to provide the requested information for the judge's review pursuant to R. v. Dixon and R. v. Chu.

The applicants, charged with sexual assault and administering a stupefying drug, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to a 39-month delay between the charges and the trial date.

The court analyzed the delay using the Morin framework, attributing portions to inherent time requirements, defence actions, Crown actions, and institutional delay.

Although the court found actual and inferred prejudice, the unreasonable delay was calculated to be only one month beyond the Morin guidelines.

The court concluded that this short period of unreasonable delay was outweighed by the societal interest in having the serious charges determined on their merits, and dismissed the application.