J. Lynch

During a criminal proceeding, the defendants applied to exclude recordings of intercepted conversations.

The Crown sought to admit sessions 381 and 842.

The court found that portions of session 381 were sufficiently audible and contextualized to be admitted, while prejudicial portions regarding personal drug use were excluded.

The court ruled that session 842 was inadmissible hearsay, as the statements had no evidentiary value unless admitted for the truth of their contents.

In a voir dire during a criminal proceeding, the Crown sought to admit evidence of web-browsing intercepts and MMS messages allegedly captured from the accused's cell phone using novel police interception software.

The court reviewed the requirements for authenticating electronic documents under sections 31.1 to 31.3 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court found that the police witness lacked the necessary expertise and actual knowledge to confirm that the intercepted data accurately reflected what was accessed or displayed on the accused's device.

As the technology was novel and untested by the police, and no expert evidence or corroborating data was provided, the Crown failed to authenticate the electronic documents.

The evidence was ruled inadmissible.

The accused was charged with numerous drug and firearms offences after police executed a search warrant at his apartment and found large quantities of cocaine, fentanyl, crystal methamphetamine, MDMA, 57 handguns, long guns, and ammunition.

The accused admitted to possessing a small amount of cocaine but denied knowledge of the rest, claiming he rented the room where the contraband was found to an acquaintance.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as unbelievable and found that the circumstantial evidence, including the immense value of the drugs, established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had knowledge and constructive possession of all the items.

The accused was found guilty on all 73 counts.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission finding them liable for insider trading and tipping contrary to s. 76 of the Securities Act.

The Commission found that a corporate lawyer tipped an investment advisor about three corporate transactions, who then tipped others in a chain.

The Divisional Court upheld the findings against the lawyer and three of the investment advisors, finding the Commission's inferences from circumstantial evidence were reasonable.

However, the court allowed the appeal of one investment advisor at the end of the chain, finding the Commission made factual errors in concluding he ought reasonably to have known the information came from an insider.

The sanctions against the unsuccessful appellants were upheld.